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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
USE IT OR LOSE IT: CANADIAN IDENTITY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
ARCTIC SECURITY POLICY 
by 
Michael P. McCormack 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
This dissertation investigates the specific factors that drive state action in Canadian 
Arctic security policy, particularly in relation to securitization of the Arctic region and 
historical factors that influence decision-making. The purpose of this research is to 
develop stronger linkages between securitization processes and actual policymaking. 
When studying the Arctic as a defined geographical space, we see considerable 
differences between Arctic states when it comes to how cultural and historical attachment 
to the Arctic region may serve as a selling point for the ability of national governments to 
justify allocation of defense resources to their respective publics. Using the Canadian 
case, this research illustrates the strength of identity factors when compared to day-to-day 
bureaucratic politics and the influence of public opinion. This dissertation does not 
follow the ideas of one particular theoretical paradigm, but instead utilizes eclecticism to 
better illustrate the depth of the various factors that may contribute to policymaking. 
Additionally, the effects of policymaking and securitization processes are measured 
through public opinion. The ultimate findings of this research support a hypothesis of 
linear identity factors as a major influence on Canadian Arctic security policy, but also 
suggest that research on securitization theory needs to better connect rhetorical 
 v 
 
securitization processes to actual policymaking. Through this, the research not only 
provides value in using this case as a test for the strengths and limits of securitization 
theory, but also emboldens understandings of security policy as being driven by a 
combination of domestic policy, foreign policy, endemic historical factors, and 
government strategic communication practices. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In August 2007, a group of Russian scientists studying the extent of the Lomonosov 
Ridge used a submersible to plant a Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole. 
While the event proved to be little more than a publicity stunt, Western media outlets 
were quick to see this as a harbinger of a new “resource race” in the Arctic,1 particularly 
in the context of the general relationship between Russia and the West at the time.2 In the 
end, this relatively minor incident created greater public attention to the Arctic as a 
source of “threat” that required action on the part of Arctic states. This is not to say, 
however, that the impact of climate change in the Arctic was not previously understood 
and planned for by various governments prior to this incident. Instead, the Russian 
“claim” on the North Pole opened up more questions regarding the geopolitical 
significance of the region and the various issues that Arctic states ought to address in 
developing a strategy for responding to Arctic climate change. Scholars and practitioners 
                                                             
1 This tone was seen in news pieces by major media outlets in covering the Lomsonov Ridge expedition, 
both during the expedition itself as well as after the “flag-planting.” Examples of this can be found in Jung 
Hwa Song, “Cold War at North Pole?” ABC News, July 31, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=3432208; Jamie Doward, Robin McKie, and Tom Parfitt, 
“Russia leads race for North Pole oil,” The Guardian, July 28, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/29/russia.oil; and Doug Struck, “Russia’s Deep-Sea Flag-
Planting at North Pole Strikes a Chill in Canada,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2007, accessed April 19, 
2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/06/AR2007080601369.html. 
Seemingly even-handed descriptions of the event nonetheless contained a suspicious tone of Russian 
intentions. As seen in CNN, “Russia plants flag on Arctic floor,” August 4, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/02/arctic.sub.reut/index.html?eref=yahoo, expedition leader 
Arthur Chilingarov is described as “pro-Kremlin” while also discussing Russian media descriptions of the 
event as potentially “[raising] tension with the United States in a battle for Arctic gas.”   
2 Earlier in the year, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech critical of American foreign policy at 
the Munich Security Conference that would later be seen as a turning point in souring the Russian-
American relationship. See Rob Watson, “Putin’s speech: Back to cold war?” BBC News, February 10, 
2007, accessed April 19, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm. Just days after the North 
Pole flag-planting event, Russia resumed a Cold War practice of undertaking long-range bomber patrols 
which included flights over the Arctic.  
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have provided answers to many of these questions as of late, although full understanding 
of the political, economic, and social issues facing the region are still under development.  
As conceptions of security began to evolve beyond hard materialist concerns 
following the end of the Cold War, scholarship tying the natural environment to ideas 
about security also began emerging. This, in turn, increased attention to the study of 
specific cases in which the effects of climate change could be tied to measurable impacts 
on human populations. This has precipitated academic work on developing theoretical 
conceptions of the Arctic space and its relationship to real-world security issues. While 
the challenges faced by Arctic states have received greater attention on the parts of 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and think-tanks, academic communities 
devoted to Arctic issues have also begun forming. As such, academic work that addresses 
potential security problems in the Arctic in a comprehensive manner has been attempted, 
although there are still some areas in which even comprehensive approaches to Arctic 
issues are lacking. This is particularly evident when it comes to understanding the more 
discursive elements of the issue, such as the ability of governments to draw attention to 
and prioritize Arctic security issues within their respective bureaucracies and justify 
expenditure of resources on Arctic issues to their national populations. Additionally, 
academic work on Arctic security issues has, ironically, straddled the line between “non-
traditional” conceptions of security that brought the natural environment into the 
discussion in the first place and more “traditional” conceptions that focus on power-
balancing in the region. The manner in which scholarship about the Arctic is taking shape 
in many ways mirrors ongoing discussions about how best to frame our understanding of 
security and what constitutes “threats.” 
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The particular areas of this issue that this work takes interest in concern the 
specific factors that drive state action when it comes to Arctic security matters. In 
studying the Arctic as a defined geographical space, we see considerable differences 
between Arctic states when it comes to how cultural and historical attachment to the 
Arctic region may serve as a “selling point” for the ability of national governments to 
justify allocation of defense resources to their respective publics. As such, more 
investigation of how national governments promote the allocation of resources to Arctic 
security issues both within their respective Arctic regions as well as on a national level 
may yield interesting conclusions in explaining government behavior on this issue. 
Rather than addressing the Arctic space in its totality, my approach will focus on the 
Canadian case. Although several interesting issues could still be discovered by looking 
across the Arctic space in general, there are also notable reasons for why I am choosing 
this case in particular. Firstly, a narrower focus helps to mitigate the possibility of falling 
into the trap of “re-packaging” existing work on the subject matter, even if work on 
security issues in the Arctic remains relatively limited in general. Secondly, this case 
creates an interesting methodological framework from which we can perhaps draw larger 
conclusions about the factors driving state behavior in national security decision-making.  
 In this dissertation I will approach this subject through three main research 
questions. Firstly, how much does Canada identify with the Arctic space on an overall 
cultural level? Secondly, how does Canada conceive the region in the context of its own 
strategic outlook, and what steps is it taking to address political, economic, and 
environmental changes in the Arctic? Thirdly, how does overall national identification 
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with the region serve as a driving factor to prioritize Arctic security issues versus simply 
acting to protect sovereign territory and natural resources?  
The Arctic in Brief 
Seen as a region of strategic importance during the Cold War period, the Arctic 
Ocean has received increased attention in policy circles in recent years due to recognition 
of the potential economic impacts of the region’s warming climate. This has raised 
notable areas of concern for states with direct stakes in the region: First, a general 
decrease in Arctic ice extent is expected to lead to an increase in available shipping 
routes in the coming decades; second, the Arctic seabed is believed to contain an 
abundance of key natural resources, which has raised concerns about the potential for 
competition and/or conflict in the region. Although states and energy corporations have 
paid increased attention to the potential of the Arctic region as a source of oil and gas 
wealth, the true extent of this potential still remains under study. An oft-cited 2008 study 
by the United States Geological Survey estimated that the region holds approximately 
13% of the global share of undiscovered oil, 30% of the global share of undiscovered 
natural gas, and 20% of the global share of undiscovered natural gas liquids.3 
How do we define the Arctic region? The simplest answer would be to point to 
the territory lying above the Arctic Circle, which sits at roughly 66º 33’N latitude. Some 
climatologists, however, favor a definition that better envelops the distinct climatological 
                                                             
3 United States Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic,” 23, 2008, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home#.VTQzrcmtzxQ. 
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factors that constitute the Arctic region.4 The differences in opinion about this particular 
definition are of little use to this analysis, however. Instead, the main focus of this work 
actually rests on the idea that the conception of what the Arctic “is” and “is not” can vary 
considerably among the different Arctic states. It is, therefore, more important to 
understand who the relevant actors in the region are and how they are responding to the 
prospect of Arctic climate change. The variance of actors giving serious attention to the 
Arctic as an area of strategic importance range from the eight states with territorial claims 
in the region (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the 
United States) to non-Arctic states interested in potential resources in the region (China) 
to intergovernmental organizations (particularly the European Union and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization). Because of this, a true idea of the region’s importance is 
still very much a matter of debate. 
Of the eight states with territorial claims in the Arctic, we can further distinguish 
a group that is often referred to as the “Arctic Five”: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, 
and the United States. What differentiates these five states from the other three is their 
holding of both maritime territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Arctic 
Ocean.5 Because of mutual interests in addressing climate change in the region, the 
Arctic states have increasingly worked through institutions such as the Arctic Council to 
develop multilateral, concrete agreements regarding responsible governance of the Arctic 
                                                             
4 An illustration of these two definitions can be found courtesy of the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data 
Center at: https://nsidc.org/sites/nsidc.org/files/images//arctic_map.gif (accessed April 21, 2015).  
5 Although Iceland technically has a small piece of maritime territory north of the Arctic Circle as well, it is 
excluded from this group due to its distance from areas of greater concern found at higher latitudes.  
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space. The most impactful agreement governing use of the Arctic Ocean was agreed to by 
the Arctic Five in 2008. Known as the Ilulissat Declaration, the document expressly 
dismissed the possibility of developing a standing legal regime regulating the use of the 
Arctic Ocean.6 The impact of this document was important for two reasons. First, it set a 
tone of cooperation in addressing territorial disputes and in preventing competition over 
territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean. Second, it recognized the supremacy of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the supreme legal regime in 
dealing with maritime legal issues in the region. This implicitly recognized the Arctic 
Ocean as a space generally open to the international community, a precedent that was a 
departure from the division of Antarctica under the stewardship of a handful of states in 
1959.7 
Beyond the resource potential in the Arctic region, the general trend of melting 
ice has also led to the likelihood of the increased viability of shipping through the Arctic 
Ocean. The opening of such routes would theoretically reduce travel time and costs on 
routes from Europe to East Asia and western North America. As such, Arctic states have 
begun formulating plans for increased infrastructure development, disaster management, 
and facing challenging search-and-rescue operations in order to prepare for an expected 
                                                             
6 Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” May 28, 2008, accessed April 22, 
2015, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.  
7 Antarctica is often cited when discussing legal framework development in the Arctic Ocean, not least of 
which due to the fact that some commentators have called for a similar regime to the Antarctic Treaty to be 
established in the Arctic. Nonetheless, some notable differences—particularly in the fact that Antarctica is 
a landmass—make the reversal of the Ilulissat precedent unlikely in the near future. Further discussion on 
this comparison can be found in Oran Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the 
circumpolar north,” The Polar Record, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2009), p. 73-82, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
“The Arctic in the Context of International Law,” in, New Chances and New Responsibilities in the Arctic 
Region, Georg Witschel, Ingo Winkelmann, Kathrin Tiroch, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Eds. (Berlin: BWV, 
2010), p. 37-48. 
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increase in maritime traffic. Although such issues have allowed Arctic states to focus on 
practical matters resulting from climate change in the Arctic Ocean, there are also 
broader contentions about the status of the shipping lanes that may see increased traffic in 
the coming years. The two main routes of note are the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along 
Russia’s Arctic coast and the Northwest Passage route that traverses Canada’s northern 
fringes (see fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route8 
                                                             
8 Hugo Ahlenius, “Arctic sea routes-Northern sea route and Northwest passage.” UNEP/GRID-Arendal 
Maps and Graphics Library, 2006, accessed April 23, 2015, http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-
sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-northwest-passage_f951. 
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While the NSR falls within Russia’s sovereign territory and EEZ—and thus is not a 
matter of dispute—there are disagreements between Canada and other Arctic states about 
the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada has had recent disputes with Denmark 
and the United States in areas where small islands or resources stand in between 
territorial waters recognized under international law.9 Canada has furthermore argued to 
the United Nations that its continental shelf extends underneath these areas, which would 
give it sovereignty over the Northwest Passage under the UNCLOS.10 Conversely, the 
United States has argued that the Northwest Passage constitutes an international 
waterway that must remain open to all foreign-flagged ships. These disputes have 
remained relatively benign, however, given the shared commercial and security interests 
between the involved states.11 Having stated the reasons why the Arctic has gained 
greater international attention in recent years, outlining the reasons why the Arctic has 
been seen as a matter of international security can now be better understood. 
Security issues in the Arctic: Problem or opportunity? 
In the past decade, security and defense organizations within Arctic states have 
paid increased attention to the Arctic as a potential area of future operations. Despite the 
role that the Arctic played during the Cold War in military planning,12 current political, 
                                                             
9 Natalia Loukacheva, “Nunavut and Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,” Journal of Canadian Studies 43, 
(Spring 2009), p. 87.  
10 Ibid. 
11 This is outlined in detail in Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, “Who Controls the Northwest 
Passage?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 2009), p. 1133-1210. 
12 The impact of the Arctic space on military strategy was seen both in great power tensions (e.g. 
adversarial submarine operations by both the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Arctic Ocean) as well as in how 
land forces were trained to potentially operate in Arctic conditions (this latter aspect was indeed a mainstay 
of defense planning in Scandinavian countries during the Cold War). 
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economic, and climatological conditions—not to mention technological advancements in 
the last two decades—have nonetheless required security agencies to re-think their 
approach to operating in the region. This has raised two questions that often guide 
debates about the Arctic security issues: first, is an increased focus on military operations 
in the Arctic creating conditions for future conflict, and second, what are the motivations 
and priorities that guide Arctic states in creating plans for operating in the Arctic?  
 The first question is especially important to consider in the context of which 
countries constitute the Arctic sphere. Of the eight Arctic states, five are members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while two—Finland and Sweden—were 
officially neutral during the Cold War while also generally acting as members of the 
Western European sphere. Ultimately, this means that seven of the Arctic states were 
strategic adversaries during the Cold War to the eighth state, Russia. As discussed earlier, 
such events as the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident made it particularly tempting to 
paint the situation in the Arctic as a growing point of contention between Russia and the 
other Arctic states. Proponents of this argument point to an apparent increase in Arctic 
military exercises as evidence that military tensions are on the rise in the region.13 These 
exercises have taken place across the Arctic space and have been undertaken both 
individually and in concert with other states. Russian exercises are often highlighted in 
                                                             
13 This argument is perpetuated more by media and policy research organizations than in traditional 
scholarship, as seen in J. Michael Cole, “Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead,” 
The Diplomat, December 6, 2013, accessed April 25, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarization-
of-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-lead/. Nonetheless, some traditional scholarship has also purported 
this viewpoint, particularly in the context of national sovereignty. See Robert Huebert, “Renaissance in 
Canadian Arctic Security,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2005-06), p. 17-29. 
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Western media as a bombastic sign of Russian intentions to militarize the Arctic space.14 
Reporting on Canadian exercises will often note that the operations are undertaken in 
order to “assert sovereignty” over the country’s Arctic regions.15 Multinational exercises 
such as Cold Response, which has been conducted in Norway on several occasions since 
2006, are, unsurprisingly, billed in more muted terms.16 Denmark’s establishment of a 
major Arctic-focused military command in 201217 and Russia’s establishment of its own 
in 201418 only added to the perception that Arctic states are on a course to conflict. 
A deeper investigation of the situation, however, casts doubt on the strength of 
this narrative. Despite the attention to Arctic military exercises vis-à-vis the generally 
poor strategic relationship between Russia and other Arctic states, activities within 
intergovernmental organizations such as the Arctic Council have proven to be generally 
positive and productive.19 Moreover, the tremendous challenges posed by operating in the 
Arctic have made the idea of military conflict in the region almost unthinkable in the near 
                                                             
14 Isabelle Mandraud, “Russia prepares for ice-cold war with show of military force in the Arctic,” The 
Guardian, October 21, 2014, accessed April 28, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/russia-arctic-military-oil-gas-putin. 
15 David Pugliese, “Arctic exercise kicks off today involving Canadian Army, RCN, RCAF, Canadian 
Rangers,” Ottawa Citizen, April 1, 2015, accessed April 28, 2015, 
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/arctic-exercise-kicks-off-today-involving-canadian-
army-rcn-rcaf-canadian-rangers.  
16 Norwegian Armed Forces, “Cold Response: About,” last updated March 7, 2014, accessed April 28, 
2015, http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Pages/about.aspx.  
17 Defence Command Denmark, “Arctic Command,” last updated February 13, 2015, accessed April 28, 
2015, http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand.aspx.  
18 TASS, “Russia’s Defense Ministry establishes Arctic Strategic Command,” December 1, 2014, accessed 
April 28, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/764428.  
19 This argument is outlined in Ekaterina Piskunova, “Russia in the Arctic: What’s lurking behind the 
flag?” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 851-864, and Michael Byers, “Cold Peace: 
Arctic cooperation and Canadian foreign policy,” International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 
899-812. 
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future. This is already an issue that has been acknowledged by governments in budgetary 
terms20 as well as by military officers who have participated in recent Arctic exercises.21 
Former Canadian Chief of Staff Gen. Walter Natynczyk perhaps summarized it best: "If 
someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.”22 
Why, then, is there still a reason to focus on the Arctic as a security problem? 
Understanding the threat 
Though the analysis laid out here thus far has questioned the idea of a brewing 
conventional conflict in the Arctic region, this does not mean that the Arctic is free of 
threats or security issues worth addressing. Rather, we must think of the Arctic space not 
only on a transnational level, but also on a human level. Although estimates of when the 
warming trend in the Arctic will reach a tangible point of significance—such as an ice-
free summer—are still under debate by climatologists, the reality is that we are likely to 
see an increase in human activity in the region in the coming years while also seeing a 
change in the environment that people living in the region must endure. Whereas states 
must deal with issues such as improving search-and-rescue and law enforcement 
functions in the region to meet this expected increase in human activity, they also must 
prepare for the probability of significant environmental degradation and a decrease in 
                                                             
20 David Pugliese, “Polar Challenge: Extreme Conditions Put High Cost on Arctic Operations,” Defense 
News, June 10, 2014, accessed April 28. 2015, 
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140610/DEFREG02/306100030/Polar-Challenge-Extreme-
Conditions-Put-High-Cost-Arctic-Operations.  
21 Nathan Fry, “Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability: The Need for Joint Unity of Effort in 
Implementing the DOD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational Levels,” Military Review, 
November-December 2014, p. 54-62, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art012.pdf.  
22 Remarks made to Halifax International Security Forum, November 21, 2009. 
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food security for native populations due to the negative impacts of climate change on 
animal populations that the natives rely on for subsistence. Ultimately, it may be that 
state security is intrinsically linked with the level of actual human security in the region.  
 One debate in the field of human security is whether international law favors the 
security of individuals or the security of states. As Gerd Oberleitner argues, these two 
concepts are not mutually exclusive.23 This argument previously appeared in the 1994 
Human Development Report, which sees the security of individuals—regardless of 
nationality—as interdependent across borders.24 What this means is that the security of 
the state and the security of smaller groups within the state can necessarily intertwine: 
regardless of how a smaller group feels about its own status within the larger state, it may 
see it necessary to subsume itself within the state’s security apparatus in order to remain 
secure against threats external to the state. As Joseph Parent argued, the ability to use the 
state as a “protection racket” against outside threats can prove to be a significant 
incentive for groups to hold an agreeable position with the state on issues of security.25 
What are the implications for native groups residing in the Arctic space when we 
think of the region’s security in these terms? The first issue is one of state protection. 
Because of the aforementioned implications of maintaining a presence in Arctic affairs, 
states with a stake in the Arctic issue undoubtedly would include protecting citizens in 
their Arctic regions as part of their Arctic policies. Not only do they do this out of the 
                                                             
23 Gerd Oberleitner, “Human security and human rights,” European Training and Research Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy Occasional Paper Series, Issue 8 (June 2002), p. 8.  
24 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, p. 22.  
25 Joseph Parent, “Institutions, identity, and unity: The anomaly of Australian nationalism,” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 2007), p. 8. 
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responsibility to protect their own citizens, but it also gives states a legitimate means to 
remain engaged with the issue. By directly addressing the concept of the individual (or 
relatively small groups within their borders), the state can justify political posturing, 
bolstering of security forces in these regions, and other acts of sovereignty through the 
internationally-sanctioned right to protect one’s citizens. The second issue is how the 
day-to-day lives of individuals will be affected with an increased focus on Arctic 
protection activities. On the one hand, military build-up in the region can serve as a 
means to bolster rural villages that are otherwise devoid of major economic investment.26 
On the other hand, the environmental impacts of increased activity in the Arctic can have 
detrimental effects on these regions in the long-term. Increased activity in the Arctic 
regions—be it commercial or government—would undoubtedly affect the natural 
environment that many Arctic residents rely upon either through over-fishing or 
environmental degradation from industrial activity.27 Though the Arctic is not alone in 
these issues, a variety of meteorological phenomena make the Arctic particularly 
susceptible to environmental degradation. The exponential effects of pollution in these 
regions have also been measured to affect the build-up of certain toxins in residents’ 
bodies.28 These implications create a mixed view as to whether significant state 
investments in Arctic sovereignty activities will be positive or negative in the long-term. 
                                                             
26 Barry Scott Zellen, On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty, (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), p. 59. 
27 David Balton and Kjartan Hoydal, “Policy Options for Arctic Environmental Governance,” Arctic 
Transform, March 5, 2009, accessed April 29, 2015, http://arctic-transform.org/download/FishEX.pdf. 
28 Melissa A. Verhaag, “It is not too late: The need for a comprehensive treaty to protect the Arctic 
environment,” Georgetown Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 2003), p. 559-61. 
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Bridging the gap: The purpose and value of this research 
What are the merits of choosing the Arctic as the subject of analysis in the first place? 
From a pragmatic standpoint, academic research on policies related to climate change is 
emerging as a popular topic within the field of international relations, due both to the 
increasing relevance of the topic in policy circles as well as increased attention to non-
traditional aspects of security. The Arctic also serves as one of the best cases for 
understanding the real-world consequences of climate change and how they relates to 
security studies.  
In order to serve as an original contribution to the field, there must be some 
understanding of how my research differs from other aspects of research on Arctic 
security issues. Although recent scholarship taking a comprehensive approach on Arctic 
security issues has been attempted,29 much of this has focused primarily on real-world 
aspects of the issue while giving only superficial attention to the relationship between 
identity and security. In effect, current scholarship on the region has served as a solid 
foundation for understanding the main issues facing the Arctic states (as I summarized 
above) while leaving room for more theoretical development on understanding the factors 
that drive action in addressing these issues. Additionally, my work will help to build upon 
literature that has connected the role of general discourse about the Arctic to 
prioritization of Arctic security issues specifically.30 Unlike existing literature, however, I 
                                                             
29 Recent examples include James Kraska, Ed., Arctic Security in An Age of Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2013), and Zellen, The Fast Changing Arctic. 
30 An example of this can be seen in Leif Christian Jensen, “Seduced and surrounded by security: A post-
structuralist take on Norwegian High North securitizing discourses,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48, 
No. 1 (March 2013), p. 80-99. 
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will provide a bridge to how discourse may drive action rather than only explain its role 
in raising the issue as a potential priority for governments. 
This work also has applications to the field of international relations in general 
that go beyond the Arctic case or the two countries being studied here. While cultural and 
identity-based explanations of national security decision-making have received 
significant attention since the end of the Cold War,31 this work will also highlight how 
seemingly regional issues within states can be brought to the attention of the national 
populace as a significant matter of national security. Given differing opinions between 
regions within a state on how to prioritize various issues of national importance, greater 
understanding of the dynamics that drive security issue prioritization based upon the 
amalgamation of these preferences on a national level may prove particularly interesting. 
My research will therefore place significant emphasis on balancing how cultural issues on 
both a regional and national level influence larger decision-making. 
Ultimately, one of the main goals of this project will be to develop better 
understandings of agenda-setting in the context of Arctic security. By this I am referring 
to identifying how key players in Canada on this issue—be it political leaders or 
particular aspects of the bureaucracies themselves—have managed to raise the security 
issues facing the Arctic to a higher level of prioritization in national decision-making. 
                                                             
31Some examples include Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996); Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 
2010); and Brent Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (Routledge: New York, 2008). 
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Existing international relations literature does provide some tools to work with along 
these lines, although it also makes the temptation to answer all questions regarding the 
strategic value of the Arctic region stronger. The problem with taking such an approach is 
that it would likely result in vague answers to many questions rather than theoretically 
strong answers to a handful of questions. As discussed above, I have identified three 
questions to be addressed in this research. Additionally, applying major paradigms of 
international relations to this case leads to a complex theoretical intersection that appears 
to speak to all perspectives. I do not approach this topic with the goal of trying to explain 
behavior through the tenets of a single paradigm. Indeed, this analysis will intertwine 
several components of competing paradigms to holistically explain behavior among 
involved actors, particularly when it comes to issues of power and interest (realism) and 
having a national identity that is strongly connected to the region (constructivism). This is 
not to say that the conclusions reached here may not arguably fall more within the bounds 
of one paradigm rather than others; instead, the approach taken here is cognizant of the 
fact that explanatory power on this subject matter may lie more with eclecticism than 
with a single paradigm. Such an approach is influenced by existing work on eclecticism 
in international relations32 as well as in security studies specifically.33  
                                                             
32 A comprehensive overview of the use of pluralistic approaches in international relations can be found in 
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, (Routledge: New York, 
2011), 188-212. Additional work that may prove useful on this subject is Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, 
Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010).  
33 Multiple chapters in Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security apply here. In particular, this includes 
the introductory chapters (Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security” 
and Ronald L. Jepperson et. al., “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security”) as well as chapters on 
differences in domestic strategic culture (Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before 
World War II” and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China”).  
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This work is also influenced by the securitization approach advanced by the 
Copenhagen School. Because of this work’s focus on the role that elite interests play in 
framing the Arctic as a significant security issue that requires the immediate attention of 
the national security bureaucracy, the securitization approach will prove rather useful to 
further understanding how national governments “sell” the idea of an Arctic security 
“problem” to their respective publics. Furthermore, this will open up our discussions of 
Arctic security issues to include more investigation of the range of voices that actually 
precipitate action on Arctic matters in the form of security practices. Although I have 
given brief mention to the human security angle that is most immediately threatened by 
climate change in the Arctic, this work will serve to demonstrate how government 
prioritization of Arctic security issues in the two case countries is actually more of a “top-
down” phenomenon than vice versa. While several factors play into the creation of this 
dynamic, it also must be understood that some of the terms that scholars have used to 
categorize the interactions that influence thinking about security are very much fluid 
concepts: that is, we are still developing understandings of what these concepts actually 
mean and encompass. By incorporating existing literature on securitization and other 
approaches, this work will not simply regurgitate a line of dogmatic thinking about 
security, rather, it will seek to enhance how these terms are employed. 
Understanding securitization and the rise of “environmental security”  
The quintessential work on securitization theory came at a time when the 
expanding definition of the term “security” created much consternation among those who 
favored more “traditional” understandings of security. In contrast to traditionalists who 
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saw the expansion of security as problematic at the end of the Cold War,34 the 
development of the securitization approach by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde was guided 
by the view that security studies needed to evolve beyond explaining security only in 
terms of military force.35 In constructing securitization, the authors moved beyond seeing 
security issues as being the targets of politicization, and instead wanted to describe the 
process that occurs when politicized security issues are elevated to a level of importance 
that supersedes normal political rules. The crucial point here is that for a securitization 
process to occur, there must be an actual speech act (or series of such) that elevates a 
given referential object to a position of existential threat.36 This is an important 
distinction to make as securitization theory speaks to how a problem is elevated to a 
position of threat, but not necessarily to the means that the government will use in order 
to respond to this threat. When understanding how securitization theory applies to this 
analysis, it must be recognized that the key point is to understand how the respective 
governments frame the issue, rather than how successful they are in taking coherent 
action on the issue when having to operationalize their security agenda within the 
national bureaucracy.37 
                                                             
34 See Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, 
No. 2 (June 1991), p. 213, and Robert Jervis, “Security Studies: Ideas, Policy and Politics,” in The 
Evolution of Political Knowledge, Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International 
Politics, Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson, Eds. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, 2004), p. 
106-107. 
35 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner: 
Boulder, 1998), p. 4. 
36 Ibid., 23-26. 
37 Rita Floyd refers to this problem by extending the logic of securitization to understand why a referent 
object is securitized in the first place and who, if anyone, benefits from doing so. See Rita Floyd, Security 
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 The natural environment was also given specific attention in constructing the 
securitization approach.38 What separates the natural environment from other aspects of 
securitization is the relationship between scientific communities and the political actors 
that result to securitizing moves. Because of their ability to analyze complex sets of data 
in a way that most of the political establishment or general population cannot, the 
scientific community is theoretically given significant power in state decisions on 
environmental matters. This has particularly been the case in recent years, according to 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, given a higher standard of proof required by international 
actors. Interestingly, increased demands for this level of proof are actually the key source 
of strength for the scientific community, who are given the task of “reducing uncertainty” 
in the face of increased political attention on environmental matters.39 This theoretical 
explanation, of course, does not always prove true in the realms of normal political 
operations.40 The equilibrium between theory and reality when looking at this in 
securitization terms therefore lies in how political actors (and, indirectly, the scientific 
community) are able to raise the natural environment as a referent object for a 
                                                             
and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 56.  
38 In fact, the natural environment constitutes one of the five “sectors” that are described in Buzan, et al., 
Security, p. 27, as being a means to, “differentiate types of interaction” that may otherwise be missed when 
viewing security solely through a state-based lens. See Buzan, et al., Security, p. 71-94.  
39 Buzan, et al., Security, p. 72-73. 
40 Domestic politics on this front differ between Arctic states for both structural and endemic reasons. The 
parliamentary systems of Canada, Denmark, and Norway allow for greater participation by 
environmentally-focused parties, whereas the presidential system of the United States and the mixed 
political system of Russia are less receptive to participation by environmentally-focused parties. Even so, 
there does not seem to be a clear relationship between the strength of the environmental lobby and the 
extent to which each state securitizes the Arctic.  
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securitizing move both in the case of significant disasters (e.g., the 1986 Chernobyl 
accident) or in longer-term threats to the overall human condition (i.e., the question of 
whether human civilization itself must alter its activities in order to mitigate the threats 
posed by climate change).41 
Additional work on the securitization concept has also expanded the ways in 
which we can apply securitization across levels of analysis that in turn helps to clarify the 
transnational impact of the Arctic issue. Although the development of securitization 
theory opened the door to a number of interesting modes of analysis for understanding 
how political leaders shape discourse on security issue prioritization through the use of 
speech acts, it also became evident that further comprehension of the contexts created by 
these initial definitions was necessary. Constituting climate change as an overarching 
threat brings the securitization process to a higher level of analysis (unlike the original 
conception, which existed as a “middle-range” construct between policymakers and their 
domestic audience42), which can be described as “macrosecuritization.” The 
distinguishing factor here is the ability of the threat to be universalized across a portion of 
the global population rather than just by the citizens of a single state. Although 
macrosecuritization refers to the overarching process of constituting the threat, 
acceptance of the threat across regions is also aided by the existence of trans-regional 
“security constellations” that can build commonalities between otherwise disparate 
                                                             
41 Buzan et al., Security, p. 73-76. 
42 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: Reconsidering scale in 
securitization theory,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 255-56. 
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regions.43 This may prove especially useful given the scope of analysis here: The Arctic 
“threat” is trans-regional but how states respond to the issue is also guided by how their 
own territory or region is impacted. The macrosecuritization and security constellation 
frameworks thus offer a possible route to comprehending the sometimes difficult problem 
of traversing multiple levels of analysis within the securitization concept. 
Beyond the securitization angle, the field of environmental security itself began 
receiving greater attention following the end of the Cold War. Much of this was due to a 
general shift toward greater understandings of “non-traditional” security studies during 
this time, but it was also representative of real-world events that caused scholars to 
wonder how the natural environment fit into the realm of security studies, if at all. 
Influential works that laid the foundation for environmental security during this time, 
such as those by Thomas Homer-Dixon44 and Robert Kaplan,45 were very much 
influenced by armed conflicts within and between lesser-developed countries during the 
1980s and 1990s. In these terms, environmental security was not only framed as the 
means by which climate change and environmental degradation affected the basic needs 
of individuals, but also how such changes—and the expected worsening of these 
conditions—would ultimately lead to scarcity-driven conflicts at the state level.46 Kaplan 
                                                             
43 Ibid. The “security constellations” idea incorporates the “regional security complexes” construct outlined 
in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
44 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” 
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), p.76-116. 
45 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic, February 1994, accessed May 6, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/.  
46 Floyd, Security and the Environment, p. 76-77. 
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would go as far to refer to the natural environment as a “hostile power” that would 
become “the national-security issue of the twenty-first century.”47 Such framing of the 
issue in these terms is interesting for two reasons. First, it was largely—although not 
exclusively—tied to the lesser-developed world. This was understandable given the 
abundance of inter- and intrastate conflicts in poorer states around the end of the Cold 
War, although the threat was also quickly understood to be a “civilizational” problem that 
affected the developed world as well.48 The second, and more pressing issue, however, 
was how the actual “threat” from the natural environment was constructed. Although the 
initial foundations of environmental security departed from traditional security studies in 
describing the threat to individuals—rather than the state—the argument quickly circled 
back to how states needed to respond to this threat, or even how changes in the natural 
environment would increasingly serve as a catalyst for conflict between states. 
Differentiating human security from environmental security may indeed speak to this 
dynamic: whereas human security conceptions focused on the individual as the referent 
object, environmental security began to be a matter of threat to the state.49 This 
distinction is important as it helps to recognize the importance of political actors pointing 
to threats emanating from the natural environment in the first place. 
 
                                                             
47 Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.” 
48 Homer-Dixon’s influence on U.S. environmental policy during the 1990s was substantial, with senior 
Clinton administration officials being quick to frame the issue as something that affected the U.S. on an 
existential level. See Floyd, Security and the Environment, p. 78-79. 
49 Elizabeth L. Chalecki, Environmental Security: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2013), p. 
8. 
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Identity-building and the Arctic security community 
When considering the impact of identity and cultural factors on decision-making, 
it is worth discussing exactly how the term “identity” applies to the case at hand. From a 
paradigmatic standpoint, identity as a causal factor is generally associated with the 
constructivist approach. Superficially, some constructivist literature would be relevant to 
this analysis in that it discusses the state feeling the “need” to uphold a given identity 
construct.50 At the same time, better connections between identity, interest, and foreign 
policy development can also be found in neo-classical realist literature in being described 
as a “cartelization” process.51 The diversity of theorizing about the power of identity does 
provide this analysis with many existing concepts on which to build, but it also confirms 
the use of analytical eclecticism as the best frame of reference for this case. Because of 
this, it is also best to determine the specific manner in which identity constructs are 
applicable to this analysis, rather than delving into the complexities of the term “identity” 
at large. 
Incorporating identity concepts here requires understanding the term at two levels 
of analysis. First, there need to be understandings of how identity is developed at the state 
level. Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” concept is relevant here as it 
identifies how concepts of nationhood based upon a given set of political borders are 
continually reinforced through societal identification with a “deep, horizontal 
                                                             
50 See Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2009) and Brent Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (Routledge: New York, 
2008). 
51 See Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Neoclassical realism and identity” in, Neoclassical realism, the state, and 
foreign policy, Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p. 135-36. 
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comradeship” regardless of individual social status.52 The crux of the “imagination” of 
this community, however, is the means by which the development of the community 
takes place through language. The modern state was, in many cases, imagined through 
the development of a given set of vernacular understandings that were mass produced to 
develop ideas about what the national community stood for.53 If we apply the “imagined 
communities” concept to this case, we can develop ideas about how society in each state 
develops understandings of what the nation “is” and “is not.”  
The second level of analysis is found at the transnational level. The first work to 
give attention to the political ramifications of a changing Arctic after the Cold War 
generally focused on the development of discourse, regimes, and institutions that helped 
to bring attention to the issues facing the Arctic.54 The habitual use of the word regimes 
in this literature, I would argue, also created some interesting precedents in how the 
Arctic was analyzed further. Rather than using this word interchangeably with such 
words as “norms,” viewing Arctic politics as a “regime” implied that the Arctic was a 
coherent space that required substantive governing. As such, the Arctic was increasingly 
viewed as a transnational community that was in need of regular, cooperative caretaking 
from the Arctic states. Despite positive ideas about Arctic regimes and governance 
emerging during this period, it was only very recently that more specific attention was 
                                                             
52 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 2006), p. 7. 
53 Ibid., p. 37-46. 
54 Examples of this include E.C.H Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International 
Region (Routledge: New York, 2004); Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, Eds., Polar Politics: Creating 
International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Oran R. Young, 
Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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given to the security aspects of the issue.55 When envisioning how Arctic states approach 
their own Arctic territory, we therefore must be considerate of the fact that this territory is 
also part of a larger, transnational space that has been managed with an evolving set of 
multinational regimes.  
Along these lines, it is also quite possible that Canada is on the verge of forming a 
distinctive Arctic identity that is representative of how the Arctic specifically contributes 
to its national fabric. The impact of this idea is in how states effectively use the Arctic as 
a means to further larger foreign policy goals. In the case of Canada, the Arctic is used as 
a vehicle for emboldening national conceptions of sovereignty. This goal then elevates 
the Arctic to a level of significant importance in how Canada develops its overall security 
and foreign policy priorities. As such, the Arctic could ultimately become a cornerstone 
of the country’s holistic identity. Identifying the potential existence of such a construct in 
the course of this analysis would prove to be an interesting addition to our understanding 
of how national-level factors work intersubjectively with transnational factors in creating 
a conception of the Arctic space. 
 The final framework that is of particular application here is the notion of security 
community. The most significant definition of the term “security community” was 
undertaken by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s as a means to describe a social dynamic 
between groups in which there were mutual understandings of the need to avoid physical 
conflict between each other. Contrary to a realpolitik explanation of the absence of war 
                                                             
55 The absence of security issues in these discussions was actually by design in the case of the Arctic 
Council: the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that founded the body expressly prohibited the discussion of military 
matters as part of the Council’s regular agenda.  
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between groups—or more commonly, states—members of the community were bound to 
avoid violence by some underlying set of core values.56 Adler and Barnett built upon this 
concept by seeing the security community framework as a means to move past the divide 
between political realists and institutionalists.57 What is most interesting about recent 
work on security communities, however, is how it frames the concept of peace within a 
given security community. Although peaceful security communities such as post-World 
War II Western Europe were built around shared norms and institutions, “peace” in this 
context must also be understood as “absence of war.”58 This understanding of security 
community has interesting applications to the Arctic space given the players involved. On 
the one hand, Arctic states have proved to be generally cooperative on Arctic matters and 
have put significant energy into creating institutions that address shared problems across 
the Arctic space. On the other hand, the general geopolitical tensions between Russia and 
other Arctic states does leave open the possibility of a decline in the otherwise positive 
dynamic that exists in Arctic political spheres. As such, the cementing of the Arctic as, at 
the very least, a permanently “non-war” security community would protect the region 
from the generally negative dynamics that underline the relationship between Russia and 
the West. While interstate relations in the Arctic region may not provide cause for worry 
                                                             
56 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Eds. Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 6-7. 
57 Ibid., p. 14. 
58 This conception is discussed in the case of Brazil and Argentina, who had mutual understandings of 
avoiding war while also maintaining a sense of historical rivalry. See Andrew Hurrell, “An emerging 
security community in South America?” in Ibid., p. 228-264. 
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in the short-term, seeing the region as falling within this version of security community in 
the future is certainly something worth considering. 
Connecting theory and practice 
Having outlined the theoretical constructs that influence this research, it is worth 
considering how my research will add further to these discussions. As noted earlier, one 
of the more problematic questions for the Copenhagen School is connecting rhetoric to 
action. That is, what is the purpose of giving thought to how governments or other 
influential actors frame a security issue if they ultimately do not precipitate tangible 
action on said issue? This question is perhaps best answered by understanding the idea of 
security practices, which bridges the movement from discourse to action on a given 
issue. Lene Hansen has offered useful discussion along these lines in explaining how 
policy and identity are constructed as mutually constitutive when it comes to developing 
foreign policy. This does not mean that identity and policy cannot be separated; instead, 
“adjustments” to stabilize the equilibrium between the two occur if the identity or group 
of policies begin to drift away from the norm.59 Unlike policy, however, there is less of a 
conscious process in defining identity. As such, the extent to which identity influences 
policy cannot truly be understood as a direct process, but rather as a factor that combines 
with external constraints (e.g., material capabilities or bureaucratic dynamics) to 
ultimately influence policy decisions.60  
                                                             
59 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 28-31. 
60 Ibid. 
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 A problem that arises with this is how we quantify the role of agency within 
structural processes when it comes to foreign policy development. As noted by Vincent 
Pouliot, rational processes have not always offered adequate answers to how actors solve 
practical problems when forced to act immediately.61 Subsequently, there is also the 
question of where a sense of “practice” comes from in the first place: Is it simply another 
word for norms or do we need to give more thought to whether the process of enabling 
policy is something distinct in itself? Pouliot sees the key as being the degree of “implicit 
learning” that is regularly replicated by those in positions of power. In other words, 
practices are built because they are shown over time to work, which, as Pouliot argues, 
has led to the sustained dominance of realpolitik thinking among practitioners.62 What 
this focus on security practices means for the purposes of this analysis is understanding 
how influential identity factors are to actual policy outcomes in light of the existence of 
other processes. The goal here is, therefore, not to make the argument that other factors—
such as economic pressures or even material security concerns—do not play a noticeable 
role in policy processes. Instead, the argument presented here is expected to explain how 
agenda-setters in the country studied have played upon identity factors in order to raise 
the profile of Arctic security issues. Although significant attention to Arctic security 
issues has only been ongoing for less than a decade, sufficient time has nonetheless 
passed in order to be able to evaluate whether discursive attention to the issue has 
                                                             
61 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010), p. 17.  
62 Ibid., p. 30-31.  
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resulted in tangible results in action (and even to determine what factors have driven this 
action). 
 In addition to the factors discussed above, the methodological value of this 
particular case selection offers interesting opportunities to understand the development of 
identity factors within a given state as they relate to security matters. The selection of this 
case not only gives us the ability to demonstrate how a regional issue has arguably 
become enveloped within national identity but also to dig deeper into the nuances of how 
these identity factors are reified and guided by national policymaking.  
Aside from incorporating previously discussed theoretical literature, analysis of 
relevant literature related to the case country will remain focused on government policy 
documents (particularly their respective national Arctic strategies) as well as relevant 
news reporting of recent events related to the case. In order to build better understanding 
of how identity plays a role in how Canada approaches the issue, there will also be 
incorporation of historical analysis of past policy and attitudes that may give insight to 
present-day behavior. Beyond simply tying the Arctic region to modern conceptions of 
security, there first needs to be a deeper understanding of how Arctic-identity formed in 
the country over time. This understanding goes beyond the security aspect of the Arctic 
and points to how Canada raised the issue of the Arctic as a space needing attention, 
albeit for environmental or social reasons. 
Plan of research  
The next three chapters will serve as the empirical basis for this study. In the 
second chapter, I give a detailed overview of the evolution of Canadian Arctic policy 
since major Arctic expeditions began taking place in the late 19th century. This chapter 
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also shows how Canadian agenda-setters—particularly senior government officials—
have used the Arctic as a means to reinforce Canadian conceptions of national 
sovereignty in modern times. This includes discussion of the region’s critical role in 
Canadian security and defense policy during the Cold War. Overall, this chapter makes 
the argument that the Arctic has been consistently intertwined with Canadian ideas of 
sovereignty to build up the region as being an existential part of national identity. 
The third chapter discusses how Canada’s post-Cold War Arctic security policy is 
representative of and guided by these underlying notions of national identity. Of 
particular interest here is to give further insight to the degree to which recent policy is 
actually a representation of underlying identity factors rather than an agenda being 
shaped only by current agenda-setters or short-term interests. This is a particularly 
interesting notion to address given political disputes about who is actually driving 
Canadian security policy in the Arctic.63  
The fourth chapter analyzes public opinion and media responses to Canadian 
Arctic security policy during the Stephen Harper era. This chapter provides additional 
empirical weight to measuring how the securitization process resonated in Canadian 
society and also shows how the media acted as a significant player in the securitization 
process in itself. Additionally, this chapter helps to highlight how Arctic politics fit into 
Canadian politics generally, and whether this period of time showed new trends in how 
the issue will be prioritized in the future. 
                                                             
63 In other words, this speaks to a consistent complaint of the political opposition to Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper’s government since it took office in 2006: namely that the government has engaged in bellicose 
rhetoric about Arctic sovereignty that is a departure from previous attitudes of Canadian foreign policy. 
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The fifth and concluding chapter evaluates the conclusions reached in the three 
empirical chapters and offers possible connections between this research and further 
scholarship on security discourse and security practices.   
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Chapter 2: Building a Canadian Arctic identity 
 
Identifying early influences in building the Canadian conception of the Arctic 
includes recognition of the social and economic dynamics in Canada in the 19th century. 
As Canada was still colonized under British rule during this time, it meant that attempts 
to traverse northward were guided by European beliefs of limitless economic potential in 
the largely untouched frontiers of the known world. This further introduced two 
important factors that guide our understanding of the exploration of the Canadian Arctic: 
first, the general wonderment of the pristine frontier that presented itself to those willing 
to explore it, and second, the impact on native peoples and the natural environment that 
were affected by British Canada’s increased presence in the region. The combination of 
these two factors created a strong sense of otherness in the early Canadian psyche when it 
came to envisioning the Arctic, a tradition that was ultimately passed down to “southern” 
Canadian society as it achieved sovereign independence. To this day, the understanding 
of the North as a distinct entity is not only recognized in current societal rhetoric and 
government policy, but also shares the sense of awe that captivated the early explorers of 
the region. 
 Although exploration of the Canadian Arctic did not begin in earnest until the 
mid-1800s, European colonization in Canada over the two centuries prior had already 
created a burgeoning trading regime based upon competition for the colony’s vast 
resources. The interests of British and French fur traders led them to continually seek out 
new areas of resources via the territory’s seemingly endless network of rivers and lakes. 
By the 18th century, traders had effectively wiped out certain animal populations along 
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the east coast and St. Lawrence River.64 Because of this, European merchants 
increasingly came into frequent contact with native tribes as they ventured further into 
previously unexplored lands. The relationship with native peoples during this time was 
dichotomous: on the one hand, their knowledge of the geography in regions previously 
unexplored by Europeans proved invaluable as British explorers pushed closer to the 
Arctic in the early 19th century. On the other hand, elements of the Royal Navy were less 
aware of the natives’ expertise, instead utilizing their own methods in exploring the 
region.65 The main goal during this period was to discover the possible existence of the 
long-theorized Northwest Passage route connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As a 
result, the means of exploring the Arctic were driven both by a rivalry of sorts amongst 
the different British interests themselves—particularly between fur traders and the Royal 
Navy—as well as larger British goals of controlling trade in the region in contrast to 
other countries.66  
Under the direction of Sir John Barrow, the second secretary of the Admiralty, 
Britain ambitiously worked to ensure maritime dominance of the Arctic. Although 
                                                             
64 John McCannon, A History of the Arctic, (London: Reaktion, 2012), p. 86-88. 
65 These differences affected the speed by which travelers were able to move through the region: land-based 
routes often involved travelling light and quick, whereas later sea-based routes were slower and larger. This 
was also representative of differing methods utilized by the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Royal Navy, 
as outlined in Hugh N. Wallace, The Navy, the Company, and Richard King, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 
1980), p. 2-3. There were also instances in which the British outright rejected indigenous expertise as being 
too primitive, much to their own detriment. This is seen in the example of declining to use Inuit clothing 
that ultimately held up better in cold weather conditions, as discussed in Ken S. Coates and William R. 
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historians consider Barrow to be the grand architect of Arctic exploration during this 
time,67 the explorer who would gain the most fame for his exploits would be Sir John 
Franklin. While Franklin would participate in the initial 1818 expeditions that set the tone 
for British Arctic exploration in the coming decades, it was not success during that time 
that brought him to the forefront of the public eye.68 On the contrary, Franklin’s 
expedition from 1818-21 proved disastrous, as did a second expedition from 1825-27. 
Franklin’s fame, interestingly enough, was buoyed by these failures: as it turned out, the 
idea of an explorer bumbling his way through a forbidding landscape provided for an 
entertaining narrative back home.69 Such failures would only foreshadow what was to 
come for Franklin as attempts to map the Arctic coastline continued during the 1830s. 
Although much of the Canadian Arctic was explored and mapped during this time, 
expeditions failed to find the final link that would prove the existence of a true Northwest 
Passage. Seeking to remedy this, the Admiralty called upon Franklin to undertake what 
would be his final mission.70 Launched in May 1845 using the ironclad vessels Erebus 
and Terror, Franklin’s expedition was tasked with the mission of finding the missing link 
that had bedeviled European explorers for centuries prior.  
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After failing to hear from Franklin’s expedition by the summer of 1847, British 
officials became concerned about the welfare of the crew. By the end of the year, the 
Admiralty was convinced that Franklin and his crew were in dire straits, and began 
preparations to send a search party the following summer.71 It was not until 1854 that the 
fate of Franklin and his crew was finally discovered: an expedition led by John Rae made 
contact with Inuit villagers who had come across possessions and remains of Franklin’s 
crew, even alleging that the longest surviving crewmembers may have resulted to 
cannibalism to head off starvation.72 Further investigations during the 1850s and onward 
slowly pieced together what transpired during the doomed expedition. Franklin himself 
was discovered to have died in June 1847. 
Franklin’s expedition was ultimately befallen by becoming lodged in ice while 
seeking the connecting piece in the Northwest Passage—and thus resulting in the crew 
eventually succumbing to sickness or starvation73—with the drama of piecing together 
the story of the expedition taking on a mythical character in itself. As the details of 
Franklin’s ill-fated mission emerged over time, the legend that developed around 
Franklin during his first forays into the Arctic—that of a man taking on the harshest 
conditions on Earth for the sake of human exploration—transformed into a sort of 
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martyrdom for the cause. This was certainly helped by the saga of finding the remains of 
the expedition in the first place—his wife’s pleas to authority and financing of her own 
expeditions to find him, not to mention the adulation of such high-profile figures as 
Charles Dickens, created this image almost immediately74--and also by the role that the 
events of 1845-47 would take on as a heroic narrative in the early formation of modern 
Canadian identity.  
 The initial emergence of a nationalist interpretation of the Franklin expedition in 
the 20th century was likely due to Canadian desires to assert sovereignty over its Arctic 
frontiers. Unlike during the time of the Franklin expedition, Canada’s transition to the 
status of British dominion in 1867 now meant that it been developing its own attitudes 
relative to the world around it. This is an interesting point when we compare what had 
transpired over the previous century: whereas the British Admiralty’s failures in the 
Arctic were often pointed to as being a result of an imperial culture that chose 
expansionism over caution,75 Canada now had the opportunity to establish an Arctic 
policy that was independent of the whims of the British Empire. This did not mean that 
Canada at the turn of the 20th century was any less tenacious about the need to stake its 
claim in the Arctic, however. Following the election of Wilfred Laurier to the office of 
Canadian Prime Minister in 1896, the Canadian government showed increasing concern 
about its assertive American neighbor, whose expansionist ideals included looking 
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northward toward the Arctic.76 This was also coming at a time when renewed interest in 
the Arctic was occurring at a global scale, not least due Norwegian Roald Amundsen’s 
1905 transit of the Northwest Passage, the first successful maritime navigation of the 
entire route. The Canadian perspective at this time was therefore more driven by concerns 
about the geopolitical threats to the country’s sovereignty that were posed by this new 
period of Arctic exploration, rather than being driven by any attachment to the region on 
a historical level. It was as a result of this time period, however, that conceptions about 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty began to take shape. 
 The chief concern for the Canadians was the possibility of American incursions in 
Hudson Bay and the Arctic archipelago. Beginning in 1906, the government sent Captain 
Joseph-Elzèar Bernier to enforce fishing and whaling tariff regulations in the region as a 
means of demonstrating Canada’s commitment to protecting its sovereignty in the Arctic. 
Bernier demonstrated a particular zeal for the mission, and began claiming Arctic islands 
under the Canadian flag in several trips through 1911. Although these expressions of 
sovereignty went mostly unchallenged, there is some debate as to how receptive the 
government was to Bernier’s “island-hopping” method of enforcing sovereignty.77 
Regardless of this, Bernier’s voyages created a precedent demonstrating that Canada was 
willing to enforce its Arctic claims. 
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 The more famous embodiment of Canadian Arctic sovereignty would come soon 
after under the direction of Vilhjalmur Stefansson. Born in Manitoba and raised in North 
Dakota by Icelandic parents, Stefansson was influenced both by the intellectual curiosity 
of his parents as well as the frontier lifestyle that he experienced as a child. Although 
entering Harvard at the turn of the 20th century as a divinity student, Stefansson instead 
switched to study anthropology, following a budding interest in the works of Herbert 
Spencer and Charles Darwin.78 Stefansson’s desire to investigate his ancestral homeland 
led him to Iceland in 1903. Despite losing interest in Arctic pursuits following this trip, 
an offer to take part in the Anglo-American Polar Expedition in 1906 would lead him to 
rediscover the possibility of satisfying his intellectual curiosity in the region.79 Originally 
expected to link up with the expedition’s ship at a seaside village in the Yukon following 
an overland journey, Stefansson instead found himself stranded among Eskimo villagers. 
This experience led Stefansson to live among the Eskimos and adapt to their way of life. 
Having become disillusioned with the Anglo-American expedition during this time, 
Stefansson left in August 1907.80  
The importance of noting this element of Stefansson’s experience not only sets 
the tone for understanding the value of his more famous expedition in the ensuing years, 
but also to demonstrate how his individual experiences would impact the legacy that he 
left on Canada’s northern experience. Stefansson’s major expedition on behalf of 
Canadian interests was launched in 1913. The irony of this was that Stefansson’s personal 
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identification as a Canadian was unclear. After all, his family had moved to the United 
States shortly after Stefansson’s birth, something that was not lost on Stefansson in his 
adult life.81 Stefansson additionally needed to reclaim his Canadian citizenship as an 
adult, as his father’s naturalization as an American citizen in the 1880s had nullified the 
younger Stefansson’s ability to claim Canadian citizenship through birth.82 Stefansson’s 
previous forays into the Arctic—both as part of the Anglo-American expedition as well 
as a second trip from 1908-12—had also received financial support from American 
institutions as a result of his academic connections in the United States.  
Regardless of Stefansson’s personal inclinations about his nationality,83 the 
Canadian government sought to give Stefansson financial backing in return for an 
expedition that would be unquestionably Canadian. Having been granted some funds 
from American institutions for an ethnological expedition in 1913, though still falling 
short of the total needed, Stefansson turned to Canada for additional help. The Canadian 
government agreed to fully fund the expedition provided that Stefansson drop his 
American backers and instead pursue the operation as a Canadian expedition. This also 
shifted the purpose of the mission, which now included claiming newly discovered lands 
as Canadian territory.84 Though the Canadian government may have demonstrated a 
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mixed reaction toward Bernier’s expeditions a few years earlier, concerns about foreign 
incursions in Canada’s Arctic claims had not wholly withered. The outbreak of major war 
in Europe the following year only further bolstered general Canadian anxiety about being 
able to protect its claims. The context of the war was not lost on Stefansson. Ending his 
expedition and beginning a series of lectures in the fall of 1918, the explorer built on the 
victorious feelings occurring in Canada at this time to shape his travels in the Arctic as 
being part of a Canadian “destiny” to further develop its northern lands.85  
The five-year expedition itself would end up having a tremendous impact on how 
Canadian views of Arctic sovereignty were shaped going forward. Although the 
expedition experienced early trauma,86 Stefansson’s expedition was ultimately successful 
in answering a number of questions about unknown geographical features in the Arctic as 
well as generally asserting Canadian sovereignty interests.87 Stefansson’s work was not 
completed in 1918, however. Stefansson was increasingly concerned about Denmark’s 
intentions in the Arctic, seeing recent actions near Greenland as evidence of a concerted 
Danish effort to challenge Canada’s sovereignty claims. Stefansson’s viewpoint was 
initially shared by bureaucrat J.B. Harkin, who pushed this concern in government circles 
in 1920. However, Harkin would become increasingly suspicious of Stefansson’s actual 
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motivations for raising the alarm against the Danes.88 Stefansson had also long wanted to 
annex Wrangel Island under Canadian control, a fairly dubious idea given its proximity to 
the Soviet Union. Following a failed attempt to establish a presence on the island, 
resulting in the death of four members of Stefansson’s team, the Canadian government 
was ready to be finished with the explorer.89 Despite this, Harkin and others concerned 
about the potential Danish threat were able to convince new prime minister Mackenzie 
King, who came to power in 1922, that Canada needed to reinforce its sovereign claims 
over areas that might be of interest to the Danes, particularly Ellesmere Island. The 
importance of this moment was less about the actual policies and players and more about 
their impact. As the government instituted a series of summer Arctic patrols from 1922-
25, public perceptions were soon shaped into the idea that there was, indeed, a significant 
threat from Denmark to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. In reality, this was not actually the 
case. Nonetheless, the perception that Canada’s Arctic interests were constantly under 
threat from outside actors had taken hold.90 
What should be clear by this point is the that the legacy of these expeditions not 
only helped to create a national narrative for Canada as it moved toward independence 
from Great Britain in 1931,91 but that the narrative also took on a life of its own beyond 
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the actual events of various Arctic expeditions. Although the expeditions were able to 
make an immediate impact on their future legacy in some respects, the weaving of the 
Arctic into the Canadian national fabric was also not something that necessarily occurred 
immediately. Instead, the process of bringing more understanding to the Canadian Arctic 
was indeed intertwined with attempts to better define the meaning of Canadian 
nationhood. The first comprehensive work that addressed the Franklin expedition came 
through Richard Lambert’s 1949 book Franklin of the Arctic. In this book, Lambert did 
not shy away from criticizing Franklin per se, but nonetheless continued the theme of 
building the Arctic as a forbidding environment that would not have been understood if 
not for the courage of explorers such as Franklin. In short, Franklin was understood to be 
a hero because he attempted to brave the Arctic, regardless of his various follies along the 
way that, as later historical analysis would show, arguably could have been foreseen prior 
to his disastrous final expedition.92 Although Lambert’s book was by no means the first 
to build a heroic mythology around Canadian expeditions in the Arctic,93 his book re-
introduced the potential value of the Arctic as a foundation on which to build a positive, 
nationalistic Canadian ideal.  
As previously touched upon, there was a parallel narrative occurring at this time 
as well. The championing of the Arctic within the Canadian cultural narrative also caused 
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its proponents to highlight the divisions between Canadian accomplishments in the Arctic 
and the British interests that had initially undertaken them. This resulted in a narrative 
that acknowledged the British role as being a key part of the Canadian Arctic chronology 
while also seeking to highlight a distinctive Canadian understanding of the region. As 
such, the British were commended for taking the initiative of exploring the region, but the 
Canadian approach to the Arctic was seen as more appreciative of the expertise of native 
peoples in operating and surviving in the region’s forbidding elements.94 On a cultural 
level, Canada was certainly finding opportunities to highlight the Arctic as an intrinsic 
part of its young nationhood.  
 By the early 1930s, Canada’s efforts to assert its sovereignty over Arctic claims 
had seemingly paid off. Other Arctic states began to accept Canada’s claims in the 
region—the lone exception being the United States, which nonetheless did not mount a 
substantive challenge to Canada in this respect. This acceptance also changed the way in 
which Canada could approach its Arctic space,95 as well as causing some cognitive 
dissonance on the parts of Canadian policymakers. No longer needing to publicize 
perceived threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, there was some concern that continued 
focus on the Arctic would make the country seem like nothing more than a frozen, barren 
landscape to foreign economic interests. There may have also been declining interest on 
the public’s part on the topic, although those with an interest in promoting Arctic 
exploits—particularly those who had explored the region—continued to produce a variety 
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of media and cultural products related to their experiences. As such, the issue of 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty was not going unnoticed by the public, even if there was not 
a conscious prioritization of the region in national political discussions.96 Such a dynamic 
is important to note: although the public may not have placed significant weight to the 
Arctic in terms of the political priorities that regularly affected them at this time, general 
awareness of the issue nonetheless made it easier for government officials to point to 
Arctic sovereignty matters as a grave threat when needed.  
Having solidified its claims over the Arctic space, Canada was now faced with the 
question of what to do with the territory. The focus on the Arctic was now moving from a 
matter of sovereignty to a matter of responsibility. What this meant in practical terms was 
increasing the level of access to the northern territories as well as the overall welfare of 
Inuit natives living in the Arctic. In the early 20th century, the value of white fox fur pelts 
rose significantly, setting off a new boom in Arctic fur trading. The largest trading 
operation was run by the Hudson’s Bay Company, which had long been involved in the 
region. The Canadian government soon realized that increased economic activities in the 
region were having a potentially adverse effect on Inuit populations, not least of which 
due to the potential for affecting their access to their food supplies. The Canadian 
government responded by passing legislation limiting outside hunting activities, which 
also resulted in an increased presence by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
during the 1920s.97 Part of the problem in simply cracking down on trading activities, 
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however, was that some Inuit had become economically reliant on the traders. This was 
evident when the government entertained the idea of limiting the areas where trading 
posts could operate. As some existing posts had become vital economic hubs for the 
Inuits, shutting them down left local populations without a consistent source for their 
basic needs. This left the Canadian government in the position of having to find ways to 
provide these populations with sustenance to make up for the shortfall.98 This period 
demonstrated that the Canadian government not only had to deal with potential incursions 
from non-native economic interests, but also how complicated the process of providing 
for the basic needs of native peoples in this region would be. 
 By assuming sovereignty over Arctic territories with Inuit populations, Canada 
was also responsible for creating a political status for the group. Policies for 
administering relationships with the Inuit changed hands several times during the 1920s 
and 1930s, with the chief issue being whether the group should fall under existing 
legislation related to other native groups.99 Although a permanent policy stating that the 
federal government was responsible for the welfare of the Inuit was established in 1939, 
the group was nonetheless deemed distinct from the First Nations groups that lived 
elsewhere in Canada.100  
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 It was during this time that Canada was again faced with the prospect of major 
war in Europe. Unlike during the First World War, Canada now had an independent 
foreign and defense policy and was no longer bound to follow Britain into armed 
conflicts. Mired in economic depression during the 1930s, public support for joining 
Britain in the event of war was low. The country was also reluctant to repeat the 
experience of the 1917 “conscription crisis” in which deep divisions between Canada’s 
English- and French-speaking communities emerged over the country’s participation in 
the war.101 The Canadian Parliament would ultimately declare war on Germany within 
days of its invasion of Poland in September 1939, although there are some interesting 
events to note as to how Canadian society moved from being generally against 
participation in the European theater to, at the least, tacitly supportive. A visit by the 
British royal couple in the spring of 1939 had not only been received warmly by the 
public, but also seemed to trigger a sense of empathy for the British situation, even 
among French-Canadians.102 Despite Canada’s relatively quick response in voting 
whether to join the British war effort following the invasion of Poland, this was not as a 
result of a wholehearted belief of the need to respond to Germany’s actions. Instead, 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s motivation was to ensure that Canada had the ability to 
make an independent decision without seeming beholden to British requests for 
support.103 An emergency meeting of Parliament to debate the measure saw most 
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members supporting Canadian contributions to the war—much to King’s surprise—
although the government’s intent was to avoid a full-scale mobilization on the scale of 
World War I. Ultimately, parliamentary approval to join the war appeared based around a 
resigned belief that not supporting Britain would be an absurdity given the political 
situation in Europe.104 This was also helped, of course, by the fact that King and his 
cabinet were secure in the idea that Canada now had the ability to make independent 
decisions on these matters. 
 With a relatively lacking industrial base and an underequipped and unprepared 
military force, Canada’s initial contributions came in the form of producing war materiel 
for Britain. It soon became apparent, however, that Canada would need to increase 
investments in its defense capabilities and later use them in the European theater. By the 
end of the war in 1945, the country had gone from reluctant ally to a country that had 
offered legitimate contributions to the most intense aspects of the conflict, to include the 
Italian Campaign, Normandy landings, and liberation of the Netherlands.105 Much in the 
same way that Canadian participation in World War I fueled patriotic fervor in a time of 
Canada staking its claims to Arctic sovereignty, the second iteration created a legacy of a 
country willing to rise to global security challenges.  
Despite Canada’s notable participation in the war, the Arctic was not seen as a 
strategic issue even despite Canada’s concerns about homeland defense. Nonetheless, 
wartime security preparations did lead to the creation of security institutions that continue 
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to hold sway in the region to the present day. Although most of Canada’s foreign military 
participation during World War II took place in Europe, there was also legitimate reason 
to fear Japanese incursions on Canada’s Pacific coast. This belief was fueled by the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the capture of Britain’s Pacific 
colonies soon after. There was also the fear of an “insider threat” from the large 
population of Japanese immigrants who inhabited British Columbia. Popular fears of 
Japanese-Canadians sympathizing with Japan during the war fueled internment and 
relocation policies which resettled thousands of Japanese-Canadians away from British 
Columbia—where most of them lived—in other parts of the country. Although the 
resettled Japanese-Canadians were allowed to return by 1949, some had already chosen 
to continue their lives elsewhere in Canada.106 This period was a black mark on Canada’s 
democratic process, particularly as these policies had been undertaken with widespread 
support from non-Japanese-Canadians. 
Fears of a Japanese threat also led to demands to form a defense force in British 
Columbia in 1942. Noting that citizens had already taken it upon themselves to defend 
their homeland through coastal patrols and forming volunteer civil defense units, the 
Canadian government determined that it was best to establish a formal citizens’ defense 
corps in British Columbia.107 Because budgetary concerns constrained the formation of 
more organized reserve units, the government favored the establishment of an auxiliary 
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defense corps model, which took the name “Pacific Coast Militia Rangers” (PCMR) in 
the spring of 1942. This name accomplished two goals: The model not only embraced the 
practical aspects of Canada’s Pacific defense needs, but the name ranger also inspired 
romantic images of patriotic citizens defending their local communities in a time of 
war.108 PCMR units were given significant local autonomy in terms of electing leadership 
and ensuring the readiness of their troops. The downside of this was not only the 
possibility of local politics influencing unit readiness, but the expectation that PCMR 
units would be self-reliant also left them receiving little tangible assistance from the 
Canadian military beyond some spare rifles and ammunition.109 The expansion of the 
PCMR into the colder climate of the Yukon only added to the organization’s mystique, 
creating an image of courageous rangers willing to endure the frozen climate on dog sleds 
to protect their communities and country.110 
Beyond these themes, the Rangers would ultimately evolve into a militia force 
that was also representative of native peoples that inhabited Canada’s less-defended 
regions. The recruitment of Aboriginal rangers proved particularly successful during 
World War II,111 which would pay dividends for the ranger model after the end of the 
war. Although the PCMR began to see reductions even before the end of the war—the 
Japanese were on the defensive by the end of 1943, with Allied forces launching their 
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final offensive against the Germans soon after—the success of the PCMR remained fresh 
in the minds of defense planners at the war’s conclusion. Senior defense officials began 
to discuss the possibility of expanding the PCMR model to a countrywide force that 
would serve as the country’s cost-effective territorial militia, particularly in remote areas 
in the north. The need for such a force was predicated not only by fears of future Soviet 
incursions, but perhaps moreso by concerns that Canada would have trouble maintaining 
its sovereignty as the United States developed plans for continental defense.112 In 1947, 
the new Canadian Rangers organization was established. Its role was not only to be on 
the lookout for outside incursions, but also to provide local expertise to the military 
during exercises.113 This role was particularly important in the Canadian Arctic, where 
the new Rangers served as a warning post in remote regions where it was unfeasible for 
the military to maintain a regular presence. The Rangers program was also seen as a way 
to accomplish the government’s goal of bringing modern society to the Inuit.114 Although 
the PCMR had been quickly raised as a means to meet an urgent threat, the new militia, 
interestingly enough, proved to be an effective way to quell fears that Canada was not 
actively aware of threats to its territory. 
There are several important themes discussed thus far that are notable in 
understanding the shaping of Canadian Arctic policy going forward. Because Canada’s 
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relationship with the Arctic was a dynamic that moved alongside the country’s gradual 
move toward independence, there is the question of whether ideas about nationhood and 
sovereignty were necessarily predicated on the state itself being an independent entity. 
That is, was Canada’s Arctic policy necessarily something that evolved out of the 
country’s existing notions of its identity, or something that developed parallel to the 
factors that influenced the creation of this identity? From the discussion above, it appears 
that Canada’s views of the Arctic were indeed influenced by the country’s general 
political and economic position at a given point in time. Nonetheless, the experiences of 
Arctic explorers and their ability to impact Canadian society—particularly in that their 
exploits would take on a life of their own at times—also played a significant role in how 
the country viewed its Arctic frontiers. It must be understood, therefore, that the Arctic 
had permeated the Canadian consciousness on both the political and social levels by the 
end of World War II. As I have demonstrated here, this was not always a conscious 
decision, but rather the result of a contingent set of processes and historical events that 
led Canada to feel the need to assert claims over its Arctic territory. 
The term that would take on special importance along these lines is “sovereignty.” 
Superficially, it wouldn’t seem out of place for Canada to feel the need to protect areas 
that it claimed as part of its sovereign territory. What is distinct here, however, are the 
particular reasons why Canada felt the need to point out its willingness to protect its 
sovereignty at different points in time. Though decision-making on Arctic matters up to 
this point was often the result of various bureaucratic and domestic-level factors that have 
been discussed here, the first half of the twentieth century also saw a latent Canadian fear 
of American political and economic dominance. This was, of course, tempered by the 
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desire—if not the existential need—to maintain positive relations with the United States. 
As such, fears of American infringements in the Arctic (or in Canada at large) generally 
provided the impetus for Canada to clearly assert sovereignty over its claimed Arctic 
space. As the historical record shows, American interests in the Arctic were never solidly 
expansive beyond the basic protection of Alaska. Nonetheless, the occasional unknowns 
created by its southern neighbor were enough to motivate Canada to think clearly about 
the worth of its Arctic territory and the resources that it was willing to invest in the 
region. As we will see during the Cold War period, lingering fears of too much American 
influence on Canada were instrumental in building the country’s modern security and 
defense policies. 
Finally, the Arctic served as a useful way in which to translate the experience of 
early Canadian settlers to the modern day. Much as the 18th century fur traders gradually 
expanded their known world by exploring Canada’s wondrous terrain, the Arctic region 
now served to add to the narrative of Canadians with a “can-do” attitude as stewards of a 
vast country with tremendous natural beauty. Canadian identity would also shape itself in 
terms of being decidedly “northern.” This was not only done as a means to contrast the 
country with the American experience but also because, due to the country’s endemic 
geologic formations and the way in which the country was gradually settled, it was hard 
to argue that Canada was not of an intrinsically “northern” character.115 The focus on 
developing Canadian identity in such terms only increased in the 1950s as Canadians 
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sought ways to define Canadian identity outside of the country’s military history.116 The 
post-World War II period was therefore one in which Canada’s modern identity was 
facing a fresh recalibration of values; its Arctic policy was no different.  
Canada and the Cold War: The Arctic as a strategic problem 
 Beyond concerns about the strategic situation it faced at the advent of the Cold 
War, Canada also faced decisions about how to orient its broader foreign policy. After 
all, the country’s ability to conduct a wholly independent foreign policy was a relatively 
new phenomenon and a considerable portion of that period had been consumed by the 
impact of World War II. The birth of the United Nations offered a tremendous 
opportunity for Canada to establish itself as an international player. Although its strategic 
interests were undoubtedly aligned with the West, the country also could act as a force 
moderating the growing international divide developing between the American and 
Soviet spheres of influence. Canada’s early role in the UN not only supported the overall 
development of the organization, but also established a key role for the country as a 
reliable contributor to the growing number of international peacekeeping operations. 
Such a role suited Canada well, as it maintained a relatively large military force while 
also being free from the foreign commitments carried by well-equipped allies such as 
Britain, France, or the United States. The commitment to international peacekeeping 
operations proved to be a significant aspect of Canadian defense policy through the 1950s 
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and 1960s.117 It also, arguably, created an apocryphal notion of Canada as being 
altruistically and internationally driven when the country was simply seeking to develop a 
foreign policy that both fit its capabilities and allowed it to retain a sovereign identity. 
This idea continues to exist within the Canadian discourse to this day.118 
 Canada was also preoccupied by the realities of defending its vast territory from 
potential Soviet incursions or, even more worrying, American incursions to prevent the 
Soviets from establishing a presence in North America. Realization of this latter reality 
forced Canada to be proactive in establishing concrete linkages with the American 
defense establishment early on while it was still in a position to work with the Americans 
on an equal footing. The beginnings of the Canadian-American defense linkage actually 
began in 1940 following a meeting between King and U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York. The result of this meeting was the establishment of 
the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), a consultative body between the two 
states that included senior defense and diplomatic officials. The push to meet at 
Ogdensburg was precipitated more by the Canadians. Whereas the Americans were still 
attempting to stay uninvolved in the global conflict during this time, Canada’s decision to 
assist the British demanded engagement of the Americans on matters of coastal 
defense.119 Though the PJBD only acted in an advisory capacity, the formation of the 
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board was effectively the beginning of comprehensive defense cooperation between the 
two countries.120 
 The continental defense relationship only strengthened following World War II 
with operational defense capabilities being developed by the two countries. Although the 
allied experience during the war and cooperation through the PJBD had strengthened 
relationships between the two sides, the Canadians were still wary of giving too much 
leeway to the Americans while negotiating the possibility of allowing American forces to 
operate in their country. This was complicated by the fact that initial plans would base 
American bombers at stations in Newfoundland and Labrador, which were moving 
toward a referendum to leave British control for Canadian confederation in 1948.121 
Following a Canadian victory in this referendum, the Canadians and Americans finally 
came to agreement on the issue in 1952. Nonetheless, concerns about an increased 
American presence in the country were never really quelled, but rather took a back seat to 
the realities of the Soviet threat.122 
The role of the Arctic in continental defense also became central to Canadian 
foreign and defense planning at this time. The Canadians were left with a difficult 
decision vis-à-vis their American counterparts: Now that the two countries were moving 
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closer toward a unified system of continental defense, should the Americans be pressed to 
officially recognize Canada’s Arctic claims? Although the Americans had given de facto 
acquiescence to Canadian claims during the 1920s, there were fears that this policy would 
change in light of feared Soviet incursions. The Canadians ultimately decided against 
seeking formal recognition for the sake of maintaining harmonious relations with the 
United States.123 Having established that the Canadians were on board with a strongly-
linked continental defense, albeit with some reservations, the Americans began to 
establish formal defense structures that would include the participation of the Canadians. 
The chief defensive concern in the early Cold War period was to provide an early-
warning system to detect possible incursions by Soviet military forces. Planners had 
envisioned a chain of radar stations that would stretch across the North American Arctic 
space to serve this purpose. The formal agreement for the establishment of the Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line across the Canadian Arctic came into being in 1955, with the 
system coming online in 1957. The DEW Line was ultimately a diplomatic victory for 
the Canadians. As part of the agreement, the Americans gave significant control to the 
Canadians in operating the stations, which was also seen by the Canadians as further 
(albeit unofficial) recognition of Canadian claims to its Arctic frontiers.124 Alongside 
membership in the newly-formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 
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and the establishment of the bilateral North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) with the United States in 1958,125 Canada had secured a robust position 
against the Soviet threat, although concerns about sovereignty within these structures 
remained. 
The Canadians also needed to prepare for the possibility of how to fight a war in 
the Arctic if such an event occurred. Such preparations remained largely within the realm 
of the hypothetical, however, with Canadian military planners more occupied by the 
possibility of all-out nuclear war than a conventional war in the Arctic latitudes. As such, 
the military did not put too much emphasis on Arctic warfare during the early Cold War 
period.126 Instead, the new mission opened up a viable role for the Canadian Rangers. 
This also created a number of questions regarding not only the role of the organization in 
Canada’s territorial defense, but also how a force that was largely Aboriginal fit into 
Canadian society at large. Ranger membership in the Arctic regions was largely 
composed of local Aboriginals (with the exception of units in the Yukon, which were 
predominately white), which has historically had a noticeable effect on the role of the 
organization in their local communities.127 While Aboriginal members of the Rangers 
may have identified with their given local community, they also served as representatives 
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of the Canadian military in their role as Rangers. This created a dual conception of 
citizenship that would be openly acknowledged by Aboriginal leadership.128  
One of the long-standing points of contention that would develop during the Cold 
War between the Canadian government and Arctic communities was the degree to which 
the region was militarized. This was contentious for two reasons: first, the obvious 
anxiety felt by Arctic residents over the prospect of their homeland becoming a 
battleground; second, as discussed by Barry Scott Zellen in reference to the Inuit, a clear 
distinction between friend and foe was not present in the Inuit mindset. Though many 
Canadian Inuits did feel loyalty toward Canada—particularly as many fought in the 
Canadian military during World War II—they also felt loyal toward the safety of other 
Arctic indigenous groups outside of Canada (including in the Soviet Union).129 This was 
an interesting point of reference in light of the Cold War context: Whereas Canadian 
Aboriginals may have held a sincere sense of loyalty toward Canada, they also were not 
tied solely to Canadian conceptions of the outside world. This dynamic may be natural in 
any instance in which a state increases its presence in one of its sub-state units over time, 
as was the case in the Canadian North. What this revealed, however, is that remote Arctic 
communities may be indifferent about what is occurring elsewhere in Canada but would 
perhaps be affected by what is occurring in another Arctic community on the other side 
of the world. It is worth noting that Zellen’s example here did raise the question of this 
feeling being one pushed by Aboriginal leaders—rather than being representative of the 
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feelings of Aboriginal communities on the whole—in order to fulfill an ulterior 
agenda.130 Even so, other historical facts surrounding Aboriginal conceptions of 
community certainly make this construct potentially viable. 
“Southern” Canada was also undergoing changes in terms of how it viewed the 
North and its role in Canadian identity. Much as the Cold War Canadian narrative was 
based on internationalism and responsibility in decision-making, cultural works on the 
Arctic showed an increasing tendency to shift from the “heroic” stories of earlier 
explorations to the importance of environmental stewardship by people inhabiting the 
Arctic. This was seen as influenced by the idea that Southern Canadians not only sought 
to build a safer narrative of how its country should operate in the Arctic, but also that 
increased contact with the Inuit provided for the need to better understand their needs and 
viewpoints.131 This was certainly influenced by a general trend toward cultural 
postmodernism, but was also the result of the North, while still psychologically distant, 
occupying an increasingly less forbidding position to Southerners. In short, the Arctic 
still retained a sense of being a distinct wilderness while also being normalized as a 
geographical feature.132 This was also then internalized as a part of the development of 
Canada as a progressive state: Because the Arctic region was largely inhabited and 
underdeveloped relative to the rest of the country, it was both an area that was either due 
to be prioritized within economic and social development efforts or even a recognized 
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wilderness that was purposely not developed in order to maintain the uniqueness of the 
landscape.133 The national perception of the Arctic region was therefore co-constitutive 
with the dynamics of the national understanding of the Canadian identity as a whole. 
The next round of attention to this issue came after the election of John 
Diefenbaker to the role of prime minister in 1957. Calling a snap election the following 
year, Diefenbaker used the momentum of his political campaign to outline a new national 
vision that specifically referenced the Arctic:  
“As far as the Arctic is concerned, how many of you here knew the pioneers in 
Western Canada? I saw the early days here. Here in Winnipeg in 1909, when the 
vast movement was taking place into the Western plains, they had imagination. 
There is a new imagination now. The Arctic. We intend to carry out the legislative 
program of Arctic research, to develop Arctic routes, to develop those vast hidden 
resources the last few years have revealed.”134 
This speech was perhaps the most direct acknowledgement in modern times of the 
Arctic’s place in the Canadian national identity. Not only did the tone of the speech serve 
to benefit Diefenbaker’s subsequent electoral victory, but it also set the intention to 
prioritize northern issues under Diefenbaker’s government.135 Diefenbaker appeared 
highly influenced in this regard by the economist Dr. Merril Menzies, whom he brought 
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in as a speechwriter and economic advisor during his 1957 campaign. As a result, the 
idea of the “northern vision” took shape in the form of a regional economic development 
program. More notably, the program was driven by a concerted effort to develop 
potential energy and mineral reserves in the North, which was helped by the fact that 
these areas remained under federal control. This not only resulted in actual energy 
exploration activities, but also spurred the construction of roads, railways, port facilities, 
and funding for social programs in the North.136 In retrospect, however, the actual impact 
of Diefenbaker’s rhetoric in practical terms was decidedly mixed. Although 
Diefenbaker’s discussion of the Arctic was considerable in tying the region to the larger 
national fabric going forward, the successes of the northern development program in 
terms of building infrastructure also did not completely live up to the government’s 
plans.137 
The reasons for Diefenbaker’s northern vision were also not wholly due to 
domestic factors. Shortly after taking the helm in Ottawa, Diefenbaker’s government 
faced an increasingly tense relationship with the United States over cross-border trade 
regimes. What proved particularly problematic for the Canadians was an increasingly 
tough set of protectionist economic policies by the United States, especially in limiting 
imports of Canadian oil.138 From the American side, the early interactions with the 
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Diefenbaker government also showed an increasingly nationalist tone from the 
Canadians. This may have actually resulted in a moral win for the Canadians in the 
bilateral relationship, as American concern over Diefenbaker’s campaign rhetoric caused 
them to develop a more comprehensive set of policies when dealing with Canadian 
concerns.139 Ultimately, the relationship between the two sides did not experience a major 
rift despite the disagreements during Diefenbaker’s first years. Instead, this experience 
showed that Diefenbaker’s domestic conception of the “northern vision,” while motivated 
largely by internal factors, was also not wholly disassociated from the Canadian-
American relationship at the time. Such a dynamic was only representative of the running 
theme that was consistent of Canadian Arctic decision-making during the 20th century.  
International law, controversy, and the sovereignty showdown 
 With the Canadian Arctic seeing increased access by the early 1960s—whether 
because of government development programs or through supply of distant military 
facilities such as those constituting the DEW Line—there were growing concerns about 
the need to formalize legal claims over the maritime routes surrounding Canada’s Arctic 
islands. At this time, there was not yet an international standard defining territorial 
maritime limits, but instead a varying set of international customs that were under 
codification discussions in international bodies.140 The issue was further complicated 
given the unique character of the Canadian Arctic archipelago: Even if Canada accepted 
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an international standard limit from its coastal waters, how would this apply to the straits 
between the numerous islands? Part of the later impetus for developing an official policy 
on these distinctions was derived from increased incursions that tested the lack of official 
policies. Initially, such policies were not seen as necessary because existing laws calling 
for the application for permission to transit the Arctic archipelago were generally 
respected by the largely American ships that provided supplies to the DEW Line 
facilities.141 Nonetheless, various organs of the Canadian government had already been 
pondering the territoriality question during the 1950s. Although the Canadians considered 
imposing the 12-mile claim beyond the furthest reaches of the archipelago, strategic 
concerns—be it recognition of the American submarine presence in those areas or fears 
of stirring up a territorial rivalry with the Soviet Union—led the Canadians to be more 
conservative in their actions. The safest bet was to instead claim the straits between the 
Arctic islands, even though this was probably going to be met with protests from the 
United States.142 This viewpoint was not actually put into official policy at this point in 
time, although there was also little need to actually take a stand on this issue. 
 What would occur several years later would prove to be one of the most 
controversial and defining moments in modern Canadian conceptions of Arctic 
sovereignty. In 1968, an oil field was discovered near Prudhoe Bay on the Alaskan Arctic 
coastline. The discovery led not only to increased interest in the potential oil resources 
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that could be found in the region, but also the means of getting to and from extraction 
sites. In October of that year, the American corporation Humble Oil began plans to send 
an oil tanker through the Northwest Passage the following summer. There were a few 
implications to this decision that affected the political landscape surrounding Northwest 
Passage sovereignty. Firstly, the voyage itself would be historic: the ship Manhattan that 
would go on to make the trip was the first commercial vessel to traverse the passage in its 
entirety, and only the ninth surface vessel to do so.143 Secondly, the ship would require 
the assistance of icebreakers to complete the voyage, which would require official 
coordination with the Canadian or American governments in order to receive assistance 
from their respective coast guards. In his first meeting with U.S. President Richard Nixon 
in March 1969, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau asked that the Americans 
submit an official request for the Manhattan voyage. Under the guise of seeing the issue 
as a private business matter that did not concern the U.S. government—not to mention 
understanding the potential precedent that would be set by agreeing to the Canadian 
request—Nixon declined to ask official permission.144 The Manhattan nonetheless began 
its voyage in August 1969 from Philadelphia, making the return to New York in 
November. Along the way, the ship was escorted by both Canadian and American 
icebreakers.145 Aside from demonstrating that a large commercial vessel could indeed 
transit the Northwest Passage, the voyage did not appear to be particularly eventful.  
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Yet in 1970, the Canadians were already seeing the Manhattan’s voyage as a 
direct challenge to their Arctic sovereignty and were using the event to justify further 
changes in how they defined their Arctic claims. How did it reach this point? We first 
need to examine the discussions that were taking place following Humble’s 1968 
announcement of its intention to transit the Northwest Passage. Canada demonstrated 
immediate concern after Humble’s announcement, although there were competing 
explanations as to why it did. One could fairly argue that the Canadian government was 
concerned about the environmental implications of the transit of a large oil tanker 
through the Northwest Passage, although previous research by Meren and Plumptre finds 
that the Canadian concern was likely driven more by fears of sovereignty infringement 
despite political statements to the contrary.146 Allowing the voyage of the Manhattan 
could also actually prove the difficulties of operating in the Northwest Passage, 
bolstering Canadian arguments that the waterway was a unique geographical feature that 
would be an exception to future international maritime agreements.147  
Canadian consideration of the plan did not only involve how to approach the U.S. 
on official terms—as was eventually done by Trudeau in March 1969—but also to 
determine if some of the practicalities of the voyage could result in later precedents. For 
example, this was seen in determining whether to formally request that the U.S. Coast 
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Guard ask permission to transit the Northwest Passage while providing escort support to 
the Manhattan. Although the USCG was not required to ask permission under previous 
agreements, the Canadians submitted a permission request in this instance as a subtle 
means of gaining effective sovereignty recognition.148 Why was there ultimately no 
strong stand taken by the Canadian government prior to the Manhattan’s voyage? 
Internal discussions raised the possibility of setting an official policy on use of the 
Northwest Passage, but it may have come down to the small window of time that Canada 
had to develop a comprehensive legal justification to assert sovereignty over the 
Northwest Passage. There were also a number of external considerations, not least of 
which the general desire to keep the issue from rising to the point of major political 
confrontation with the United States.149  
As a result, the effects of the Manhattan voyage would be seen in subsequent 
Canadian policy. Fearing that this crossing was the first of many, the Canadians unveiled 
an official set of policies regarding sovereignty over the Arctic straits. Not only were 
these policies enacted fairly quickly after the Manhattan’s voyage, but they were also the 
culmination of the existing discussions that had been occurring both inside of Canada and 
at the global level for over a decade. The first clear instance asserting Canadian 
sovereignty over the Arctic occurred in April 1970 when Secretary of State for External 
Affairs Mitchell Sharp noted in a parliamentary debate, “Canada has always regarded the 
waters…of the Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters…the present Government 
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maintains that position.”150 Two months later, Parliament passed the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPAA), which asserted Canada’s jurisdiction in enforcing 
against commercial dumping in the Arctic to a limit of 100 miles from the coast and 
effectively subsumed the Arctic archipelago. Other legislation extended Canada’s 
recognized territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles, in line with an increasing 
trend in the international community.151 Although the actual language of the legislation 
referred to protecting against pollution and illegal dumping—albeit giving fairly wide 
latitude to enforcement authorities in determining what constituted those activities152—it 
was quite clear what this legislation signaled to the outside world. The United States was 
quick to express its disappointment, as the Americans argued that the Northwest Passage 
should be treated as an international waterway.153 Invoking Sharp’s statement and the 
AWPAA, External Affairs legal advisor J.A. Beesley offered the assertion that the unique 
nature of the Arctic archipelago resulted in Canada’s right to claim jurisdiction over the 
islands.154 Although, the “unique nature of the Arctic” argument had been advanced 
internally, it was through these actions that the Canadians staked their position officially. 
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These positions were not accepted on the international level, however, with the notable 
exception of the Soviet Union.155  
Beyond legal mechanisms, the defense establishment also offered an official 
position on the issue. The 1971 defense White Paper explicitly prioritized Arctic 
sovereignty within the Canadian Forces’ strategic outlook;156 this was a notable departure 
from the previous White Paper in 1964, which did not directly address the issue.157 
Language on the Arctic not only discussed bolstering defense capabilities in the region, 
but also spoke directly to the mission of assisting civil authorities in social development 
efforts in the North.158 This language was representative of some of the issues facing 
Canada and its security policy during this time. The problems faced in combating the 
Québec separatist group Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), which culminated in the 
taking of hostages during the 1970 October Crisis, demonstrated that Canada indeed 
faced security threats aside from the Arctic and Cold War fronts. Furthermore, the 
détente policies that would come into effect regarding relations with the Soviet Union 
eliminated the temptation to boost defense spending during the 1970s.159 Thus, the shifts 
that occurred in Arctic policy from 1968-71 were perhaps the most significant on the 
issue in the modern era. Nonetheless, it was also clear that Canada had other priorities 
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during this time—such as social spending, facing the 1970s economic crisis, or even just 
within the realm of security and defense spending—that left the Arctic competing for 
attention. 
Such was the issue facing Brian Mulroney upon his election as Prime Minister in 
1984. Mulroney and his Progressive Conservative party not only sought a departure from 
the roughly two decades of Liberal governance previous,160 but also emphasized the need 
to devote more resources to a defense establishment that had been put on the bureaucratic 
backburner by the Trudeau government in the 1970s and early 1980s.161 Over the course 
of Mulroney’s tenure, which lasted until 1993, there was also a desire to foster warmer 
relations with the United States.162 For Mulroney, this was an economic necessity 
following the problems faced by the country during the 1970s. Mulroney’s attitude 
toward the United States resulted in a number of tangible policy achievements during his 
time in office, most notably the signing of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in 
1988.163 Interestingly, Mulroney’s approach to U.S. relations was also noticeably 
different from that of John Diefenbaker, the last notable Progressive Conservative prime 
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minister, which demonstrates the evolution that took place in the bilateral relationship 
over the previous three decades. 
Mulroney’s views toward the United States would nonetheless be tested through 
another contentious incident involving use of the Northwest Passage. In August 1985, the 
U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea traveled from the Pacific coast via the Panama 
Canal on a resupply mission to a U.S. base in Greenland. On the return trip, however, the 
ship instead traversed the Northwest Passage. Although the U.S. Coast Guard informed 
Canadian authorities of its intention to travel through the route, it did not explicitly ask 
for permission. The Canadian public was furious. One activist group even went so far as 
to hire a plane to drop Canadian flag-wrapped leaflets on the ship’s deck as it traveled 
through the Arctic archipelago.164 Although the Americans claimed that the decision to 
travel through the Northwest Passage was simply a matter of taking the shortest route 
back to the Pacific, the Canadians could not help but see this as an affront to Canadian 
sovereignty in the same vein as the events surrounding the Manhattan’s voyage. Much as 
was the case in that incident, the Canadians were quick to react. In September, Secretary 
of State for External Affairs Joe Clark spoke in Parliament regarding a series of 
initiatives to further assert sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago, which included the 
possibility of bringing the issue to the World Court if necessary.165 The most notable of 
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these was establishing a Canadian claim to a “straight line” around the archipelago.166 
The issue was further complicated by the fact that the U.S. had rejected adherence to the 
UNCLOS in 1982, which created the possibility that the two countries did not have a 
basic foundation by which to understand each other’s position should the Northwest 
Passage dispute be presented in front of an international tribunal.167 This mindset also 
influenced the 1987 defense white paper, which discussed the Canadian intention to 
procure nuclear-powered submarines as a recognition of Canada’s inability to protect 
itself from maritime threats under its present organization.168 The Canadian position 
influenced the signing of an agreement between the two countries in 1988 that brought a 
sense of closure to the issue. While the agreement did not set binding terms governing 
use of the Northwest Passage by U.S. ships, it did state that the U.S. would make an 
effort to act in a cooperative nature with Canadian authorities when American ships used 
the route.169 Much as had been the case with previous instances of potential American 
infringement on Canadian claims in the 20th century, the Canadians had managed to win 
tacit acknowledgement of their position from their neighbors while stopping short of 
receiving official legal recognition of their claims. Although this did leave the door open 
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to future American incursions, the historical record showed that the Americans had little 
energy to match the Canadian response when controversies over Arctic claims occurred. 
Therefore, the Canadians had managed to mostly maintain their Arctic claims simply by 
showing the willingness to expend effort to match challenges to those claims.  
The systemic power balance between East and West during this time was also 
having an effect on policy toward the Arctic. As part of the thawing of relations taking 
place alongside Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union, there were also efforts 
to establish cooperative understandings between the two sides regarding the use of the 
Arctic space. A key moment came during a Gorbachev speech in October 1987 in 
Murmansk. In this speech, Gorbachev proposed that the Arctic states agree to 
establishing an Arctic nuclear-free zone as part of a phased demilitarization in the region, 
as well as suggesting the need to develop cooperative programs on energy production, 
scientific exploration, and environmental protection.170 Initial diplomatic 
communications between the West and the Soviet Union on this issue soon left NATO 
states skeptical of the motivations behind this announcement, however, as Soviet 
proposals on the demilitarization issue actually appeared to give them the military 
advantage.171 Still, there was value to Gorbachev’s speech, particularly if we look at it in 
the context of larger Soviet reforms and the effects that the influence the policy had 
following the Cold War. Although the speech marked a clear turning point in Soviet 
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Arctic policy, the non-military factors highlighted in Gorbachev’s speech may have also 
been a culmination of the direction in which Soviet Arctic policy was already moving, 
rather than responding to more recent events preceding the speech.172 A focus on non-
military factors also had an impact going forward despite the failure to establish clear 
agreements on the military aspects of a potential Arctic demilitarization program. By 
emphasizing these factors, Gorbachev helped to shift the conversation about the Arctic 
from one of strategic rivalry to one of international cooperation focused around energy, 
economic development, and environmental matters.173  
Conclusions: The Canadian Arctic identity 
The historical review of Canada’s Arctic policy tells us of a few key factors that 
can guide our understanding of present-day Canadian Arctic policy. Firstly, Canada’s 
particular history during the colonial period significantly contributed to the importance of 
the Arctic later on in constructing the Canadian identity. As the country’s geography 
proved ever-forbidding and captivating to early settlers, early influences on the Canadian 
identity were guided by a sense of frontierism and appreciation for the country’s natural 
environment. Even as the country had mostly been explored by the 20th century, the 
handful of corners in the Arctic space that remained unexplored only reinvigorated this 
tradition. What is especially interesting in constructing the idea of the Arctic is how the 
region took on a life of its own in the Canadian psyche. As evidenced by Franklin’s final 
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expedition, even hasty attempts to explore the Arctic were spun as generally positive 
examples of the region’s unique and forbidding character. Such narratives were 
instrumental in building a sense of uniqueness in the Canadian identity as the country 
moved toward independence in the 20th century. 
Secondly, the historical record has shown that Canada’s identity was largely built 
with an eye toward the United States. As its southern neighbor also built its national 
identity within the New World construct—as well as having its own brand of frontierism 
and territorial expansion—Canada regularly found the need to identify the characteristics 
that made it especially unique. The country was able to do this by emphasizing its 
“northern” character, something that the United States could only claim halfheartedly 
following its acquisition of Alaska. Although the two countries have managed to develop 
a close sense of kinship over cultural similarities and mutually beneficial economic 
relations, Canada has shown itself to be especially sensitive to any hint of American 
incursion. As Canada began to pepper strategic defense documents with specific 
references to “sovereignty,” it did so especially with attention to fears to growing 
American influence in the country at a given time. The Arctic therefore served two 
purposes in helping to Canada distinguish itself from the United States. First, the 
distinction of “northern character” helped to create a sense of Canadian uniqueness that 
could remain exclusive of American influence. Secondly—and on more practical terms—
Canadian ownership of a vast Arctic territory gave it more of a stake in hemispheric 
defense discussions, particularly as the two countries’ defense structures established 
closer links during the Cold War.  
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Finally, the Arctic has shown to be an enduring issue in Canadian identity 
formation that has been met with similar responses when the country has felt that 
sovereignty over its Arctic territory was threatened. Although this analysis has certainly 
highlighted how certain individuals, external security issues, and domestic politics have 
had a significant impact on individual government actions, the historical record 
nonetheless shows a clear trend over time toward defending the notion of Canadian 
Arctic sovereignty. Additionally, the Canadian public has often found itself engaged on 
the issue when the government raises it, regardless of its opinion of the Arctic as a day-
to-day national priority. Why are these findings important? As I will discuss in the 
following chapters, the discursive raising of the Arctic as a priority for the Canadian 
government in recent years is less influenced by the actions of individual leaders as it is 
by historical and cultural attachment to the region. Instead, current policies are merely the 
modern iteration of a Canadian legacy of sensitivity to the sovereignty of its Arctic 
territory. As demonstrated in this historical analysis of the issue, the deep roots of the 
Arctic in the Canadian character continue to serve as the primary motivating factor in 
how Canada conducts its modern-day Arctic policy. The paradox of this, however, is that 
rhetoric and substantive policy changes have not always resulted in significant economic 
investment in the Arctic, regardless of whether the government makes a concerted 
attempt to undertake such a program. This dynamic may be reflective of the reality of 
domestic politics, but also guides our understanding of the gap that remains between 
raising the discursive alarm over an issue and actually committing resources to address it. 
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Ch. 3: New dimensions of security in the Canadian Arctic, 1993-2015 
When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, there was little need for sustained tension in 
the conflict between East and West. Instead, the possibility of positive relationships 
centered on non-security issues seemed like the more attractive option for working on 
issues pertaining to the Arctic. Canada welcomed this development as the country sought 
to eliminate the need to focus its defense and security policies on the possibility of a 
territorial threat. This was particularly suited to the post-Cold War foreign policy 
developed by Jean Chrétien’s government following its election in 1993, which sought a 
politically “safe” set of policies that could guide Canada into the next century.  
The emergence of high-profile humanitarian crises during the 1990s also allowed 
Canada to promote peacekeeping operations as the cornerstone of its defense policy. As 
Sean Maloney discussed, participation in peacekeeping missions allowed Canada to 
achieve four objectives that directly impacted its national interest: pushing global threats 
away from North America; the ability to use a larger coalition (mainly NATO) as a 
support base; ability to use military contributions as political leverage; and ability to 
participate in operations which were well-suited to the size and capability of the 
Canadian military.174 It can also be argued that the Canadian focus on humanitarian 
concerns was for the purposes of political expediency on the part of the Chrétien 
government (in power for the majority of the 1990s), which did not develop a distinct 
vision for the Canadian defense and security establishment after the Cold War.175 T.S. 
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Hataley and Kim Nossal’s study of the Canadian response to the 1999 crisis in East 
Timor also supports this viewpoint. Whereas Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
showed particular zeal for the human security agenda, a combination of defense budget 
cuts and political indifference left the Chrétien administration initially hesitant to 
contribute to the United Nations force in East Timor. Though Canada eventually did 
make military contributions to the force, the delay in agreeing to contribute was 
inconsistent with Canada’s supposed prioritization of peacekeeping operations in the 
international arena to that point.176 The idea of Canada as a committed “peacemaker” 
may therefore be a bit of a revisionist account of the country’s foreign and defense 
policies during the 20th century. On the contrary, the analysis here thus far has 
demonstrated that Canada’s foreign policy has historically been more attuned to 
realpolitik than observers often realized. The notion of the Arctic as an integral part of 
the national identity has only solidified this argument. Later in this chapter, this particular 
aspect of the Canadian foreign policy tradition will be re-visited when discussing Arctic 
policy under Stephen Harper’s government. 
The 1990s nonetheless represented an opportunity to think differently about the 
meanings of security in the Arctic, both due to growing recognition of the effects of 
climate change as well as due to the en vogue status of global institution-building. 
Expanding upon the rapprochement over the Arctic that took place in the latter stages of 
the Cold War, Arctic states were quick to frame global understandings of the Arctic 
within themes of economic development and environmental protection. The emerging 
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concept of “sustainable” development as first popularized by the Brundtland Commission 
in the 1980s was a particularly attractive idea to apply to the Arctic region. Under the 
direction of former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the United 
Nations-mandated Commission developed a comprehensive document between 1983 and 
1987 that outlined the tenets of sustainable development.177 With an explicit focus on the 
relationship between human development and the lessening of armed conflict, the nascent 
concept of sustainable development was seemingly the perfect experiment that could use 
the Arctic as a model for future success. As such, the institutionalization of sustainable 
development policies under the guidance of the Arctic Council was built in this image.  
The Arctic Council was formed as a result of several ministerial meetings 
between Arctic states beginning in 1989, with the organization itself being founded under 
the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. Inspired by the sustainable development concept prevalent 
at the time,178 it is no surprise that the formation of the Arctic Council avoided a hard 
security component. Curiously, a footnote to the otherwise short Ottawa Declaration did 
explicitly state that the Arctic Council was to avoid military matters.179 Although such a 
statement certainly was an act of foresight on the part of the Arctic Council’s framers, 
this also helped to set an important precedent that the Arctic was not only to be conflict-
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free in the post-Cold War era, but a legitimately positive area of cooperation between 
former strategic foes.  
From the Canadian standpoint, the Arctic Council should have been a welcome 
development in the Canadian foreign policy agenda, particularly in light of other global 
discussions about climate change. The carving of the new territory of Nunavut, whose 
population is largely Aboriginal, from the Northwest Territories in 1999 also was seen as 
a victory for the human development agenda in the Arctic. Still, the practical difficulties 
of increasing economic development in the Arctic regions were soon realized in the 
course of these discussions.180 The Canadians were also not totally divorced from 
approaching the emerging concept of “human” security through military force. It was 
during this time that the “responsibility to protect” or “R2P” doctrine gained traction in 
the international community as a result of mass humanitarian crises that were perceived 
to have been exacerbated by international community inaction. Two schools of thought 
developed regarding how to approach human security. Whereas Japan spearheaded a 
human security approach known as “freedom from want”—which saw human security as 
a concept that stemmed from development—Canada and Norway advocated for a 
“freedom from fear” approach that put emphasis on protection from physical violence.181 
Canada was also instrumental in developing two international organs focusing on human 
security in the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the Human 
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Security Network (HSN). The ICISS was disbanded following the release of its findings 
in 2001, though its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect was undoubtedly the first 
to give significant weight to the “R2P” concept.182  
Canadian Arctic policy by the late 1990s, although seemingly setting a positive 
tone for a sustainable future in the Arctic region, was thus attempting to incorporate a 
number of emerging concepts that may have been too ambitious for Canada’s actual level 
of capability. Although the Arctic may not have been the chief domestic concern for 
Canada in light of Québec’s razor-thin failed secession referendum in 1995 and an 
economic crisis that tanked the value of the Canadian dollar, the region was nonetheless 
close to the heart of Chrétien, who had served as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development under Pierre Trudeau.183 In 2000, the Canadian government released a 
report outlining its strategy for the Arctic. The report established four main “objectives” 
for Canada’s Arctic strategy:  
“To enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and 
Aboriginal people; To assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty 
in the North; To establish the Circumpolar North as a vibrant geopolitical entity 
integrated into a rules-based international system; and to promote the human 
security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic.”184  
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At first glance, this would seemingly balance Canada’s then-orientation with its historical 
emphasis on Arctic sovereignty. An analysis of the report, however, found it to be more 
focused on themes in the former category: sustainable development, Northern institution-
building, and using the Arctic as a vehicle for international cooperation, particularly with 
post-Soviet Russia. The concept of sovereignty only received a handful of passing 
references, and was arguably out-of-place given the document’s focus on 
intergovernmental cooperation.185 The confusion between the strategy’s stated objectives 
and its actual recommendations were rather representative of the dynamic that puzzled 
the Canadian mindset at the time. That is, how could Canada establish itself as a global 
leader in sustainability and institution-building when it actually showed a historical 
sensitivity to outside interference? 
This confusion was also present in how Canada re-positioned its post-Cold War 
defense policy, something that was further hampered by controversy in the military 
during the 1990s. While participation in peacekeeping was a politically palatable use of 
the military during this time, the incident that came to be known as the “Somalia Affair” 
would expose the deep cultural problems that actually existed in the Canadian military. In 
March 1993, a Somali teenager was beaten and killed at the hands of Canadian Airborne 
Regiment (CAR) peacekeepers who suspected the teenager of stealing supplies. Public 
exposure of the incident shortly thereafter not only shocked Canadian society, but also 
exposed widespread discipline and organizational problems in the military that were seen 
as key factors contributing to the event. Ironically, the urgency of the Cold War may have 
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actually helped to mold this culture: Faced with a very “conventional” threat, the military 
did little to foster professionalization or academic advancement for its future leaders 
during the period. A public inquiry into the Somalia Affair found that the events that led 
to the death of the Somali teenager were not simply undertaken by a handful of 
miscreants, but were representative of a rough and insular culture that fostered such 
actions.186 The Somalia Inquiry found that these issues were particularly exacerbated 
within the CAR, which was not a separate unit in itself but instead a “skeleton” 
organization composed of units from other parts of the Canadian military. The unit had 
also undergone a reorganization from 1991-92, which the inquiry found to be detrimental 
to the regiment’s ability to undertake its peacekeeping role in Somalia.187 As a result of 
the Somalia Affair, the CAR was disbanded in 1995. Although the controversy did spur 
positive reforms in the Canadian military in many of the problem areas,188 the exposure 
of such entrenched social problems in the Canadian military during the 1990s was 
nonetheless among the most shameful periods in the history of the country’s defense 
establishment. 
 The stressful combination of greater demand on the Canadian military to 
contribute to worldwide contingencies and the general desire to reduce post-Cold War 
military expenditures was not ignored in the 1994 defense white paper. The document 
acknowledged the uncertainty of the international security environment while also 
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discussing the difficulty of doing so amidst Canadian budget constraints.189 The 
document then struck a tone of multilateralism, aiming for a defense posture focused on 
the ability to take part in peacekeeping missions. A section focusing on protecting the 
Canadian homeland even struck this tone, focusing on using the military in such activities 
as aiding civil protection, fisheries enforcement, and responding to environmental 
disasters.190 The tone of this document was certainly not unwelcome given the apparent 
easing of tensions at the end of the Cold War, but it did allow regular maintenance of 
military readiness to be de-prioritized within the budgetary process. Particularly in 
retrospect, it became evident just how misunderstood the complexity of responding to 
international humanitarian crises really was. Although the Canadian focus on multilateral 
peacekeeping during this time was a logical use of the military’s resources, the factors in 
place needed to sustain these operations—such as efficient logistics chains and the ability 
to deploy military units to far-away locations in short order—were not provided for in 
both budgetary terms and strategic outlook. The tone of the 1994 white paper was a 
representation of this flawed thinking in that it assumed a more stable international 
outlook following the end of the Cold War.191 As seen in crises ranging from the former 
Yugoslavia to sub-Saharan Africa during this time, the reality was anything but peaceful. 
In light of this, it was clear that Canada was facing a crisis of being in its foreign 
and defense policies. Although the politically palatable multilateralism that drove these 
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policies during this period may have allowed for an element of stability in light of 
domestic turmoil, it also helped to feed a certain amnesia about Canada’s own history 
when it came to how its military was employed. While the country has had a reputable 
history of peacekeeping under the United Nations flag, it also has a defense policy 
beyond it. Yet the lull in strategic tension in the 1990s nonetheless allowed for a new 
image of “Canada as peacekeeper, and only that” to become the image of Canadian 
defense policy. There are a few possible reasons why this came into being, whether it was 
societal relief over the end of the Cold War or a desire to distinguish the Canadian 
national identity from the more militaristic United States.192 Interestingly, the 
contribution of Canadian military personnel as a percentage of total United Nations 
peacekeeping forces has actually fallen dramatically since 1991, when Canada was 
among the top contributors to UN peacekeeping missions.193At the very least, the idea of 
Canadian peacekeeping being truly driven by altruism rather than by ulterior motives was 
also a misleading notion that fed into this myth.194 Public opinion polls since the end of 
the Cold War on this issue have also yielded interesting results. Canadians have shown 
consistency in expressing favorable opinions toward peacekeeping, but have also shown 
themselves to be responsive to changes in the international environment.195 Nonetheless, 
                                                             
192 Eric Wagner, “The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping and the Cold 
War,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2006-2007), p. 48. 
193 United Nations, “Troop and peace contributors archive (1990-2014),” accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml.  
194 Wagner, p. 48-53. This is also explored at length in David Jefferess, “Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the 
Myth of the Canadian Peacekeeper,” University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), p. 709-
727. 
195 Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world,” 
International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 370-400. 
 85 
 
a dichotomy developed when tying peacekeeping to specific operations: While a 
favorable percentage of Canadians continued to show a “moral obligation” to assist 
people suffering from war or poverty, support for Canadian participation in coalition 
operations in Afghanistan beginning in 2002 was less enthusiastic.196 Canadians thus 
showed a tendency toward internationalism, but were less enthusiastic about participation 
in international military operations when the mission was more bluntly defined as 
combat-oriented. In this sense, Canadian public opinion was shying away from the reality 
of what peacekeeping actually entailed.197  
 The purpose of explaining Canada’s overall foreign and defense orientation 
during this time is to better position our understanding of why the Arctic re-gained 
rhetorical prominence when Stephen Harper took office in 2006. The political cycle that 
led to a re-assertion of sovereigntist language was not only a product of the confused 
policies of the 1990s, but was also a result of Canada having to face the aforementioned 
difficulty of continuing to push the “peacekeeper” image while engaging in 
unquestionably full-fledged military operations abroad. Following the terrorist attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001, the Canadian government was asked to join the 
US-led coalition against Afghanistan and the larger global campaign against terrorism. 
The Canadians were quick to respond, committing naval forces to the Arabian Sea in 
October 2001 to support American military operations.198 The prospect of committing 
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ground troops, however, was less enthusiastic. While discussing the issue in November 
2001, Chrétien was quick to point out that any ground mission would last no longer than 
six months, and would be halted should Canadian troops find themselves in a “full-
conflict situation.”199  
Clearly, the Canadians were having trouble getting past the prospect of 
warfighters engaging in warfare. A six-month army deployment did eventually follow in 
2002, although further Canadian contributions were not ironed out at this time. Canada 
would later commit to a stable force rotation that lasted until the end of 2011. This was 
likely due to several factors to include demonstrating commitment to Western initiatives 
against terrorism and maintaining positive relations with the United States, particularly in 
light of Canadian opposition to the 2003 Iraq War.200 From this period of time we can 
draw the conclusion that Canada, while not refusing to keep its alliance commitments, 
was also reluctant to fully commit to the internationalist position on which it had claimed 
to base its post-Cold War foreign policy.  
 In Arctic policy terms, Canada was faced with a similar conundrum of 
determining how best to address the security issues that may have been developing in the 
region. Although the disappearance of the Soviet threat alleviated the need to defend the 
Canadian Arctic on military terms, hard security issues did not completely disappear 
from the region during the 1990s. Both the American and Russian navies continued to 
operate submarines in the region in a mutually suspicious manner, raising concerns that 
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the possibility of conflict still remained. The secretive nature of American submarine 
operations also made it difficult for the Canadians to fully press the issue despite the 
close defense relationship between the two countries.201 Despite the presence of “what-if” 
scenarios, however, hard security issues were not prioritized given the low chance of 
conflict. Instead, the focus of Arctic security policy remained in the realm of lingering 
legal issues under UNCLOS and the basic maintenance of military forces that could 
operate in the Arctic if the geopolitical situation changed in the future.202  
The 1990s and first few years of the new century were largely free of major 
concerns for Arctic security, although this was perhaps a refusal to attend to a problem 
demanding imminent attention. Certainly, the establishment of the Arctic Council and the 
work of other intergovernmental climate organizations helped to bring attention to the 
real problems that were due to face the region. There was, however, a noticeable gap 
between the end of the Cold War and the 2007 Russian flag incident in which the Arctic 
was analyzed in hard security terms. There are several possible reasons for this, not least 
of which due to the way that the Arctic was viewed in the respective Arctic states. Aside 
from Canada’s views outlined above, Russia was in the process of regaining economic 
and political momentum following the ascendency of Vladimir Putin to the Russian 
presidency in 2000. Although the country did submit a claim to the United Nations 
arguing for an extension to its recognized Arctic claims in 2001,203 the Russian 
                                                             
201 Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War Era,” 
International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1999), p. 215-221.  
202 Ibid., p. 224-228.  
203 United Nations. “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, Submissions to the Commission, Submission by the 
 88 
 
government did not begin drafting an updated version of its argument until 2012.204 In the 
United States, the issue of climate change had become highly politicized (and particularly 
looked down upon by the George W. Bush administration), thus effectively removing the 
possibility of significant action on Arctic policy.  
 Climate policy was nonetheless an area that was gaining increased momentum as 
an emerging security issue in the new century. Although the feasibility of a liberal 
international order was challenged in the Western world by the difficulties of the United 
States’ military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the resigned recognition of the 
continued presence of violent conflict also helped to inspire attention to the effects of 
climate change on the human environment. This was especially present in areas such as 
sub-Saharan Africa, where conflicts over scarce natural resources continued to plague the 
continent. Even outside of armed conflict, major environmental events—such as the 2004 
Asian tsunami that claimed the lives of over 200,000 people—gave greater weight to the 
hypothesis that natural disasters and human security were not mutually exclusive. Paul 
Martin’s government—which succeeded that of fellow Liberal Jean Chrétien in 
December 2003—had already begun realizing the necessity of a more coherent Arctic 
policy. In a 2005 strategy billed as the “International Policy Statement,” the government 
explicitly defined the need to emphasize the country’s Arctic sovereignty as well as to 
pay greater attention to northern issues.205 Still, assertions of Arctic sovereignty had not 
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yet emerged as a foreign policy priority ahead of issues such as terrorism or broader 
development concerns. As climate change began to gain more attention from 
policymakers, however, this would soon change. 
Stephen Harper and Arctic Sovereignty 
 In December 2005, the Conservative Party outlined an ambitious defense strategy, 
known as “Canada First,” as part of its platform for the next month’s federal election. As 
part of Canada First, the Stephen Harper-led Conservatives would increase defense 
spending in order to procure new aircraft, ships, and increase the total number of military 
personnel.206 In a speech that month to outline the plan, Harper did not focus on the 
ongoing mission in Afghanistan, which was Canada’s biggest defense priority at the time, 
in order to justify the call for increased defense spending. Instead, Harper used the 
opportunity to tie the plan to a renewed emphasis on Arctic sovereignty. As part of this 
renewed commitment, the new government would seek to utilize overall defense 
procurements to commit further resources to the Arctic region as well as to build a new 
naval facility in Nunavut that could be used for both civilian and military purposes.207 
Harper’s statements were certainly reminiscent of past instances in which Canada held 
anxieties about the status of its perceived level of Arctic sovereignty. As in past 
instances, these anxieties did not appear out of thin air. The setting this time was Hans 
Island, a small rock formation that lies about halfway between Greenland and Ellesmere 
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Island in the Nares Strait and whose ownership is the source of a long-running dispute 
between Canada and Denmark. In the years preceding Harper’s speech, a series of mostly 
symbolic actions on the island had become the source of renewed diplomatic dispute 
between the two countries.208 Although these disputes were benign in nature, public 
attention to these actions nonetheless raised the profile of Canadian Arctic sovereignty 
concerns.209  
A curious dynamic upon Harper’s election in January 2006 was how these new 
assertions of sovereignty fit into Canada’s relationship with the United States. In his first 
press conference following his election, Harper directly criticized the United States for its 
position that the Northwest Passage constituted an international waterway.210 In light of 
Canada’s previous history of asserting its Arctic sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States, 
this could have been seen as an immediate attempt to signal to the Americans that Harper 
would not be a pushover in the bilateral relationship. The context of what Harper sought 
to change in the relationship, however, was quite the opposite. Owing to somewhat frosty 
relations in the years previous that were particularly enflamed by the Iraq War, the 
Conservatives were able to paint a latent anti-Americanism that existed in Canada at this 
time as unproductive to the overall health of the bilateral relationship. Harper had thus 
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actually prioritized the rebuilding of the Canada-US relationship, something that he was 
successful in doing early in his tenure.211 This was also, arguably, an evolution of the 
modern Conservative tradition in approaching U.S. relations. If we look at the previous 
examples of Diefenbaker, who was more stubborn about his country’s interests in the 
bilateral relationship, and Mulroney, who was warmer toward the United States while 
also having to deal with the controversial Polar Sea incident, we see an interesting meld 
of steadfast national sovereignty and committed concern about the strength of the 
relationship. This may have only been possible because, as was the case in the century 
previous, the United States was not eager to push the Canadians on Arctic sovereignty 
matters. For Harper, being able to speak effectively to both the sovereigntist and 
bilateralist positions early in his governing term was a major boon for his agenda.  
 During his first year in office, Harper would add further rhetorical weight to the 
Canadian government’s focus on Arctic sovereignty. In an August 2006 speech in Iqaluit, 
Harper described the “first principle of Arctic sovereignty” to be “use it or lose it;”212 that 
is, the country was required to constantly reinforce its sovereignty over its Arctic territory 
to prevent it from being encroached upon by others. Such a statement not only reiterated 
Harper’s focus on the Arctic, but also added a special urgency to the issue. On a 
discursive level, this presented a certain irony: Rather than speaking to the global threat 
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faced as a result of Arctic climate change—which could, in the most literal sense, result 
in the decrease of landmass due to rising sea levels—Harper was actually speaking to the 
need to bolster human activity in order to deter a hypothetical military incursion. As it 
would so happen, Harper’s “use it or lose it” remark took place during the midst of a 
Canadian military exercise whose magnitude had perhaps not been seen in the Arctic in 
decades.213  
Shortly prior to Harper’s assumption of office, the Canadian military had begun a 
reorganization process that was completed in 2006. The result of this was the re-flagging 
of the previous Canadian Forces Northern Area, which was responsible for military 
operations in northern Canada, under a new command called Joint Task Force North. The 
change was more than cosmetic: As part of the larger defense transformation, Joint Task 
Force North was imagined as a flexible organization that would work more closely with 
civil authorities to respond to emergencies and environmental disasters.214 Such a change 
was particularly convenient for the practical aspects of the new focus on the Arctic, but 
also allowed the government to present the impression that it was immediately 
committing resources to the Arctic—even if the change was already forthcoming under 
the previous government’s defense restructuring.  
 Defining the Arctic “threat” was also an evolving thought process during this 
time. While the long-term threat came from the melting of Arctic ice and the subsequent 
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negative effects on the natural environment, there were also questions of which man-
made threats needed to be prioritized in strategic thinking. Although pessimistic thinkers 
would offer the possibility of state-to-state threats if Canada did not assert its sovereignty 
in the region, the likelier threat came from man-made environmental damage due to 
resource exploitation, illegal dumping, or poaching of endangered species. The expected 
increase in human activity would also cause a greater demand on search-and-rescue 
resources, which tended to be handled by the military and civilian coast guard. Defining 
the chief threats had importance beyond allocating budgetary resources. If the biggest 
threats to the Arctic came through means that were usually dealt with by law enforcement 
authorities, would there really be much point in increasing military forces in the region? 
Even in an “aid to civilian authorities” capacity, it would not be necessary to increase the 
military presence in the Arctic in the way proposed under the new strategy. For this to 
happen, external forces would need to justify this presence. 
 Although it was due to circumstances that were not caused by Canada directly, 
but instead the deteriorating manner of relations between the West and Russia, such an 
opportunity presented itself in 2007. While Western media outlets saw the 2007 Russian 
flag-planting incident as the latest evidence of a resumption of the Cold War given the 
state of Western-Russian relations at the time, the Canadian government was also in a 
position to showcase the incident as justification of its Arctic strategy. Foreign minister 
Peter Mackay’s immediate response characterized the Russian action as harkening back 
to the fifteenth century,215 although it was the resulting actions that would prove to be 
                                                             
215 C.J. Chivers, “Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed,” New York Times, August 3, 2007, accessed 
February 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html?_r=0.  
 94 
 
more impactful. Shortly after the incident, Harper took the opportunity to make an 
“important announcement” regarding Canada’s Arctic sovereignty in a speech at Resolute 
Bay. Repeating his “use it or lose it” line from the previous summer, Harper formally 
announced the government’s plans to construct a naval facility and Arctic military 
training center as promised in the 2006 election campaign.216 Although the language in 
the speech was strikingly similar to language used in previous speeches on the Arctic—
particularly in emphasizing Canada’s Arctic heritage—the previous week’s events 
provided for convenient timing for Harper’s message to be amplified. 
 By framing the incident as an extension of recent Russian prodding of the North 
Atlantic security framework,217 Canada—and the United States, for that matter—
immediately established an image of Russian actions in the Arctic as being inherently 
aggressive. This discursive tool did not just follow the immediate aftermath of the 
incident, but was regularly utilized when accusing Russia of infringing on Canadian 
sovereignty.218 Such a dynamic between Russia and the West also helped to add 
legitimacy to the Harper government’s political agenda in the Arctic. Why then does a 
deeper examination of the issue show that conflict was unlikely to arise? In the wake of 
the flag-planting episode, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov visited Canada in 
November 2007. During his visit, the two sides signed several agreements on matters of 
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Arctic economic cooperation, agricultural relations, and energy policy.219 It was clear that 
any actual controversy over the August incident had abated on a government-to-
government level. The signing of the Ilulissat Declaration the following year only 
strengthened the argument that, despite what media and the general public had been led 
to believe in the months previous, there was indeed little chance of physical conflict 
between the Arctic states.  
 Aside from what was happening in the public eye, work still needed to be done 
for the Harper government in meeting the goals of its Arctic agenda. In 2009, the 
government laid out a comprehensive “Northern Strategy.” While the strategy did not 
present anything particularly new beyond what the government had previously stated 
when discussing its Arctic agenda, the unveiling of the country’s first Arctic strategy 
since 2000 did demonstrate renewed commitment to the region. The Northern Strategy 
outlined four key areas of focus: Arctic sovereignty, protecting Canada’s “environmental 
heritage,” social and economic development, and increasing political devolution to local 
governments.220 As was evident by the use of these four pillars, the strategy balanced 
both the sovereigntist aspects of the Arctic agenda with the softer, human dimension that 
generally preoccupied day-to-day Northern affairs.  
What was also notable here was the language used: It was not simply a matter of 
protecting Canada’s sovereign territory, but also its “heritage.” In this line of thinking, 
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Canadian government action to protect sovereign territory in the Arctic was, therefore, 
preserving the most intrinsic root of Canadian nationhood. Also important to note here, 
however, is how the tone of the document matched the dynamic observed in November 
2007: Even while the relationship between the East and West was tense, Canada was 
seeking to take a cooperative approach to multinational Arctic affairs. The presence of 
the sovereignty pillar also proved a bit ironic as the document even went so far as to 
downplay Arctic territory disagreements with Denmark and the United States, saying 
“All of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no sovereignty or defense 
challenges for Canada.”221 Never mind the role that these disagreements had in elevating 
Canadian fears of losing Arctic territory in the previous century, now the government was 
outright saying that such fears were misplaced!  
A second document, billed as the “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” 
was released in 2010 and used similar tones in translating Canada’s Arctic strategy to the 
international context. Even when discussing matters of Arctic sovereignty, the document 
emphasized Canada’s intention to assure its sovereignty claims through legal channels.222 
The manner in which the Arctic agenda was shaped during this time was representative of 
the duality that characterized Canadian Arctic policy at this time.  
While Harper’s rhetoric demanded that Canada take stronger action to defend its 
Arctic sovereignty, his government was actually taking a more passive approach in 
policy. By following up on campaign pledges to coherently elevate the status of the 
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Arctic in both domestic and foreign policy, Harper’s government had seemingly 
conquered a major aspect of its political agenda. By the end of the Conservatives’ reign 
in 2015, however, the operationalization of the Arctic agenda had become mired in 
budgetary concerns, technical delays, and political controversy.  
What follows is an interesting test of the gap that may exist between rhetoric and 
domestic politics in applying securitization concepts to the real world. In doing this, I will 
examine the two key areas of focus for the Harper government’s Canadian Arctic agenda. 
First, the role that hard security structures—namely the military—played in the agenda 
will help to demonstrate whether the Arctic was actually made to be a priority in the 
defense agenda. Second, the “soft” aspects of the Arctic security agenda—those being 
economic development and human security issues—will highlight how the government 
actually worked against itself in getting to the root of the problem.  
Preparing for the war that wouldn’t happen 
 As ambitious as the Arctic agenda was regarding a reinforcement of Canadian 
defense capabilities in the Arctic, not even the most optimistic military planners could 
argue that increasing the defense footprint would be possible without unique difficulty. 
Fortunately, the government was able to call on a group of familiar faces, the Canadian 
Rangers, to aid in its effort. Not only did the Rangers continue to offer an opportunity to 
act as a low-cost “listening post” in the Arctic, but also offered invaluable expertise to a 
defense establishment that was looking to increase its presence in a region in which it had 
relatively little operational experience. Additionally, further attention to the Canadian 
Rangers was a palatable way of selling the idea of an increased military presence in the 
Arctic to the public, as the Rangers’ iconic uniforms consisting of red sweaters and 
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baseball caps presented a familiar tone to “Southern” Canadians.223 The Rangers’ 
expertise not only included valuable understandings of their local geography, but also 
included training Canadian military personnel in basic survival skills endemic to the 
harsh Arctic climate. Coupled with a pledge from Harper for additional funding to 
increase personnel, add new Ranger units (or “patrols”), and modernize the Rangers’ 
equipment, the use of the Rangers as part of the new Arctic agenda seemed like a sensible 
plan.224 
 Although the renewed role for the Canadian Rangers could be seen as a success in 
basic terms, the actual reality of these plans did not live up to their rhetorical gusto. In 
contrast, defense officials felt that Ranger patrols were already plentiful and at necessary 
personnel levels across the Arctic, and that resources would actually be better suited to 
patrols well south of the Arctic. In the end, it was actually the non-Arctic units that saw 
the most growth as a result of the government’s plans to boost the Rangers’ size.225 The 
more public controversy involved efforts to procure replacements for the Rangers’ Lee 
Enfield rifles, which dated to World War II. The process did not even begin until the 
summer of 2011, and it was not until four years later that the new rifles began making 
their way to the Rangers in a disbursement cycle that was planned to last until 2019.226 
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 Issues procuring rifles proved to be a microcosm for other problems that plagued 
the defense establishment on more expensive systems. The one that would cause the most 
political controversy—and even be a major factor in challenging Harper’s position as 
prime minister—was the process surrounding the procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-
35 fighter jet. A joint development effort of eight countries—with the United States as 
the largest investor—the F-35 was seen as a reasonably-priced option for countries 
seeking a 21st century replacement for aging fighter aircraft. Canada joined the project in 
1997—although it did not sign a binding agreement to purchase the future fighter227—and 
did not face controversy over the decision for the first several years of the aircraft’s 
development. Fissures began to appear in the program south of the border in March 2010, 
however, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates fired the senior military officer in 
charge of the program due to cost overruns and performance issues.228 
Controversy over the program would strike Ottawa just a few months later. 
Without first having parliamentary debate or seeking a competitive bid to replace its 
current crop of F-18 fighter jets, the government announced its intention to purchase 65 
F-35s. Although the government had stated its intention to buy that many fighter jets 
under the Canada First strategy, the unilateral decision by the government to commit to 
the F-35 specifically was immediately seized upon by the political opposition.229 The 
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controversy was further inflamed when media reports suggested that the government was 
misrepresenting the true costs of the program.230 The problems mounted for the 
Conservatives in February 2011 when Canada’s elections board charged that the party 
had violated electoral rules during the 2006 campaign.231 This only fueled growing 
criticisms about the government’s overall level of transparency—many of which 
stemmed from the F-35 cost issue—resulting in the opposition presenting a vote of no-
confidence in March 2011 and forcing another election. The no-confidence vote also 
involved the first instance in Canadian history in which a government was held in 
contempt by a parliamentary committee.232  
Despite the tumultuous year the Conservatives had faced politically, they actually 
increased their share of power in parliament in the election two months later, attaining a 
majority for the first time since coming to power. The reason for this was not only a 
fractured political opposition, but also the manner in which it split. The left-wing New 
Democratic Party (NDP), which in previous years had served as second-fiddle 
progressives behind the more established Liberals, emerged as the second-place finishers 
in the 2011 election and captured the role of official opposition. The Liberals, on the 
other hand, lost over half of their previous share of seats. Liberal leader Michael 
Ignatieff, who resigned after an election in which he failed to even win his own 
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constituency, was an accomplished historian who had argued for a hawkish, 
internationalist foreign policy.233 Perhaps Ignatieff’s foreign policy made him 
indistinguishable from that of Harper, who was often accused by the political opposition 
of being too bellicose by Canadian standards. Perhaps Ignatieff simply presented himself 
as too aloof during the election campaign.234 Or perhaps, in some way, the Canadian 
government had finally articulated a coherent set of policies that provided stability for the 
Canadian electorate in a way that had not been realized since the end of the Cold War.  
 If this latter proposition was the case, it did not change the fact that the 
government’s success at throwing rhetorical support behind its Arctic agenda 
significantly outweighed its ability to actually successfully implement the agenda. As the 
F-35 program continued to have problems outside of Canada’s borders,235 strategists 
began to question the appropriateness of the jet for Canada’s particular needs. Some 
questioned the logic of replacing the dual-engine F-18—which offered a safeguard in 
case of the loss of one engine—with the single-engine F-35 given the expected use of the 
jet over the vast Arctic territory.236 There were also concerns that the first jets delivered 
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to Canada would not include a satellite communications suite necessary to communicate 
from distant points over the Arctic.237 The budgetary woes extended to other aspects of 
the agenda as well, notably in the construction of the Nanisivik Naval Facility. Located at 
the site of a former zinc mine on Baffin Island, the new naval facility would be used to 
support deep-water maritime operations during the summer months. Harper originally 
announced plans for the naval facility in 2007 with an estimated budget allocation of 
$100 million as well as plans for an adjacent airstrip. When the Royal Canadian Navy 
approved plans for the base in 2010, however, the plan’s price tag had ballooned to $258 
million.238 The government eventually scaled back the project to reduce the cost to $116 
million, which resulted in shelving plans for the airstrip as well as plans to keep the 
facility running year round.239 Ground was also not broken on the facility until 2015, with 
an expected opening date of 2018.240 
 Ships that could potentially be docking at Nanisivik in the future were also 
contributing to the budgetary woes. In 2010, the government unveiled plans to construct 
several ships for Arctic operations under a program called the National Shipbuilding 
Procurement Strategy (NSPS). The NSPS called for construction of new ships for both 
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combatant and non-combatant roles (i.e., icebreaking). The program also served a role 
beyond procurement for the robust Arctic agenda: while the Canadian shipbuilding 
industry had been previously been driven by a “boom-and-bust” cycle that saw ships built 
mostly during times of need, the NSPS provided a new dynamic that would see ships 
built on a more regular schedule regardless of the international political situation.241 As 
such, the NSPS also incorporated the goal of establishing strong relationships with the 
shipbuilding industry, to include a competitive bidding process for the task of building 
the ships.242 The program began to experience problems over the ensuing years, however, 
as it became apparent that the government had underestimated the true costs of the 
program.243 The scope of the NSPS also showed itself to be too broad: as the strategy 
called for the construction of several different types of ships, determining how to focus 
budgetary resources may have effectively resulted in projects competing against each 
other. Echoing criticisms of the F-35 project, commentators also began to see the ships as 
ineffective in meeting operational requirements while creating a significant cost burden 
for the government.244  
 In contrast to these setbacks, the government’s rhetorical support for its Arctic 
agenda was in full swing. Harper used annual trips to the Arctic—he visited the region 
                                                             
241 Martin Auger, “The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: A Five-Year Assessment,” Library of 
Parliament, June 15, 2015, p. 1. 
242 Ibid., p. 3-4. 
243 Ibid., p. 13-14. 
244 Michael Byers, “Why Canada’s search for an icebreaker is an Arctic embarrassment,” The Globe and 
Mail, January 21, 2014, accessed March 6, 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-
north/why-canadas-search-for-an-icebreaker-is-an-arctic-embarrassment/article16425755/.  
 104 
 
each summer between 2006 and 2015245—to lend legitimacy to the government’s agenda. 
The visits eventually drew ire from the political opposition, not only due to public 
revelations of the cost of the visits, but also due to perceptions of their contrived nature. 
For Harper’s opponents, images of the prime minister donning Canadian Ranger apparel 
and riding snowmobiles made the visits seem like less of a demonstration of national 
sovereignty and more, as one Liberal member of parliament quipped, a “million-dollar 
photo op.”246  
Public knowledge of the difficulties in operationalizing the Arctic agenda also 
could not prevent the development of a perception that a massive militarization campaign 
was underway in the region. One example of this was during the 2011 election campaign 
when Ignatieff accused Harper of choosing militarization of the Arctic over a focus on 
improving the region’s social services.247 After all, the 2009 Northern Strategy did devote 
attention to ensuring security in the region through “ground-up” social and economic 
development. On balance, however, Ignatieff’s criticism of these aspects of Harper’s 
Arctic policies was not unfounded; by that point, the perception was that Harper’s Arctic 
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economic development programs put particular emphasis on natural resource exploitation 
as an economic engine rather than diversifying the region’s economy.248  
As Northern socioeconomic issues received increased public attention,249 the true 
depth of issues facing Arctic communities also became more apparent. Although 
Harper’s economic programs may have provided short-term relief to Arctic communities 
that struggled to maintain sustainable economies, critics did not see this as solving the 
longstanding social problems—such as dealing with mental health and high suicide 
rates—that plagued these communities. The emphasis on natural resource exploitation as 
a vehicle for economic growth was particularly ironic to many given the potentially 
negative environmental effects of these activities, which would harm subsistence 
economies that were essential to providing for many Arctic communities.250 Scientists 
were further skeptical of supposed scientific research stations as being heavily influenced 
by the energy sector.251 In time, the tangible results of Harper’s ambitious Arctic agenda 
had slowly unraveled on both the hard and soft security fronts. 
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 How can we explain the difficulties of turning the ambition of the Arctic agenda 
into reality? There are three key areas that likely resulted in this. First, the difficulties of 
ramping up human activity in the Arctic may have been underestimated. Although the 
limitations posed by Arctic operations were expected, it was not until more coherent 
plans were drawn up for these operations that the true costs began to hit home. While the 
“not knowing without doing” phenomenon was not surprising, there were also cases of 
simple shortsightedness: in the Nanisivik case, the government’s failure to communicate 
with local authorities led them to begin plans for the new port facility without fully 
understanding what resources would be available.252 Even energy corporations who 
appeared quite keen on the Arctic’s untapped natural resources found themselves scaling 
down operations after early difficulties operating in the region.253 The Harper 
government’s nearly decade-long ambitions in the Arctic showed that the region was less 
understood than previously thought. 
 The second problem in implementing the Arctic agenda was simple bureaucratic 
politics. Of the near-decade that the Harper government held power, it spent over half of 
it as a minority government. This made it more difficult for the government to win 
parliamentary support for Arctic programs, particularly given the agenda’s emphasis on 
boosting defense spending and increasing natural resource exploitation. Moreover, 
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controversies over cost overruns in Arctic projects began to be seen by the political 
opposition as further evidence of opaque government behavior that extended to the 
broader political agenda.254 Although the fractured nature of Canada’s political 
opposition255 may have aided Harper’s ability to grow his political coalition from 2006-
2011 on numerical terms, this also created a growing discontent in opposing political 
circles that would turn against Harper in the 2015 election. 
 The third problem may have simply been due to exogenous factors that negatively 
impacted key aspects of the Arctic agenda. The most notable example was the budgetary 
issues faced by the F-35 program. Although Canada had extended a tentative 
commitment to procure airplanes from the program, it did not sustain the initial research 
and development costs that were borne by the United States. While the source of the 
controversy may have been the government’s failure to be forthcoming about the 
program’s true costs, program delays which the government was helpless to prevent also 
would have put it in a difficult political position. The decline of global oil prices, which 
took a toll on the Canadian economy,256 also made it difficult to sustain continued 
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investment in government infrastructure projects in the North. This was not unique to the 
boom-and-bust nature of infrastructure investment, but the particular difficulties of 
operating in the North made long-term infrastructure investment more difficult than in 
other regions. 
Having traced the Arctic legacy leading to the present, we have gained significant 
insight into how the political processes that result in tangible action presented a different 
challenge than the speech acts that are made to be central to securitization theory. The 
second—and arguably more important—component of understanding securitization 
theory comes from understanding how speech acts translate into public acceptance of the 
given constitution of threat. In the next chapter, I will assess how public perceptions of 
the Arctic agenda as an existential security matter developed during the course of the 
Harper government, with particular attention to potential differences across regions and 
ideological lines. 
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Ch. 4: Measuring the impact of policy in media and public opinion 
The final aspect of this analysis will look at how government Arctic policy from 2006 to 
2015 was reflected in Canadian media reporting and public opinion. This will draw from 
original research of media reporting as well as analysis of existing public opinion data 
over this time period in order to evaluate the influence of government policy rhetoric on 
the populace. In addition, public opinion and media reporting following key 
flashpoints—particularly the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident—will be evaluated to 
discern whether the national populace was energized on the issue by instances of possible 
“threat.” 
 The more intriguing part of this analysis involves analyzing the effect of 
government rhetoric not only on a national level, but also across provinces and between 
“Northern” Canada and “Southern” Canada. The reason for doing this is to control for 
other factors that may have influenced perceptions of government Arctic rhetoric and 
policy, such as political party loyalty, economic and social divides, education levels, and 
exposure to regular media on Arctic issues. The difficulty in doing so, however, is that 
the potential resonance of the Arctic as a recent security issue is not something that can 
be viewed in a vacuum. As has been argued here, rhetoric about Arctic securitization is, 
in fact, the result of an evolution of Canadian identity since the 19th century. When 
adjusting for perceptions of government action to address the “Arctic security problem,” 
therefore, we cannot isolate the modern nature of the issue from other political lines that 
may have influenced opinions on government action. Instead, research on media 
reporting and public opinion across regions will help to demonstrate whether there was 
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resonance on a national level that is clearly evident beyond other, regional-level factors 
that may affect reception to government rhetoric on given issues.  
The Canadian political landscape: A brief background  
Isolating Canadian electoral politics as a potential variable in public opinion on the Arctic 
may actually be relatively easy to achieve simply because the landscape has been so fluid 
in the past fifty years. An analysis of electoral results from 1968 to 2015257 found it 
difficult to identify consistent party loyalties over an extended period of time from the 
1990s onward, with some exceptions. A large part of this had to do with the presence of 
“political insurgencies” that would occur every few elections. Prior to the 1993 election, 
the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties generally battled for the majority of 
seats (ridings), with smaller proportions won by the NDP and Social Credit Party.258 In 
1993, however, a victory by Jean Chrétien’s Liberals was also met by a Conservative 
collapse—many areas of Western Canada that generally favored the Conservatives voted 
for the Reform Party instead—and the emergence of the Bloc Québécois as a powerful 
political force in light of growing tensions over Quebec’s political status. Conversely, the 
2011 success of the NDP was aided by the wooing of Liberal and Bloc Québécois-
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leaning voters, resulting in massive losses for both parties.259 Attempting to categorize 
voting trends on a simple left-right ideological spectrum also would not capture the 
various cleavages that exist between parties, nor would it represent the potential diversity 
of opinions that could be present across issues. Nonetheless, we can make some 
assumptions based upon the areas in which political trends have shown more consistency. 
For example, we would expect less political support for Harper’s Arctic agenda in 
metropolitan Toronto or Montreal, given the Conservatives’ flagging political success in 
those areas in the last two decades. Conversely, we would expect stronger support in 
Harper’s home province of Alberta, whose own economic interests in natural resource 
development would only increase favorable views toward the government’s Arctic 
economic program.  
 There is also the issue of how Northern Canadians view their interests within the 
Canadian federal system. Each of the three northern territories holds a seat in the 338-
member House of Commons and 105-member Senate, although geographic factors—
particularly in the Nunavut archipelago—make intimate representation more difficult 
than in more populated areas. In addition, Northern Quebec is located within a 
geographically large electoral riding that extends into “Southern” Canada, which may 
limit the resonance of that community’s needs at the federal level. Northern regions also 
remain dependent on federal subsidies, potentially limiting the political position of 
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Northern regions in the federal political process even further.260 Residents of Northern 
Quebec also found themselves trapped in a difficult position when Quebec’s provincial 
government began to assert greater control over the federal-provincial relationship in the 
1980s, which may have further isolated the needs of the primarily Aboriginal population 
from federal purview. Thus, even attempts to push Northern issues to the provincial level 
may not always be fruitful.261 While political devolution giving greater autonomy to local 
governance may be favored by Northern regions, particularly those with a large 
Aboriginal population,262 the current reality is that decisions on Northern issues are 
largely controlled by Southern Canada. This is not only due to a lack of influential 
political representation at the federal level, but also the fact that many northerners live in 
the three territories that hold less power vis-à-vis the federal government than do 
Canada’s provinces. This is especially pronounced in Nunavut, whose geography has 
provided the federal government with an argument to give the territory less power over 
natural resource rights than in the Northwest Territories or Yukon.263 This also, arguably, 
maintains a certain level of psychological distance between Northern and Southern 
Canada in that the northern territories are still viewed as distant frontiers that can be 
governed directly from Ottawa.  
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 On the question of how Northerners view an increased federal presence in the 
Arctic, there is also a notable mix of rhetoric. Some perspectives were more welcoming 
to increased resource extraction activities in the North as a means to boost the region’s 
struggling economy, assuming that such activities were balanced by necessary 
environmental protections.264 Other perspectives, such as those argued by former Inuit 
leader and Canadian diplomat Mary Simon, were more concerned about the realistic 
impacts of increased outside activity on the day-to-day life of Northern communities.265 
There is some weight behind using the term “realistic impacts” here. Although resource 
exploitation could provide short-to-medium-term economic relief for struggling Northern 
communities, the likely effect would be the decline—if not eventual, total elimination 
of—traditional subsistence activities that served as the lifeline for these communities. For 
many Northern communities, having to face such a reality head-on creates a sense of 
pause in the abstract rhetoric happening at the national level. 
 In the context of public opinion on the issue, there are also some methodological 
factors to consider. Even aside from the above conundrum of geographic distance 
between the majority of Canadians and the Arctic, there is also the issue of assumptions 
about how much Canadians truly comprehend the Arctic. The difficulties of measuring 
public opinion have been shown to be particularly present in Canada, not least of which 
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are due to language divisions that can significantly alter the tone of poll questions.266 Yet 
it may also be possible that the elasticity of policy decisions to public opinion may be 
overstated, particularly when the nature of Canadian parliamentary democracy has made 
it difficult for single parties to consistently command strong majorities on a given issue. 
François Petry’s study of democratic responsiveness in Canadian politics found that 
public opinion was certainly able to influence policy outcomes on key issues, particularly 
in cases in which the effects of policies were redistributive to the larger population versus 
benefitting elite interest groups. This was made easier, however, when public opinion 
already supported the government’s agenda.267 An interesting finding by Petry here also 
has application to Arctic policy under Stephen Harper. Using the example of Brian 
Mulroney pursuing free-trade agreements in opposition to public opinion, Petry notes that 
Mulroney was able to overcome this opposition by intensifying communications 
campaigns to meet intensified overall discussion of the free trade issue.268 In short, the 
government was able to win the argument by having the most prominent voice in a loud 
discussion. Although public opinion may not have been steadfastly against Harper’s 
Arctic agenda—as will be discussed below—there is some logical extension here. By 
presenting a bold plan in the face of increased demand for bold action, the government 
may have been able to gain significant momentum to implement its agenda. 
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 One also must consider where the Arctic stands as both a domestic and foreign 
policy issue: socioeconomic issues fall within the former, whereas sovereignty and 
climate policy, for the most part, fall within the latter. The intuitive assumption is that 
domestic policy carries more weight between the two in public opinion, though Petry’s 
analysis demonstrates that changes in government could also noticeably alter this 
balance.269 Carrying this assumption forward, it would not be surprising to see such a 
dynamic when Harper increased rhetoric about Canadian Arctic sovereignty in the 
international sphere. In the previous chapter, I discussed the salience of the Arctic issue 
in the late 1990s in the context of broader Canadian foreign policy. Yet there are also 
some notable points to address when putting the Arctic in the context of foreign policy, 
particularly when determining how opinions differ between across regions.  
The most contentious example of this is how Quebec’s unique culture within the 
Canadian identity shapes public opinion in that province, especially considering the 
dynamics germane to French-language media. Public opinion in Quebec has also shown 
itself to have notable differences from the rest of Canada on major foreign policy issues. 
While Quebec showed higher disagreement than the rest of Canada with the United 
States’ post-9/11 defense policy (to include the invasion of Iraq),270 Quebeckers were 
more favorable than the rest of Canada toward the 1987 Canada-US Free Trade 
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Agreement and subsequent 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.271 There are 
some factors that explain the case of the former. Although Quebeckers’ views of the 
United States have fluctuated over time, some commentators have noted the possibility of 
a growing “anti-Americanism” streak in the province in the early 2000s.272 This may be 
due to less exposure to American media than English-speaking Canada and more 
exposure to media from France, which was more critical of American foreign policy after 
9/11.273 In trade terms, however, Quebec politicians were able to influence public opinion 
in favor of free trade by linking the issue to politics surrounding Quebec nationalism in 
the early 1990s.274 In both cases, we see examples of elites—be they political leaders, 
media, or lobbying groups—playing a significant role in shaping public opinion.  
Although concerted government campaigns existed to influence public opinion 
regarding Arctic initiatives prior to Harper’s government—as outlined in the second 
chapter—the ability of the government to engage in a comprehensive strategic 
communications campaign was heightened over previous eras via technological change. 
As such, the ability to produce mass communications campaigns that could be seen as 
easily in Toronto as they could in Iqaluit allowed for the government to harmonize its 
intended message. One must also consider, however, how Canadians viewed national 
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security in the first place. In light of the political tumult of the 1990s, Canadian attitudes 
were shifting on identity matters when it came to this issue. On matters of defining 
Canadian national identity, opinion polling outside of Quebec found a significant increase 
in support between 1995 and 2004 for factors such as “Speaking the Language,”275 
“Being Born in Canada,” and “Having Citizenship.” There was also an increase in 
support for the Canadian military and national history as sources of pride.276 Arguably, 
this change in support was wedded to the evolving dynamics of the international arena 
and their effects on Canada. Canadian participation in the American-led “War on Terror” 
and further inward evaluation of Canada’s increasingly diverse population—as generally 
harmonious as this latter phenomenon has been—may have contributed to a rise in the 
more conservative notion of national identity. Furthermore, this would have helped 
explain support for the Conservative Party’s 2006 electoral victory as well as continued 
exploitation of identity-based factors by the Harper government to garner support for its 
foreign policy and Arctic agendas.277  
Corollary to these findings is how Canadians were responding to the notion of 
internationalism. As noted in the previous chapter, controversial actions taken by 
Canadian peacekeepers in the 1990s and public realizations of the difficult realities of 
peacemaking in the Afghanistan conflict likely had an effect on public enthusiasm for 
peacekeeping. This finding was also noted in the above polling regarding inclusion of 
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“Democracy” and “Influence in the World” as sources of Canadian pride, which saw a 
decline between 1995 and 2004.278 In this sense, any Canadian attachment to 
internationalism may have come from a cyclical, “nostalgic” desire to attach something 
distinct to the Canadian identity, a desire that became subdued when further inquiry into 
the subject was presented.279  
Pinning down the sources of Canadian foreign policy becomes further 
complicated by the country’s relationship with the United States. While Canadians have 
consistently shown an independent streak when it comes to the relationship, there is also 
a general consensus that bilateral relations need to remain healthy.280 Public opinion can 
also go against certain issues that may put the government in a difficult position within 
the bilateral relationship. An example of this was seen in 2004, when the Canadian 
government backed down on its initial openness to joining an American ballistic missile 
defense system as Canadian public opinion soured toward the United States due to the 
invasion of Iraq and a series of protectionist actions by the Americans toward cross-
border trade.281  
These factors demonstrate that the Canadian public’s perceptions of foreign 
policy are subject to regular change, but are also not irrespective of rational assessment of 
the international scene. At the same time, evaluation of public attitudes toward foreign 
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policy could lead one to believe that Canadians are, at times, subject to “crises of 
confidence” between rhetorical national identity and their willingness to uphold the 
values associated with that identity. Although that is not a trait unique to Canadians, it 
does provide for an important foundation for understanding how the government can 
influence public opinion on matters of national security. 
The issue then becomes determining whether and, if it did, how the Canadian 
government was able to “sell” the Arctic as a security issue to the general public. 
Answering these questions of multiple facets of Canadian society will provide a strong 
understanding of the government’s effectiveness in securitizing the issue. The first aspect 
of this involves identifying trends and differences across the Canadian national spectrum. 
As outlined above, we would expect differences across regions based upon predominant 
political ideology, socioeconomic factors, and population density. The last aspect may 
prove to be the most interesting. While we would expect differences in opinions when 
comparing cities and rural areas, what would the dynamic be when comparing major 
cities to major cities? The value of knowing this is not only in highlighting these 
dynamics, but in determining if there are any potential variables affecting these dynamics 
beyond predominant political ideology. Moreover, it is necessary to determine whether 
the Canadian public has accepted the Arctic problem as a security issue as framed by the 
government. In order to do this, I will trace how public opinion was affected by changes 
in the international environment, most notably surrounding particular Arctic-related 
events. 
Beyond the attitudes of the general public, we can also view the potential 
securitization of the issue through the lens of the media. Certainly, the media can be 
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argued to be an extension of the securitization process rather than being the referent 
object. At the same time, the relationship between the media and public opinion is 
different from the relationship between the public and the government. Whereas the 
government attempts to win public support for its agenda, the media can both influence 
as an elite actor and serve as an effective bellwether of public opinion. This distinction is 
important as it shows that the media’s influence is not constrained by one side of the 
government-public relationship, but can instead serve the interests of either based upon 
the circumstances. Measuring media interpretations of the Arctic security agenda can 
therefore be valuable in determining if trends mirror or help shape public opinion over 
time. Additionally, trends in media reporting and editorializing on the issue may help to 
uncover identifiable preferences within the broadly defined media. If this is the case, then 
it would possibly demonstrate a third actor that has a definable role in the securitization 
process. 
Methodologically, there are some issues to note in analyzing the securitization 
process in this way. Data on Canadian public opinion in regards to this issue is not 
extensive, and the data analyzed here was gathered by polling groups that remained close 
to the issue. Although the polling methodology itself meets an empirical standard, the 
relatively limited availability of polling data should be acknowledged as a byproduct of 
the relative youth of the issue. On this note, the long-term ramifications of the Canadian 
Arctic security agenda cannot yet be evaluated given that increased focus on the issue, as 
defined here, has only been underway for a decade. This is especially important to note 
given the October 2015 electoral defeat of the Harper government, which occurred during 
the time of this writing. It is very possible that the current government under Justin 
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Trudeau would choose not to continue the country’s Arctic security agenda along the 
same lines. The value of this research, therefore, is to evaluate how the government 
during a given period of time attempted a securitization process and to understand the 
factors that allowed—or did not allow—securitization to take place. The subsequent 
effects of these processes, while not possible to study at the present time, are certainly 
worth further study in the future. 
Canadian Public Opinion and Arctic Security 
The main data sets used here were taken as part of a comprehensive joint initiative 
by the EKOS Research Associates polling firm, the Walter and Duncan Gordon 
Foundation, and the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs. Billed as 
“Rethinking the Top of the World,” the polling initiative was published in two iterations 
in 2011 and 2015. One stream of thought would find that this timeline doesn’t completely 
capture the full securitization process that might have been taking place upon Harper’s 
election in 2006. Conversely, this may have nonetheless been enough time for public 
opinion on the Arctic to “settle” with less sensitivity to heightened rhetoric that takes 
place during election campaigns. This latter assumption will guide the understanding of 
the polling results here. Interestingly, the poll also sought opinions from the public of 
other Arctic states in addition to analyzing Canadian public opinion on both the national 
and sub-national levels. Although the results of public opinion outside of Canada are not 
the subject of analysis here, they nonetheless do add some further context to the global 
public picture regarding the nature of Arctic security. 
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 On broad questions facing the Arctic, the 2011 opinion poll did show some 
notable differences between Northern and Southern Canada.282 Although respondents in 
both locales stated that the natural environment was the biggest issue facing the 
Canada—with 33% of Northerners and 39% of Southerners expressing this opinion—
Northerners also put greater value on factors such as housing, the economy, and 
education. The starkest contrast between the two, interestingly, was found amongst those 
who stated that sovereignty was the biggest issue facing the region: whereas 19% of 
respondents expressed this opinion in Southern Canada, only 6% expressed this opinion 
in Northern Canada. What might account for this difference? Pollsters noted that focus 
groups in Northern communities expressed a less developed understanding of the Arctic 
sovereignty issue, particularly as this issue was not adequately presented by the media or 
government. In Southern Canada, the highest response to the prioritization of Arctic 
sovereignty was found in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, although this 
response was not significantly higher than the average in all of Southern Canada. This 
aspect of the polling results is not particularly surprising given the socioeconomic 
differences between Northern and Southern Canada as well as the focused resonance of 
the government-driven Arctic sovereignty campaign toward Southern Canadians. 
Nonetheless, the poll also found Northern Canadians to be more upbeat on opinions of 
current quality of life, expected quality of life in the next 10 years, and current health. 
This finding is surprising at first sight, although differences between Northern regions are 
less surprising. Whereas 84% of Yukon respondents found their life to be “good,” 65% of 
                                                             
282 For reference purposes on all discussion of the 2011 poll here, see EKOS Research Associates, 
“Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey,” January 2011.  
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respondents in more remote Nunavut stated the same. This finding is helpful in 
demonstrating that even the “North” in itself is prone to differences on socioeconomic 
and wellness matters. 
 Respondents were also asked to describe an unprompted view of their 
understandings of the term “security.” A plurality of respondents in both Northern and 
Southern Canada tied security most to protecting Canada’s borders from international 
threats, with a smaller number of respondents highlighting sovereignty or environmental 
protection. The wedding of security to international threats was most commonly found in 
Alberta, with a third of respondents identifying security in this manner. When given 
prompted definitions of security, however, a greater diversity of results was discovered. 
Nine out of ten respondents in Northern Canada rated environmental and social security 
as “important,” with 86% and 82% of Southern Canadians responding the same on each 
category, respectively. When asked the question of whether the Arctic should serve as the 
center of Canadian foreign policy, over half of respondents in both Northern and 
Southern Canada responded affirmatively. More tellingly, Northerners were more likely 
to see the Arctic as an intrinsic part of Canada than Southerners with a difference of 77% 
to 63%. On its face, the difference is not surprising given the identity duality held by 
Northern Canadians versus their Southern counterparts. However, should we read into 
this statistic when considering the impact of securitization and the argument advanced 
here? The fact that six out of ten Southern Canadians saw the Arctic as intrinsically part 
of the Canadian whole does not necessarily debunk this argument, even if this statistic 
does not represent an overwhelming majority. When combined with other questions 
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asked in the polls, there was a clear statement of interest in giving definition to the 
priorities that drove Arctic security. 
When it came to hard security matters, however, 56% of Northern Canadians 
rated national security as an important factor with 69% of Southern Canadians doing the 
same. When asked about devoting military resources to the Arctic and away from global 
conflict zones, a majority of respondents in both Northern and Southern Canada—59% to 
56%—supported this idea. However, a significant difference was seen when given the 
option of not shifting overseas military forces to the Arctic, with 32% of Northerners and 
14% of Southerners expressing this opinion. On the question of building up military 
forces in the Arctic, only 52% of Northerners expressed support for this, whereas 60% of 
Southerners did the same. In Southern Canada, support for increased Arctic militarization 
was highest in Alberta and lowest in Quebec. Even so, support for military and national 
security factors ranked well below statements prioritizing quality of life and 
strengthening the socioeconomic picture across Canada. This demonstrates that while 
hard security factors were not rejected by Canadians, they were also not immediately 
prioritized following the government’s increased rhetorical focus on hard security matters 
in the Arctic. Such a finding, while intuitive, also demonstrates that public opinion 
proved to be relatively stable on the issue during this time. 
What key takeaways should be noted in this first round of opinion polls? Firstly, 
the polls represented a consistent level of understanding of the issues facing the Arctic on 
both the national and sub-national levels. Unsurprisingly, Northern Canadians prioritized 
socioeconomic issues over hard security issues. The fact that Southern Canadians also 
generally prioritized these issues—although not to as high of a degree—was also not 
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surprising. The poll results also showed that, on a provincial level, Southern attitudes 
toward the Arctic generally followed political trends: conservative-leaning Alberta 
tended to show the highest support for increasing hard security measures in the Arctic, 
whereas Quebec was generally the least supportive of such possibilities. Additionally, 
such measures did not receive overwhelming support in the country at large, particularly 
when given the option of instead focusing on socioeconomic and environmental 
protection factors. These results would thus appear consistent with Canadian political 
attitudes on domestic and foreign policy matters. 
What do these results mean for arguments advanced about the impact of 
securitization? As suggested in the first chapter, it is possible that “security” for the 
Canadian populace could indeed refer to addressing the threats faced by Northern 
populations on socioeconomic and environmental degradation matters. Thus, increased 
government attention to the Arctic could very well be a means of providing security 
around these issues. When looking at the poll results, however, the highest response to an 
unprompted definition of security suggested that traditional notions of the term had not 
entirely washed away. The rebuttal to this would be that the poll results also 
demonstrated that Canadians had very diverse views on matters of security. Although the 
government undoubtedly played up the sovereignty and hard security aspects of the issue, 
it also clearly incorporated the “human” aspects into its Arctic agenda as well. This may 
have created an open-ended securitization process, be it intended or accidental, that 
caused the public to respond with a holistic understanding of what “Arctic security” 
actually means. A parallel dynamic to this was how the shaping of Arctic security 
dialogue was occurring on a transnational level.  
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Could we not also argue that Canadian public opinion was responding not only to 
their government’s framing of the issue, but also to how the issue was being framed in 
global discussions? The poll’s engagement with respondents outside of Canada showed 
that opinions on various aspects of the Arctic issue could vary considerably between 
states, although Canadian public opinion was not an outlier on these issues outside of 
questions regarding territorial sovereignty and the ownership of the Northwest Passage. 
On both a national and global level, therefore, the 2011 poll shows that Canadians on 
both the national and sub-national level did show significant interest in the Arctic issue. 
Unsurprisingly, the views expressed in this poll did not significantly depart from 
expected results given political norms and identities on security matters. 
The 2015 version of the poll283 revisited a number of the same issues from the 
first iteration, but also provided contexts regarding how Southern Canadians viewed the 
Arctic space. While the timing of the 2011 version did allow for a more objective 
evaluation of the Harper government’s Arctic agenda, the 2015 version would have 
expectedly been of a more critical bent given the demonstrated problems that various 
Arctic investment initiatives were facing. Would this create a more negative view of the 
Arctic agenda, particularly among Southern Canadians? Or would we expect less focus 
on ambitious infrastructure, resource development, and military spending while 
maintaining support for health and education investments? The findings of the poll did 
help to reveal some underlying discursive effects of the government’s agenda on 
Canadian beliefs regarding the Arctic. To test this, the poll provided respondents with 
                                                             
283 For reference purposes on discussion of this poll, see Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 
“Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Public Opinion Survey, Vol. 2,” (September 2015).  
 127 
 
four true/false statements: Nunavut communities are not connected by road, nor is the 
province connected to any other province via road (true); the majority of Inuit, First 
Nations, and Métis in the Arctic live on reserves (false); Canada has several military 
bases along the Northwest Passage (false); there is no cell phone service in any of the 
three Arctic territories (false). In all, 37% of Southerners polled answered zero or one of 
these questions correctly, with only 10% correctly answering all four. On the question of 
road connectivity, the number of individuals incorrectly answering “false” slightly 
outweighed those answering “true.” Slightly over one-quarter of respondents incorrectly 
believed that Canada had several military bases along the Northwest Passage to provide 
for territorial defense, which raises an interesting notation to this aspect of the poll. While 
overall public knowledge of the Arctic proved to be underwhelming in this poll, could it 
be argued that the government’s rhetorical focus on hard security matters actually stuck 
in the minds of some Canadians? The totality of further results from the polls may help to 
shed light on this question. 
On matters of the greatest issues facing Canada and the Arctic specifically, there 
was little change regarding the prioritization of economic issues on the national level and 
environmental issues on the Arctic regional level. However, issues such as calling for 
governance changes as well as perceived reductions in privacy and freedom of speech—
two categories that did not appear in the 2011 polling results—appeared above all issues 
besides the economy on a national level. Certainly, it seemed that the controversies that 
had plagued the Harper government’s public image in previous years were resonating in 
public opinion. Canadians in both the North and South also demonstrated a slightly less 
optimistic outlook on their quality of life compared to the previous poll, adding further 
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weight to the assumption that the political climate at this time was sensitive to the 
economic downturn and growing discontent toward the current government. When asked 
to measure the importance of various issues facing the Arctic, there was not any 
significant change in terms of how respondents ranked the various issues against each 
other. However, there was a small decline in those respondents who assigned high 
importance to most presented Arctic issues. Additionally, statements that expressed 
support for increasing search-and-rescue and military capabilities in the Arctic saw more 
noticeable declines in respondents who agreed to their importance.  
On security matters, definitions favoring protection of the environment and 
increasing social wellness received the highest number of respondents in seeing them as 
important. The largest decline in support came for definitions that supported increasing 
the national security apparatus in the Arctic, with less than half of Northern respondents 
demonstrating that hard security definitions were not important toward their own 
definition of security. The importance of economic security to defining security also saw 
a noticeable decline, which was likely due to decreased support for natural resource 
exploitation in the region. Opinions on the perceived level of rivalry in the Arctic 
between countries also yielded some interesting results. While a clear majority of 
Northerners felt that the threat of military conflict had decreased or stayed the same in the 
previous year, 50% of Southerners answered in the same manner. This response can be 
interpreted in multiple ways as respondents who answered that the threat was unchanged 
may not necessarily be viewing the threat as absent. Nonetheless, outwardly optimistic 
feelings on this subject were clearly lower outside of Northern Canada, even if the 
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wording of this question did not provide for a clear delineation of the actual level of 
perceived threat.284  
Another interesting point to note was the decreased support for strengthening the 
Canadian military posture in the North. In both Northern and Southern Canada, the 
number of respondents expressing support for strengthening the military’s presence fell 
to less than half. Although support for this remained higher in Southern Canada, there 
was nonetheless a larger percentage decline as well. This could perhaps be as a result of 
the national political situation resonating more outside of the North. There was similarly 
a more pronounced decline in Southerners who rated a military presence in the Canadian 
as “extremely important” vis-à-vis Canadian military operations elsewhere.  
Some surprising results were uncovered when the poll turned to international 
cooperation matters. Although a slight increase in support for a hypothetical nuclear-free 
weapons zone in the Arctic was unsurprising given declining support for hard security 
solutions to Arctic issues in Canada, a sharp decrease in awareness of the Arctic Council 
among Southern Canadians was also observed. This was surprising not only because it 
challenged the assumption that awareness of Arctic issues would remain at least constant 
when compared to the 2011 poll, but it also so happened that Canada held the 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 2013-2015.  
What would explain the decline of awareness of an organization in the country 
that was meant to oversee the organization’s operations during this time? It’s possible 
that tensions with Russia over its 2014 invasion of Ukraine or the government’s focus on 
                                                             
284 The pollsters did note that focus group discussions did not yield a particular sense of strong concern 
about military threats in the region. See “Rethinking the Top of the World” (2015), p. 42-43.   
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hard security matters, neither of which fell within the purview of the organization, 
overshadowed any attention the organization might have otherwise received during the 
Canadian chairmanship. These factors might also explain similar declines in knowledge 
of the organization in Finland and Norway, whose shared borders with Russia weighed 
heavily on Northern issues from 2014 onward. On the other hand, the government’s 
championing of Arctic economic development via resource exploitation would have 
seemingly aligned with the creation of the Arctic Economic Council, which the Canadian 
government touted as a successful byproduct of its chairmanship.285 Canadians also 
showed increased support for allowing non-Arctic states to have a greater say in Arctic 
affairs, which would not be indicative of a backlash toward multinational cooperation in 
light of other geopolitical issues. There was also a decrease in those Canadians who 
thought that their country should take a “firm line” on border disputes, with more 
favoring peaceful negotiations over these disputes.  
The broader conclusion that we can draw from the poll was the presence of a 
general decrease in the resonance of Arctic issues across Canada from 2011-2015. When 
asked specific questions about Arctic matters, Canadians now showed an even greater 
tendency toward peaceful or socioeconomic-based priorities in the Arctic. If Canadian 
public opinion surrounding Arctic sovereignty did hit an apex during the course of 
Harper’s tenure as prime minister, it had seemingly diminished near the end of his tenure 
in 2015. Could we then measure points in which public opinion did spike in favor of 
                                                             
285 Shaun Malley, “Canada’s leadership of the Arctic Council—a look back,” CBC News, April 23, 2015, 
accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-s-leadership-of-the-arctic-council-a-
look-back-1.3046225.  
 131 
 
Arctic sovereignty initiatives in response to governmental influence? A study previously 
undertaken by Mathieu Landriault and Paul Minard looked at exactly this. In order to test 
the resonance of government initiatives in the public mind, Landriault and Minard looked 
at responses to the annual Arctic trips taken by Harper and key Arctic military exercises. 
The military operations in question were Operation NUNALIVUT, which typically took 
place in the spring, and Operation NANOOK, which typically coincided with Harper’s 
summer tour, and were well-publicized as a result. The level of support for these 
operations was measured in the study by support for Harper’s Conservative government 
between 2006 and 2014 during the times in which these trips occurred.286 The authors 
found that the summer Arctic tour and Operation NANOOK did have a noticeable effect 
in increasing support for the Conservative government—whereas NUNALIVUT did not 
have a noticeable effect—suggesting that Harper’s personal emphasis on Arctic matters 
did resonate with the public.287 While the effects of these operations did not have 
longstanding consequences on attitudes toward the Tories, these findings did allow for 
establishing consistency in a public opinion that favored both liberal internationalism in 
its foreign policy and bolder displays of Arctic sovereignty. However, the study did not 
achieve the expected result of finding greater support for the government in its first two 
years, which showed that other factors indeed affected public opinion despite notable 
events in the Arctic.288  
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Even so, the apparent decline in national attention to Arctic issues was consistent 
with a general decline in support for the Conservatives beginning in 2012.289 Combined 
with other aspects of the analysis of polling results, such as higher support for 
government initiatives in Conservative-dominated Alberta, there does appear to have 
been a clear connection between existing political beliefs and support for the 
government’s Arctic agenda. This does not wholly explain levels of support for the 
agenda at various points, however, as previously-discussed assessments showed support 
that was higher than would be suggested by political lines. Landriault and Minard’s 
analysis also suggests that the noticeable connection between Harper’s identity-driven 
Arctic visits and brief increases in public support for the government was indicative of 
the influence of identity factors. Nonetheless, this must be grounded in other aspects of 
Canadian political culture and beliefs, which did not ultimately see a watershed increase 
in support for hard security measures in the Arctic. Instead, identity factors were enough 
to push the issue to a point of increased discussion and perhaps, for a time, a higher level 
of support than would be expected given other political influences. This narrative can, of 
course, become self-fulfilling. What does this prove beyond the idea that the government 
can influence public opinion on a given issue for a period of time? And at what point—
and why—does the government eventually lose the ability to continually maintain 
support on the issue? The answer to this goes beyond the elite factors that exist outside of 
government control, particularly the role of media in continuing to shed light on the issue 
(whether or not their views support the government’s position).   
                                                             
289 Ibid., p. 51. 
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The mass media dynamic in Canada is interesting given the relationship between 
the country’s large size and geographic population spread. The Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC), the country’s iconic, government-backed television and radio 
service, offers both national and regionally-focused programming throughout Canada. 
Although this allows for consistent, high-quality programming regardless of local 
population density, it also may result in coverage that still is under the editorial control of 
a media corporation that is geographically distant from the issue. This could be especially 
notable in the Arctic, where the company’s local branch, CBC North, covers the entirety 
of Northern Canada. As such, the service provides a diverse array of content to serve the 
populations of Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and northern Quebec. 
When a “regional” network broadcasts in multiple languages and covers four time 
zones,290 how “local” can it really be? Although a variety of online media resources exist 
to fill the gaps in local coverage, they do not have the consistent reach of the more 
established CBC. As noted in the earlier discussion on the relationship between Northern 
residents and the government’s Arctic agenda, this may help to explain the distance 
between the Southern and Northern perspectives, even with the apparent presence of 
national mass-media in the North. 
Toronto-based The Globe and Mail, the country’s largest national newspaper, is 
also viewed as the bellwether of national perspectives. The paper, however, has faced 
criticism in how it balances local and regional coverage. Despite its national focus, it has 
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historically held conservative editorial leanings and has been perceived to privilege 
coverage of metropolitan Toronto over other metropolitan areas.291 The Globe and Mail’s 
chief national competitor, The National Post, has also been viewed as traditionally 
conservative-leaning, albeit it has been noted to occasionally buck this trend in notable 
fashion.292 Major metropolitan areas are also served by local newspapers, which can add 
political and social balance to national-level perspectives. The Toronto Star, which also 
happens to be the highest-circulation newspaper in Canada, has tended to support 
progressive perspectives.293 As noted in a 2014 Globe and Mail editorial, however, the 
left-right dynamic is not necessarily telling in terms of views toward the government. 
Although major Canadian print media favored the Conservatives in the 2011 federal 
election, this did not prevent newspapers from being routinely critical of Harper’s 
agenda.294  
As such, the media perspective in Canada must be recognized as nuanced in how 
it represents both local and national issues. The inclusion of media perspectives here is to 
not only help demonstrate how media organizations have presented Arctic security 
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matters on the local and national level, but also to show how they have framed the debate 
over time. Analysis of media perspectives here will focus on the presentation of events 
surrounding three notable events related to the Arctic: the 2007 Russian flag-planting 
incident (as well as preceding perceptions of Harper’s Arctic agenda following his 
election in the previous year); media views of the various issues that became apparent in 
the Arctic security agenda between 2010 and 2014; and “post-mortem” analyses in late 
2015 following the end of Conservative governance.  
Around the time of the 2006 federal election, Harper’s Arctic agenda was not 
going unnoticed by Canadian media. Previously, Harper was criticized for his ties to the 
“Calgary School,” a group of politically conservative academics at the University of 
Calgary who were viewed as the intellectual basis for Harper’s Western Canadian 
political movement that sought to “overturn” perceived centers of power in eastern 
Canada.295 As the election neared, critics of the Calgary School began to tie Harper’s 
ideological leanings to the much-maligned neoconservative influences of the Bush 
administration in the United States.296 Conversely, conservative perspectives, such as 
those found in The National Post, were quick to dismiss these views as baseless.297 On 
Harper’s proposed Arctic agenda, The Globe and Mail published an editorial from 
University of Calgary political scientist and Arctic expert Rob Huebert—who, 
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interestingly, appeared to avoid being lumped in with the Calgary School—two weeks 
prior to the election. In the editorial, Huebert endorsed a focused Arctic agenda while 
also expressing caution over being too optimistic about the Conservatives’ ability to 
actually achieve their proposed agenda.298 The timing of this editorial was interesting 
given how its message could be read. On the one hand, Huebert expressed a fairly 
middle-ground argument regarding the Liberals’ and Conservatives’ respective 
competence in providing for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. On the other hand, the call for 
stronger expressions of Arctic sovereignty may have implicitly supported Harper’s 
agenda, even though Huebert explicitly criticized the Conservatives’ plans. The 
importance of these perspectives is not the fact that they varied on the expected agenda of 
the Harper government, but instead that Harper’s language toward Arctic sovereignty was 
already being recognized as a looming focal point for the next government. 
The controversial Russian flag-planting incident the following year came at a time 
in which the Harper government’s Arctic agenda was beginning to take shape in policy 
implementation terms. By this point, media organizations would have seemingly 
acclimated to the normality of the Arctic sovereignty discussion. So why did this incident 
instead bring greater attention to the issue while also helping to drive a public narrative of 
growing rivalry? As mentioned in the first chapter, this event took place amidst otherwise 
declining relations between Russia and the trans-Atlantic security community. Some 
clues could also be found in how media organizations framed the event when first 
reporting on it. CBC reported the story with a headline of Russia “staking claim to [the] 
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Arctic region,”299 which, while representative of the ongoing scientific missions to build 
a case for future legal claims in the region, also communicated a sense of looming 
conflict between the Arctic states. The National Post furthered this narrative by injecting 
commentary from Arctic legal expert Michael Byers, who saw the incident as 
representative of Canada’s inability to effectively enforce its sovereign claims.300 The 
event was thus immediately being viewed in some circles with an alarmist tint, seeing 
Canada as helpless in the face of Russian incursions. 
CBC’s French-language service struck a milder tone to the unfolding situation—
describing the Canadian government’s position toward the incident as 
“unimpressed”301—with its coverage generally objective and non-editorialized.302 
Montreal daily Le Devoir took an interesting tack in one of its analyses of the situation: 
While soliciting quotes from oft-quoted experts like Huebert and Byers, the newspaper 
also sought the opinions of French-Canadian academics Frédéric Lasserre and Joël 
Plouffe, who both used the opportunity to criticize the American legal position on the 
Northwest Passage as counterproductive and inconsistent.303 Although the Americans’ 
legal argument on the Northwest Passage and their general refusal to ratify UNCLOS was 
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a regular complaint from the Canadians, the inclusion of focused criticisms against the 
Americans was an interesting choice given that previous commentaries on the issue had 
otherwise presented discomfort with perceived Russian expansionism. These comments 
were also not only representative of Canadian tendencies to jab their southern neighbors 
when presented with sovereignty concerns, but also of Canadians’ parallel exasperation at 
the United States’ differing position that potentially endangered a common continental 
position against Russian advances. Although calmer voices ultimately acknowledged that 
the Russians did not pose a dire security threat to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, the 
continued divergence of the North American positions would continue to be a sore spot 
going forward. 
The calming effect of experts on the issue did not stop the media from speculating 
about potential rivalry in the Arctic even after the initial attention to the flag-planting 
incident had subsided. Greater attention to the Arctic region also meant more focus on the 
implications of the “economic nationalism” that came with the government’s attempts to 
demonstrate that it was serious about protecting sovereign claims to resources. As argued 
in the Financial Post,304 the financial-reporting arm of The National Post, the 
government’s promotion of Northern development was becoming increasingly 
intertwined with the promotion of natural resource extraction in areas that were becoming 
noticeably difficult to draw from. This line of thinking saw the government’s agenda as 
creating the expectation that corporations would begin investing energy and funds in 
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resource extraction rather than viewing the region as a potential opportunity that needed 
to be balanced with legitimate environmental and socioeconomic concerns. Certainly, 
Harper had set the tone shortly after the Russian event by invoking his “use it or lose it” 
line. Even NDP leader Jack Layton, whose party was only the fourth-largest in the House 
of Commons at the time, expressed a desire to see greater federal investment in the 
region.305 Although Layton’s comments stated that the government needed to focus 
investment on the socioeconomic needs of the region, rather than prioritize some broad 
notion of sovereignty enforcement to counter foreign interference, these comments from 
an otherwise critical source could have been seen as tacitly encouraging to the 
government’s Arctic focus.  
In November 2007, The Toronto Star published a piece warning of an unprotected 
“back door” that was coming into shape as a result of the opening Northwest Passage.306 
The piece included input from Huebert and Byers, who both argued for the need to invest 
in more naval assets for the region but disagreed over whether they should be of a 
military or civilian coast guard nature. Also included was concerned commentary from 
the former head of Canadian military forces in the North. Embedded with the 
authoritative comments of these individuals was a handful of disconcerting scenarios, 
such as a major environmental disaster or the inability to prevent the passage of a “rogue 
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ship” through Canadian waters, which further elevated the argument that Canada was ill-
prepared to defend its Arctic territory.  
Although this particular article was actually written as a news piece (rather than 
an editorial one), its matter-of-fact description of the Arctic “threat” was demonstrative 
of the reality that the Arctic region had indeed become a matter of national security for 
Canada. What did this mean for the next few years of Canadian policy? While these 
views were certainly in line with how the issue was being presented in other Arctic states, 
it was notable that the events of August 2007 had a nearly immediate effect on Canadian 
discourse about Arctic security. Whereas the Harper government had first begun the 
securitization process during its campaigning in late 2005, the issue had seemingly 
become fully securitized two years later. The next question, then, was whether society 
(and the media that served as a connection between society and governance) would 
continue to accept the threat as the government undertook measures to counter it. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the government faced a multitude of clear difficulties 
in implementing its Arctic agenda that were reflected considerably in Canadian media.  
Yet a key question would need to result from this: Did society and the media view 
the Harper government’s missteps in its Arctic agenda as poor execution in responding to 
a legitimate threat, or did they view them as proof that the securitization of the Arctic was 
a misguided endeavor in totality? By the time the F-35 controversy began to unfold in 
2010, the Harper government had arguably been in power long enough for a full 
evaluation of Harper’s policy vision to take place, and it had already survived a snap 
election to boot. A lengthy January 2011 profile of Harper in the popular weekly 
magazine Maclean’s was particularly representative of the Canadian political climate 
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during this time. Depending on one’s perspective when reading the piece, Harper could 
either be viewed as politically bold for his strategy of moving a center-left country 
rightward, or as an ideologue seeking to implement policies that were anathema to the 
country’s progressive values.307 Similarly, there was a mix of perspectives in reference to 
the Arctic agenda. One perspective published in Maclean’s in early 2010 continued to 
lament the “inability” of Canada to protect its Arctic sovereignty and, interestingly 
enough, tied current events to previous instances of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty being 
“threatened.”308 Appeals to Canadian sovereignty would be used for the other side of the 
argument. A 2012 Ralph Nader editorial published by The Toronto Star warned against 
the Harper government’s closeness with the militaristic American security umbrella, and 
called for a Canada independent of these pressures.309 The coming tumult of the Arctic 
agenda was nonetheless overshadowed in the run-up to the 2011 federal election, which 
was more focused on the general problems with the F-35 program and perceptions of a 
lack of government transparency.  
By 2012, however, the media was beginning to pay greater attention to the 
problems encountered in the Arctic. The reporting of massive cost overruns in an Ottawa-
backed Nunavut housing project, for example, looked all too similar to the F-35 
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debacle.310 Although the Government of Nunavut shouldered most of the blame for the 
cost overruns in this instance, the event was a microcosm of the budgetary difficulties 
that were becoming apparent in Arctic operations. By 2013, Harper’s rhetoric was 
looking increasingly empty when juxtaposed with actual policy. As published in The 
National Post, it was no longer simply a question of the problems faced by the 
government bureaucratically, but also whether the threat of foreign incursions in the 
Northwest Passage was overblown in the first place.311 Arctic politics expert Heather 
Exner-Pirot referred to Harper’s Arctic policies as “embarrassing” and even referred to 
him as the “Putin of the Arctic” due to his aggressive statements about Canadian Arctic 
sovereignty.312 Oddly enough, the same media outlets that had willingly published the 
hawkish commentaries about the Russian “threat” in 2007 were now turning against the 
insinuation that the threat was ever that serious in the first place. Certainly, alarmism was 
decried by influential voices prior to this, such as was the case in a 2010 editorial by 
Plouffe and Harry Borlase that appeared in Le Devoir.313 Yet despite the 2011 electoral 
gains made by the Conservatives, the flaws in the Arctic agenda’s execution were 
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becoming clearly apparent. Less charged evaluations, such as that by Arctic historian 
Whitney Lackenbauer published in The Globe and Mail, noted the difficulties faced by 
the government while also leaving open the possibility that the spirit of the agenda could 
be salvaged.314 Still, growing frustration with the costs and difficulties faced by the 
government’s various Arctic projects should not be examined in a vacuum. As the Arctic 
agenda was heavily security-focused and promised increased military spending, it would 
only be logical that the F-35 controversy and the costs incurred in Canada’s participation 
in the Afghanistan campaign would extend a general wariness toward Arctic security 
spending. Paradoxically, this wariness was met with a doubling-down of military 
spending pledges by the government.315 Although the government was clearly 
demonstrating rhetorical commitment to its policies—even those outside of the Arctic 
space—it was clearly losing ground when the results of these policies were put under the 
microscope.  
Following a 2015 federal election involving a tight three-way race between 
Harper’s Conservatives, Trudeau’s Liberals, and Thomas Mulcair’s NDP right until 
election day, the Liberals managed to pull off a surprisingly strong victory that left them 
with a majority in the House of Commons and the Canadian prime ministership for the 
first time in nearly a decade. Naturally, questions were raised about what Arctic policy 
would look like under the new government. With Trudeau not making any particularly 
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bold statements about any changes in Arctic policy during the course of the campaign,316 
these commentaries seemingly appeared to turn toward evaluations of Harper’s policies. 
Additionally, the reality soon became evident that Trudeau would be inheriting Harper’s 
Arctic budgetary woes with ongoing projects.317 Nonetheless, some initial commentaries 
following the election also expressed a belief that Trudeau’s government would be more 
attentive to the social problems facing the North. An editorial published by CBC argued 
that failure of the Conservatives to win any of the three seats from the Northern territories 
signaled a protest against Harper’s Arctic policies. The surprising defeat of Leona 
Aglukkaq, who had represented Nunavut in the House of Commons and served as a 
member of Harper’s cabinet since 2008, in favor of Liberal candidate Hunter Tootoo was 
seen as particularly damning.318 It’s possible that the result in Nunavut was simply 
consistent with the national trend favoring the Liberals, especially as the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories also flipped to the Liberals from the Conservatives and NDP, 
respectively. Aglukkaq was also favored early in the election campaign,319 which 
suggests that there was not festering discontent in the territory toward Harper’s agenda 
leading up to the election. In the months that followed, it was not possible to discern if 
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major changes were underway in the Arctic under the new government. Although the 
Arctic and climate change matters featured during Trudeau’s March 2016 visit to 
Washington, commentators saw the visit as positive but unrevealing on Arctic matters.320 
Instead, commentaries in the United States were more focused on the warm welcome 
received by Trudeau in Washington, whose youthful, progressive demeanor was painted 
as a refreshing tack from the opaque, pessimistic rhetoric of his predecessor.321 It is 
apparent, however, that the rhetoric had shifted along these lines. Unlike his predecessor 
a decade prior, Trudeau did not expend his earliest breaths as prime minister to make 
statements of sovereignty toward Canada’s southern neighbor.  
The findings of this analysis,322 while generally intuitive, nonetheless offer 
understandings of how the securitization process aided Stephen Harper’s Arctic agenda 
during the life of his government. Although Harper faced many policy and bureaucratic 
difficulties in actually implementing the tangible aspects of the agenda, his rhetorical 
focus on the issue—and subsequent coverage of this focus within the national media—
arguably raised the profile of Arctic security issues in the public sphere. Public opinion 
polls might not have reflected overwhelming support for a stronger Canadian position on 
sovereignty matters, but they did demonstrate attention to the idea in the first place. Thus, 
the securitization process might not have been successful in making hard security matters 
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in the Arctic a public priority, but it did have an impact on creating a measurable level of 
support, even if unenthusiastic, for the government’s agenda. The combination of mass 
media and public opinion also provides some understandings of the Canadian political 
dynamic that can be used for further comparative research. Despite the diversity and 
fragmentation of Canada’s political system, strength of secondary political parties at 
various points in time, and intertwining of both domestic and foreign policies with a 
regular look toward the United States, the political dynamics driving support for the 
government’s Arctic policies were remarkably normal. That is, opinions toward the 
government’s Arctic agenda appeared to track closely with partisan political beliefs or 
day-to-day practical issues (e.g. higher support in the North for the socioeconomic 
aspects of Arctic policymaking). Therefore, while the securitization process elevated the 
issue to greater resonance in the public mind, the intensity of support for specific 
proposals came more from conventional political forces. What, then, can we determine 
from tracing the development of Canadian Arctic identity to the present as it relates to the 
securitization process? In the next chapter, I will conclude this analysis with several 
avenues in which to further evaluate that question. 
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Fig. 2: Summarization of public opinion between 2011 and 2015 
2011 Poll 2015 Poll 
Greater public focus in Northern Canada 
than Southern Canada on Arctic 
socioeconomic matters 
Southern understandings of Northern 
Canada low despite government 
securitization campaign 
More favorability in both Northern and 
Southern Canada for “soft” approaches to 
Arctic security compared to “hard” 
security measures 
Decreased support in both North and 
South for increasing military presence in 
North 
Greater support in Southern Canada for 
increasing hard security footprint in 
Arctic 
Southern understandings of Arctic 
Council low despite Canadian 
chairmanship of the organization from 
2013-15 
Highest support among Southern 
Canadians for increasing Arctic military 
presence shown in Alberta, lowest support 
in Quebec 
General decrease in Southern Canada of 
attention to Arctic issues 2013-15 
Support for various Arctic security 
measures appeared to track with domestic 
political dynamics 
Decreased support for Arctic issues likely 
influenced by general public turn against 
Harper’s government, though other factors 
in play as well 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 In August 2008, Parks Canada’s Underwater Archeology Service (UAS) began an 
expedition that would take on political significance in the coming years. While Ottawa’s 
redoubling of Arctic sovereignty was in full swing, UAS was seeking to find some of the 
earliest inspirations of Canadian Arctic identity: the remains of Sir John Franklin’s ill-
fated expedition.323 Although some details of the expedition’s fate had been determined 
over time, the remains of Franklin’s ships Erebus and Terror had actually never been 
found. Robert Grenier, the UAS archaeologist tasked with leading the expedition, had 
also led a mission to find the ships in the 1990s.324 Rather than being a routine scientific 
expedition that might have otherwise received little attention outside of academic circles, 
however, the 2008 mission was declared to be an assertion of Canadian sovereignty. This 
declaration was not made by Grenier or the scientific team, but instead by Environment 
Minister (and future Foreign Minister) John Baird, who was present to announce the 
expedition. Noting the significance of Franklin’s mission to Canadian history, Baird also 
stated, “We certainly think that by establishing our long-standing presence in the Arctic, 
that can enhance issues of sovereignty.”325 Although the mission’s timing tracked with 
the timeline of the government’s progressing Arctic agenda, it also so happened that the 
Russian scientific mission that had brought greater public attention to Arctic sovereignty 
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matters occurred the previous August. East-West relations were also at perhaps their 
lowest point in the post-Cold War era following the Russian invasion of Georgia a week 
prior to the announcement. These coincidences were likely outweighed by the 
practicalities of such an expedition, not least of which being the necessity of operating 
such a mission during the summer months to reduce difficulties in operating in the Arctic 
climate. Much as it had during Vilhjalmur Stefansson’s expeditions a century prior, the 
Canadian government was nonetheless sending a message: No opportunity to assert 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty is too small.  
After pursuing the ships for six more summers, researchers finally discovered the 
remains of Erebus in September 2014.326 For Harper, the moment was more than a piece 
of his Arctic agenda: Some commentators went so far as to note that he seemed 
personally obsessed with finding the expedition’s remains.327 Others noted Harper’s 
desire to leave a lasting legacy on the Canadian conception of the North that would push 
future prime ministers to prioritize the Arctic as a key component of national 
sovereignty.328 The discovery was announced with much fanfare by the government, with 
Harper declaring the find as a key victory for the Canadian case on the extent of its Arctic 
sovereignty. Although the tone of the announcement was to be expected by this point, the 
seemingly vindicated manner in which Harper tied the expedition to Canadian 
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sovereignty was nonetheless puzzling to observers.329 With other aspects of the Arctic 
agenda visibly facing problems, Harper was nonetheless relishing the moment. 
 The point of this anecdote is not just to provide further evidence of the extent of 
the Harper government’s securitization campaign, but also to demonstrate the way in 
which it tried to paint the Canadian Arctic as a timeless representation of national 
identity. In the course of this analysis, I have traced a linear pattern of national identity to 
demonstrate that the conception Harper spoke of was based in historical precedence. In 
light of this, the discovery of Erebus came at an interesting time. Whereas Harper would 
have trumpeted the discovery even if it had come at an earlier time during his 
government’s reign, the issues facing the government’s Arctic policy at this time made 
this a new reminder of Arctic sovereignty essential to the government’s message. From 
the government’s standpoint, it was necessary to regularly re-emphasize Arctic 
sovereignty in order to maintain continuance of the securitization process.  
But given the visible problems that the government was facing in defending this 
message, could this have actually decreased the effectiveness of the government’s 
message and actually made it seem more overbearing? From what we saw in the previous 
chapter, the strength of the government’s message on Arctic sovereignty indeed saw a 
decline in public opinion around this time. There was also a looming trend of declining 
support for the government in general which, as shown in previously cited research, had 
an effect on support for the government’s policies. This study of the Harper government’s 
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Arctic policies therefore showed that while the securitization process itself was 
successful insofar as the Canadian population generally recognized Arctic sovereignty 
challenges as a security issue—not to mention the growing recognition of Arctic security 
issues globally—the ability of the government to sustain the bureaucratic inertia of its 
Arctic agenda nonetheless fluttered after a period of time. This certainly occurred due to 
several aforementioned factors that are expected in democratic governance, but also 
raised a number of interesting questions about the problems of connecting securitization 
processes to demonstrable government action.  
While we can certainly point to the successes of the government in developing 
Arctic security on a discursive level, does it really mean much if the rhetoric was not 
ultimately matched by actual policy? Cases such as this do demonstrate some of the 
limits of securitization theory, but also present new opportunities in connecting theory to 
political practice. For all of the discussion of convincing the populace of a given threat as 
part of the securitization process, there is little discussion of how to convince those 
within government of the weight of the issue, particularly within the realm of 
parliamentary democracy. In some ways, the securitization process is almost anathema to 
the actual nature of parliamentary operations. With the rhetorical emphasis that the 
Harper government put on increasing spending on hard security measures in the Arctic, it 
would be expected that the parliamentary opposition would not look favorably upon the 
government’s proposals simply due to ideological and party-line disagreements. This 
does not, however, rule out the effect that the securitization process could have in raising 
the issue generally. That is, if the parliamentary opposition instituted counter-proposals 
that recognized some form of Arctic security response, but had a different definition of 
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what “Arctic security” actually meant, could we nonetheless see that as a representation 
of an effective securitization process? In this particularly case, the political opposition, 
particularly the Liberal Party, was not too far removed from accepting the Arctic security 
issue in the first place. As discussed by Petra Dolata, the shift from Liberal to 
Conservative governance in 2006, which was arguably an important spark in the Arctic 
sovereignty and security discussion on a rhetorical level, did not result in a momentous 
change in actual policy.330 In essence, the rhetorical change was representing already-
occurring changes in policy that had been happening under Liberal governance.  
The resulting analysis of this case has demonstrated that securitization processes 
undertaken by the Canadian government toward the Arctic from 2006-2015 were not 
solely endemic to that point in time. Instead, these processes actually built upon 
longstanding factors within the Canadian national identity that fueled a noticeable pattern 
of responses to perceived infringements to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. From this study, 
we have derived some interesting conclusions. First, securitizing moves by the 
government were often met with some sort of policy response, be it through new 
legislation or increased resources to the Arctic region. The tangible effects of these 
responses, however, were mixed and often depended on domestic political dynamics at a 
given time. A second finding is that gaps continue to exist between our understandings of 
the securitization process and actual policy implementation. Further research on this 
specific aspect of the securitization process beyond existing research on the formation of 
securitizing rhetoric may yield more interesting conclusions for how governments 
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manage both the rhetorical and governance processes. These conclusions can be plugged 
into existing research on securitization theory which is moving in this direction. 
What does this research mean for understandings about securitization? 
Some perspectives have noted how Canadian rhetoric toward the issue, while 
raising the profile of the Arctic globally, also created a false narrative of how to approach 
Arctic security issues. Keskitalo discusses the gap that exists when comparing national-
level discourse about the Arctic with discourse when viewing the region as a whole. For 
Keskitalo, Canadian rhetoric toward the Arctic still viewed the region in frontier terms, 
which created an inaccurate image of the problems that faced both the Canadian and 
global Arctic.331 This perspective identifies an interesting problem. Although the Arctic 
region as a whole faces common issues across national borders, it is ultimately national 
governments which must set a policy agenda to address these issues. As such, there is not 
only duplication of work in addressing the region’s issues, but also little coordination that 
could better suit the needs of the Arctic in totality.332 Conceptions of “otherness” that 
create differences between Northern and Southern Canada are also less pronounced in the 
Nordic countries, which hinder true Canadian understandings of the region.333 
This perspective also notes some difficulty in identifying the referent objects in 
the securitization process. By securitizing the Arctic space, was the Canadian government 
actually only talking about the Canadian Arctic rather than the region as a whole? Going 
                                                             
331 E. Carina Keskitalo, “Setting the Agenda on the Arctic: Whose Policy Frames the Region?” Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 (Fall/Winter 2012), p. 162-63.  
332 Ibid., p. 161. 
333 Ibid., p. 159. 
 154 
 
by Keskitalo’s line of thinking, this seems likely. Although Canadian securitization of its 
Arctic space inherently involved conceptions of the international dynamic, it did not 
address the threats to the Northern environment or populations globally. Instead, it 
involved constructing a foreign threat to Canadian Arctic interests when the threats to the 
total Arctic space were actually contained within the region. This sub-regional 
securitization thus created a world within a world when the threat actually required buy-
ins from all of the Arctic states. Lacking sufficient clarity on where and to whom the 
securitization processes were actually occurring may have contributed to an overly 
ambitious Arctic policy strategy that was based more on a reactive feeling to counter a 
broad notion of “threat” rather than first identifying the origin of the actual threat. 
This creates a new question: Do securitization efforts actually follow well-
established policy processes such that the government already has sufficient inertia to 
convince the population of a given threat? In other words, does the general population 
accept that a threat exists simply because a competent authority says so, even though 
democratic processes would theoretically provide the capability for pushing back against 
that decision? This is an interesting framework to understand where the securitization 
process actually begins, and is one that could potentially use further exploration. 
However, it is also inherently couched in one of the difficulties of securitization literature 
in that securitization is tied only to the speech acts of the government. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, I noted the possibility of other actors—namely the media—in furthering 
the securitization process. Securitization literature is not devoid of the roles that non-
governmental organizations and other actors play, particularly in areas such as the Arctic 
where the threat is transnational. The difficulty, however, is actually defining the picture 
 155 
 
in the region as containing “threats” rather than undergoing a time-specific period of 
politicization.334  
As seen in the discussion on the role of public opinion, the national government’s 
rhetoric has less resonance in Northern Canada. When measuring this dynamic in this 
particular case, we must also consider how the population is connected to the governing 
authorities. It is also notable that the authoritative body undertaking a securitization 
process, even if it is a government body, might not necessarily be the national 
government.  Whereas Northern Canadians have a relatively low level of representation 
in national politics, social cohesion would be expectedly higher at the local level than in 
more populated areas of Canada. Thus, the ability of Northerners to “set the agenda” 
through embedded social factors results in less need to convince the population of a given 
agenda after the policy process has been set in motion. This particular factor may not 
apply so much to security matters, however, as even “soft” aspects of security policy 
receive backing and direction from the federal government. This may be the difficulty in 
attempting to view securitization processes across multiple layers of government insofar 
as the national authority tends to control security policy. Though this does not give the 
government the monopoly on security matters, it does centralize the number of voices 
who are attempting to shape security policies.  
Further difficulty in defining the securitization of the Arctic space involves 
recognizing how the Arctic is a region that crosses other widely recognized regions. 
Although I noted the work of Buzan and Waever in using the Arctic space as a “security 
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constellation” to connect regions in the first chapter, other perspectives see regional 
construction differently. For Powers and Goertz, regions are constructed based on 
institutional economic linkages,335 which may have application to this case. In this 
conception, these economic linkages serve as a foundation for other areas of region-
building in the social and political spheres, to include security issues.336 This argument is 
not significantly different from Buzan and Waever’s per se, although it does build on that 
work’s particular definitions of regions. The interesting question raised here is the 
institutional aspect of forming a region. While it was not necessary to form the Arctic 
Council in order to view the Arctic as a coherent region, it did give weight to the idea that 
the Arctic was a region with a particular set of needs that needed to be addressed by a 
specialized, multinational body. Previously, issues facing the Arctic on a multilateral 
level were conducted in a more ad hoc fashion that did not create much continuity in 
speaking to the region’s particular needs. There was additionally the issue of where best 
to find areas of practical cooperation between Arctic states. As the Arctic Council was 
formed only a few years after the end of the Cold War, economic issues seemed to be the 
easiest foundation for cooperation to avoid lingering political differences between East 
and West. Nonetheless, the economic issues facing the Arctic regions in the Nordic 
countries were of greater relevance to respective national political discourses than in the 
United States or Canada. Discourses that emanated across the Arctic were therefore 
influenced by discourses endemic to the Nordic region, but the North American 
                                                             
335 Kathy Powers and Gary Goertz, “The economic-institutional construction of regions: conceptualization 
and operationalization,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 (December 2011), p. 2394-95. 
336 Ibid. 
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viewpoints toward the Arctic were less influential in institutional discussions. This is 
likely due to more North American rhetoric about sovereignty and hard security matters 
than in the Nordic countries, even despite the Arctic’s similar relevance to Nordic 
defense policies.337  
Thus, the images influencing a collective Arctic identity are actually 
representative of certain national-level identities that managed to rise to the top of issue 
prioritization. Because of the “regions within a region” nature of the Arctic, transnational 
regional linkages are likely best served on a continental level. For Nordic states, this has 
been easier to achieve through institutional means due to shared borders and connections 
between indigenous groups across these borders.338 The Arctic has also served as a 
particularly enriching source of post-Cold War cooperation between Norway and Russia, 
owing to both a long-history of cross-border relations prior to the Cold War period as 
well as common economic interests in the Barents Sea.339  
A visualization of such a dynamic is harder to imagine in North America, 
however, due to multiple factors. First, the area near the US-Canadian Arctic border is 
more remote than that in the Nordic region, making it difficult for the two countries to 
maintain a regular working relationship over shared territory. Second, the two countries 
are engaged in an ongoing dispute over the demarcation of the maritime border. Settling 
of this issue would likely help to bring about the possibility of greater cooperation 
                                                             
337 This is due to less general focus on hard security matters in overall national discourse in the Nordic 
countries during the formation of Arctic-focused institutions in the 1990s. 
338 The Sami people emanate from a broad region that overlaps Finland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. 
339 Geir Hønneland, “Identity Formation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region,” Cooperation and Conflict, 
Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1998), p. 283-84. 
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between the two countries in the region, although disagreements over ceding fishing 
resources near the border have not left much room for hopeful resolution in the near 
future.340 Finally, intertwined cooperation with the United States in the Arctic would only 
occur following a massive shift in historical Canadian thinking regarding its Arctic 
sovereignty. Although the 2007 Russian flag-planting incident may have altered the 
direction of modern Arctic security discourse in the West, the fact remains that many of 
the “sovereignty emergencies” that Canada previously faced emanated from concerns 
over American encroachment in the Arctic. Close cross-border relations similar to those 
present along the main US-Canadian border would therefore represent an undoing of how 
the region has historically fit into Canadian identity. For such a scenario to occur, the 
negative effects of climate change on the natural environment would need to reach a 
point at which the two sides were forced to engage in shared management of the region to 
prevent further degradation.  
Such a development would also represent a significant change in the regional 
order such that even closely intertwined relations—like those currently seen in the Nordic 
countries—would not be sufficient to address climate change. This does not mean that the 
two countries cannot have friendly, cooperative relations in the region, but instead that 
lingering identity and political factors prevent either side from submitting to a truly joint, 
regional space. 
                                                             
340 Rob Huebert, “Why Canada, U.S. must resolve their Arctic border disputes,” The Globe and Mail, 
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A further outcome of studying this case was showing the limits of securitization 
theory, even despite the acknowledged usefulness of the approach as an analytical 
foundation. Arguably, this particular case demonstrates instances in which the theory is 
superfluous to cases in which security is more embedded within a given political 
situation.341 While this does make securitization theory more apt to describing an 
emerging security situation such as that in the Arctic region, it also represent a potential 
empirical problem. If securitization theory can only apply to certain cases, then what is 
the value of using a securitization-influenced case to develop further principles for 
understanding political behavior? The value in this case is the manner in which 
securitization theory is seen as the vehicle for understanding the power of the rhetorical 
process but doesn’t necessarily act as proof of the theory’s validity. Instead, the dynamics 
observed here give considerable weight to the idea that rhetorical processes can influence 
a population on the constitution of threat, but also that the ability to constitute the threat 
in the first place stems from an existing set of identity factors. In the case of the Canadian 
Arctic, we see that these identity factors helped to reify the concept of threats to national 
sovereignty at given points in time. The fact that these identity factors maintain 
continuity in a non-obvious manner—that is, the Harper government’s highlighting of 
them was seen as actually being contrary to an understood set of identities by a fair 
portion of the population—is an even more interesting finding from the course of this 
research. It may be this factor, namely the strength of identity factors “in the background” 
of day-to-day political operations, that deserves further research.  
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In the end, standalone identity factors were not enough to create a successful, 
broadly accepted Arctic agenda. In this, the Harper government may have missed an 
opportunity to implement its agenda more gradually. Arguably, the basic securitization 
process of threat constitution was sufficient to allow the government to set the terms for 
an Arctic security agenda. Had the government dialed down its rhetorical emphasis on 
sovereignty and implemented its agenda more gradually, it might have been able to 
achieve successful results given the political limitations. This raises the question of where 
the securitization process actually ends. For the Harper government, the process was an 
integral part of its Arctic security agenda, rather than the precursor to win further public 
support. This, in many ways, was problematic from a policymaking standpoint, but also 
revealed that the level of commitment to the process might not have been necessary in the 
first place. Whereas previous instances of Canadian unease over its Arctic territory were 
marked by responses to singular instances—such as the Manhattan or Polar Sea 
incidents—the process under the Harper government was more fluid. Even having noted 
the significance that the 2007 Russian flag incident had on the securitization process, this 
incident acted to bring existing processes to light rather than create them. The fact that 
this was indeed a fluid process might have motivated the government to regularly inject 
its policies with significant rhetorical backing.  
What is interesting about this case is that it shows an instance in which the 
government’s effective securitization process actually became oversaturated. As the 
government built expectations for the level of threat, it also increased the expectation for 
actions to meet that threat. When difficulties in implementing an effective set of policies 
to meet the threat became apparent, the existence of the threat itself was questioned. In 
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this way, the government began to lose its authoritative “linguistic competence” on the 
issue.342 As the federal government is the authority tasked with ensuring security over its 
territory, however, there were no actors who could step to fill in the authority void. 
Inasmuch as the government maintained a consistent rhetorical message regarding Arctic 
sovereignty, the conceptual threat remained. By default, the lack of any other potential 
competent authority on the issue that could seriously challenge the federal government’s 
rhetoric allowed it to hold, even despite the enduring practical issues of Arctic security 
policy. 
The future of Arctic security 
 What if we consider the possibility that the Canadian government’s current policy 
difficulties may not matter so long as they are corrected in the long-term? That is, if we 
accept that rhetoric about Arctic security matters has been set as a constant in Canadian 
political discourse, would it not follow that policymakers would put more energy into 
overcoming the difficulties of operating in the Arctic? Firstly, what we believe to be the 
“short-term” in this case could very well be a decade given budgetary commitments that 
have already been set in motion by the Harper government. We are also assuming that no 
significant disruption to the relatively harmonious dynamic currently in place in the 
Arctic region will occur during this time. A change in this dynamic, however unlikely, 
could result in further rhetorical escalation that would potentially create a new set of 
financially straining policies. What is instead needed is a re-imagination of the Arctic 
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space from the Canadian perspective. Having examined historical responses to perceived 
threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, it is clear that policies to address perceived threats 
to sovereignty were reactive and focused on the short-term.  
In previous cases, this did not necessarily result in negative consequences: As 
other instances discussed here were generally focused on perceived threats from the 
United States, the Canadian response was generally sufficient to satisfy sovereignty 
concerns within the bilateral relationship. Current realities present a different set of 
challenges for Canadian policymakers, however. In contrast to the actions taken by the 
Canadian government in the early and mid-20th century regarding perceived threats to 
security, climate change has brought about a serious threat to Canadian territory. 
Canadian policy must therefore address both geopolitical balancing of Arctic sovereignty 
while also providing for legitimate responses to the effects of climate change on 
Canadian Arctic communities. This would seemingly imply that sovereignty concerns in 
the traditional sense should be de-prioritized in favor of multilateral cooperation to deal 
with the effects of climate change. The ability of the Canadian government to take this 
stance is difficult, however, due to continued Western tensions with Russia, as well as 
lingering disputes over legal claims to various areas of the Arctic space. This does have a 
negative effect on Arctic cooperation efforts, even if that aspect of the East-West 
relationship has been generally positive. The simple solution is to simply drop insistence 
on these claims, though management of the Arctic space ultimately falls back to 
individual governments agreeing to work collectively. Even among Western Arctic states, 
this is not so easy. 
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How, then, are we supposed to view the Arctic space in light of what we’ve come 
to understand about the securitization processes that have occurred in the region over the 
past decade? Firstly, the timeline of this particular securitization process suggests that it 
may be completed in basic terms, although what the future holds is still up for debate. 
The fact that the basic securitization process has occurred does not prevent the possibility 
of new rounds of securitization to address particular threats that will arise in the Arctic 
space. There is also the problem of how new threats are being created by the failure of 
cohesive security policies among the Arctic states: That is, the lack of interconnected 
cooperation on security matters between states, even among the NATO members, 
potentially creates a negative feedback loop in actually securing against the threat. This 
largely has to do with domestic retrenchment on security matters in Canada and Norway 
or, in the case of Denmark and the United States, lacking consistent policy salience on 
Arctic issues. In the latter countries, a greater push for recognition of the challenges 
facing the Arctic would likely have a positive benefit on the space as a whole, and would 
encourage more focused cooperation from other Arctic states. Unfortunately, 
significantly increased engagement on the parts of Denmark and the United States is 
unlikely due to the lack of enduring identity factors in the two countries that activate 
Arctic securitization processes. For more cohesive policies to occur, the agenda would 
need to be set by players who have a greater stake in the region within their national 
politics, which would naturally be Canada or Norway. Russia could potentially activate 
this process as well, though this would require a significant change in its greater strategic 
outlook that is also very unlikely in the near future.  
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The second issue is that securitization processes, while effective in creating 
greater focus on the fact that there are indeed security issues in the Arctic, also created a 
series of competing narratives as to where the threat actually emanated from. The most 
prominent “threat” involved infringements on sovereignty over newly discovered natural 
resources. Although this threat may have garnered the most attention in the public sphere, 
it also did not capture the full threat picture that included threats from the natural 
environment. The question is whether this was a natural tendency based upon traditional 
notions of security or whether this was a result of the language used by authoritative 
voices. Based upon the analysis presented here, it would appear that authoritative voices 
specifically crafted rhetoric based upon hard security concerns, although it would also be 
fair to say that such an approach was heavily influenced by previous conceptions of 
security. While it is possible to create understandings of threat from the natural 
environment, the discursive manner of doing so can result in conflation of what the 
public understands to be security. As seen in the previous chapter, the public is not 
ignorant to the idea of environmental matters falling within the realm of security, but also 
have not naturally engrained the idea of security-through-environmental-protection into 
the collective consciousness. The result of this, as evidenced by this case, is the ease that 
the government had in continually tying Arctic security to sovereignty matters due to the 
lack of a coherent voice offering an alternative version of regional security. Because of 
this, there was conscious recognition of the environmental aspects of Arctic security that 
were nonetheless not powerful enough to be enveloped in the actual securitization 
process. As a result, hard security matters that only made up part of the region’s security 
dominated the focus of the securitization process. 
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Finally, there is a certain irony in the fact that the region that will be directly 
impacted by the effects of climate change was less targeted by securitization rhetoric. 
With the Canadian government having to speak to the majority of its population that lives 
in “Southern” Canada, the securitization of the public in the North was functionally 
unnecessary. This could, however, result in a negative feedback loop for the practical 
aspects of the securitization process that go beyond political fallout in Northern 
communities. With the difficulties of operating in the Northern climates now evident, 
Southern Canadians’ appetite for continued investment in the region may very well 
decrease to a point of undoing stated government commitments to Northern issues. This 
would have a detrimental effect on progress made on better understandings of the 
socioeconomic issues facing the North, regardless of the difficulties encountered in recent 
policymaking. Taking into account the previously advanced argument regarding Harper’s 
personal view of Arctic security, such a scenario is one that even future governments 
would want to avoid. This also adds further to the idea that the securitization process 
toward the Arctic is non-continuous, and that a new securitization process may be 
necessary in the future for the government to continue to justify devoting resources to 
Arctic issues. Future securitization processes, however, would be unlikely to target 
rhetoric toward Northern Canadians for the same reasons as before. These securitization 
processes would also likely encounter more pushback from public opinion as the 
underlying identity factors that drove the recent securitization process were revealed and 
the rhetoric was diversified. By this I am referring to the fact that the inherent 
authoritative power held by the government was diluted by other actors having the ability 
to comment on the securitization process over an extended period of time. For a new 
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securitization process to be successful, the level of threat would need to be in response to 
a clear flashpoint in the region beyond what has previously occurred. This would either 
need to be a clear violation of national sovereignty on the part of one of the Arctic states, 
or more likely, greater public outcry over the physical consequences of climate change in 
Northern communities. 
What is not entirely evident is whether the urgency of addressing Arctic security 
issues has changed in the last decade as a result of greater awareness of the issues facing 
the region. Part of the problem is continued recognition of Arctic issues as an aspect of 
larger climate change concerns rather than on their own face. The achievement of the 
Paris Agreement to much acclaim in December 2015 was representative of this problem, 
as Arctic community leaders noted that the region received little attention in the course of 
international climate change negotiations.343 Although the Arctic did feature prominently 
on the agenda of the Nordic countries’ visit to Washington in May 2016,344 which 
matched its place during Justin Trudeau’s visit to the city earlier that year, the Arctic is 
inherently at a disadvantage when it comes to international climate discussions. Because 
of the small number of countries with a direct stake in the Arctic, the region generally 
takes second billing to the problems faced by the more numerous, lesser-developed 
countries located in warmer climates. Conceivably, the direct interests of Russia and the 
United States, not to mention growing indirect interest from China, could be enough to 
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push the Arctic to a more prominent position in global climate discussions. The current 
reality, however, is that those countries have not exercised their full abilities in agenda-
setting on climate policy matters. While the Nordic countries do have both a direct 
interest in the region and agenda-setting ability in international discussions, their low 
relative power in the international system may hinder their ability to truly influence 
lasting recognition of Arctic issues.  
The definition of “Arctic security” has also not moved considerably despite more 
attention to the issue. Although media reporting of Arctic-focused military exercises 
continue, public perceptions of the level of security in the region have still not quite 
caught up to reality. A 2015 piece in the Toronto Star noted that public perceptions of 
undefended Canadian Arctic sovereignty continued despite studies showing that the 
Canadian military was beginning to adjust positively to the difficulties it initially faced 
while operating in the region.345 For the time being, the Trudeau government and military 
have also appeared to continue operations initiated by the previous government,346 be it 
for continuity reasons or the current government not having yet unveiled a new Arctic 
strategy. Continued media attention to Arctic military operations does help to illuminate 
ongoing security issues in the region, but it may also create misconceptions about the 
origins of the threat. If the public continues to operate under a decade-old narrative 
concerning the threat of outside interference in national sovereignty, then continued 
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coverage of Arctic military operations will likely allow perceptions of state-based threats 
to continue. As previously discussed, the previous government did take steps to dismiss 
the notion of state-to-state conflict in official strategy documents. This was a departure 
from the government’s general rhetoric on the subject, however, which allowed the idea 
to persist. If future government rhetoric does not move to change this narrative, then 
regional security will likely be unable to move to a new frame of reference. Continuing to 
view Arctic security in hard security terms distracts from the threats that are most likely 
to persist in the region in the coming years.  
A possible change to this view could come through the changing economic 
situation in the region. Adding to the difficulties of operating in the Arctic region was the 
fall of global energy prices in 2014. Facing an expected loss of revenues, many energy 
corporations scaled back or suspended Arctic energy exploration in North America as the 
region yielded little short-term return on investment.347 The most curious case of this 
trend involved the efforts of Shell Oil to secure leasing rights in Alaska. Shell had 
suspended its operations in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas in 2013 following an accident 
involving two drilling ships, which resulted in a review from U.S. federal regulators.348 
Following a review of internal safety procedures, Shell re-applied for federal approval to 
resume drilling in the Chukchi Sea in 2015. After a process that faced heavy criticism 
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from environmental groups, the U.S. government granted Shell conditional approval to 
resume drilling in July 2015.349 The consternation from Shell’s opponents was short-
lived, however, as Shell announced that it was abandoning the Chukchi drilling project 
due to disappointing discoveries.350 Although Shell’s departure came at the end of an 
ongoing trend of corporations re-assessing their commitment to the Arctic, Shell’s quick 
departure after a hard-fought process to obtain regulatory approval for its Chukchi wells 
demonstrated the degree to which the Arctic region had become unpalatable for energy 
exploration activities. This trend was less apparent in Norway, whose offshore Arctic 
drilling activities are less affected by climatological and logistical difficulties than in 
North America, although the global decline of oil was having a significant effect on 
Norway’s large oil economy.351 Russian energy exploration activities also faced 
significant difficulties, though for different reasons. As a result of Russia’s 2014 invasion 
of Ukraine, Western countries imposed heavy sanctions on Russian energy exploration 
activities that effectively canceled several ongoing consortia of Western and Russian oil 
exploration. The barring of Western expertise from Russian exploration activities was 
particularly damaging to operations in the Arctic, where Russian corporations were 
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reliant on outside technology to overcome the difficulties of extraction in the region.352 In 
the Russian case, oddly enough, outside geopolitical events rather than events within the 
Arctic itself had managed to affect energy exploration. 
Although the global energy market is subject to speculative prediction, near-term 
predictions of global energy prices do not see an expected return to the price levels seen a 
decade ago. This creates a re-focusing of how the Arctic fits into the global economic 
picture, which was a large part of how the region drew increased global attention in the 
first place. If the Arctic’s energy potential is not determined to be economically feasible 
to extract, the region is less likely to be the focus of future securitization processes. While 
an expected increase in maritime transits through opening waterways presents a frame of 
reference for sovereignty-based securitization processes, such possibilities are of a 
rhetorically benign character compared to the prospect of foreign actors extracting energy 
resources. If energy resources are deemed to be de-prioritized compared to extraction in 
other areas of the world, then how would the Arctic region remain as a recognized 
priority in the minds of public opinion? The silver lining to this option would be the 
potential result of less interference of national organs in local affairs. This would also 
potentially bring less outside economic interests that are pushed at the behest of national 
government agendas, which would lower the chances of further environmental damage 
from natural resource extraction activities.  
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The unavoidable reality, however, is that Northern regions are still very 
dependent on such outside forces for subsidizing basic needs such as education, 
healthcare, food supplies, and housing. In order for greater local autonomy to become the 
reality, Northern regions would need to determine how to address these shortfalls. Such a 
dynamic is particularly difficult to change in Canada where Northern regions are only 
connected year-round by airplane. Given the declining state of the natural environment in 
the region, economic activities that supported the community in the past will likely be 
unfeasible in the future. Progress in other aspects of the region’s standard of living has 
indeed come at a price. 
Having previously discussed the difficulties of developing a regional Arctic 
identity, what is the value, if any, of promoting an “Arctic identity” in the Canadian 
national context? If Southern Canadians cannot truly value the issues that Northern 
Canadians face, is a national Arctic identity really anything more than one of many 
symbols used to represent the Canadian image? Furthermore, what does continued 
promotion of Canadian Arctic heritage actually do in practical terms for Canadian 
interests in the Arctic? Lisa Williams has argued that the Canadian Arctic identity 
actually complements Arctic regional identity in the sense that Canadian national 
interests are served by promoting a rules-based order in addressing concerns facing the 
whole Arctic space.353 While this is true on its face, it is also representative of the root 
problem that continues to hamper Arctic policy at the national level. Canada’s rule-based 
approach to the region may comport with international norms and modernity, but it also 
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often drifts into a paternalistic mindset that is too rooted in 19th and early 20th century 
views of the region. Such attitudes have arguably been bolstered by Ottawa’s recent 
attempts to undertake a more proactive agenda in the Arctic. Regardless of the fact that 
the region can be reached in a short time by air or instantaneously by internet 
communication, attempts to improve infrastructure or undertake extensive economic 
activities could not avoid the age-old problem of the region’s uniquely forbidding 
character. At some point, would Southern Canadians eventually give up the idea of 
investing in the region for this reason?  
Such is the puzzle that faces the Canadian nation in addition to demonstrating the 
potential limits of identity power in decision-making. While identity factors may weigh 
significantly in driving public opinion in favor of government sovereignty-defense 
actions, continued public support may also only hold if there is a continued perception of 
urgency in the government taking these actions. Another potential drawback from the 
government’s perspective is the ability of the public to remain informed of the progress 
of government investment and action in the region. In years past, direct media from the 
region was sparse, if not non-existent, which favored the government’s ability to steer the 
narrative in a direction positive to its interests. Now, it is difficult for the government to 
conceal the difficulties of operating in the region while facing increased scrutiny in doing 
so. The presence of the Soviet threat against the Canadian Arctic during the Cold War 
allowed the government to maintain a security posture in the Arctic regardless of other 
perceived infringements on sovereignty. While threats remain against the Arctic region in 
the form of climate change, the justification for an extended security posture in the 
current era is more difficult to defend to the public. Instead, measures to combat climate 
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change are enacted through climate policy in national decision-making. Even if the 
government attempts to frame an enhanced security posture as a deterrent to threats 
against sovereignty by outside actors, it becomes difficult to defend this position in the 
long-term absent noticeable interference from foreign actors. Although such interference 
cannot be ruled out in the future, the events of the past decade make it difficult to argue 
that an elevated level of concern on the matter is justifiable for an extended period of 
time, especially considering the need to focus resources toward mitigating the effects of 
climate change. Given current conditions, continued securitization of the Arctic space on 
sovereignty matters may have approached a point of exhaustion. 
That does not mean that hope is lost for a positive security dynamic in the Arctic 
space, nor does it mean that our understandings of Arctic security have reached an apex. 
Although the Arctic’s forbidding conditions are inherent to how much of the globe views 
the region, Arctic states ironically did not give enough attention to the true ramifications 
of this reality when planning for greater human activity in the region in the coming 
decades. Interestingly, recognition of the region’s changing climate in the near future did 
not recognize that current conditions were still unduly harsh and unique. While many 
difficult lessons have been learned about what the future holds for the Arctic, these 
lessons must also be viewed as benchmarks for positive action going forward. On a 
geopolitical level, conditions are amenable to such a possibility. The difficulties thus lie 
within states themselves, particularly in those where the Arctic and more populated 
portions of the country are separated by a great distance. Because of this, national 
governments have difficulty understanding the scope of the problems faced by Northern 
communities day-to-day, with this lacking understanding also being shared by much of 
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the national population. The result of this, as seen in Canada, is an increasingly 
threatened Arctic territory being governed by a national entity that does not understand it, 
all-the-while using the region as a means to boost national pride. 
Where, then, does positive action begin for Canada and its Arctic territory? 
Greater political devolution to Northern communities has its strengths and weaknesses, 
although it is probably not feasible to give these regions a significant share of power vis-
à-vis national governance due to dependence on federal subsidies to support the 
difficulties of living in the Arctic. Realization of the costs of resource development may 
help to positively change struggles faced in the federal-local dynamic. With an eagerness 
to rapidly seize natural resources in the region now abated (perhaps only temporarily, 
however), there can be more attention to sustainable options for economic growth in the 
region. Such options can be exercised by the local communities themselves with federal 
organs providing assistance as needed, be it in areas such as healthcare and education or 
through more investment in search-and-rescue capabilities. Building this positive future 
requires a change in mindset, however. No longer is the Arctic the forbidden frontier that 
vexed explorers searching for the world’s ends. Instead, it became an intrinsic part of the 
Canadian national fabric, one that now needs to be viewed on more equal footing with the 
rest of the national territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 175 
 
Bibliography 
Abel, Kerry and Ken S. Coates, Eds. Northern Visions: Perspectives on the North in 
Canadian History, (Broadview: Peterborough, ON, 2001). 
 
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett, Eds. Security Communities (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
Ahlenius, Hugo. “Arctic sea routes-Northern sea route and Northwest passage.” 
UNEP/GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library, 2006, accessed April 23, 2015, 
http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/arctic-sea-routes-northern-sea-route-and-
northwest-passage_f951. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). 
 
Anker, Lane. “Peacekeeping and public opinion,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 
2 (Summer 2005), p. 23-32. 
 
Auger, Martin. “The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: A Five-Year 
Assessment,” Library of Parliament, June 15, 2015. 
 
Axe, David. “Trillion-dollar jet has thirteen expensive new flaws,” Wired, December 13, 
2011, accessed March 3, 2016, http://www.wired.com/2011/12/joint-strike-fighter-13-
flaws/. 
 
Balton, David and Kjartan Hoydal. “Policy Options for Arctic Environmental 
Governance,” Arctic Transform, March 5, 2009, accessed April 29, 2015, http://arctic-
transform.org/download/FishEX.pdf. 
 
Balzacq, Thierry. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience, and 
Context,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2005), p. 
171-201. 
 
Bankes, Nigel, Terry Fenge, and Sarah Kalff. “Toward Sustainable Development in 
Canada’s Arctic: Policies and International Relations” in Canada Among Nations, 1993-
94, Christopher J. Maule and Fen Osier Hampson, Eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
Press, 1993), p. 170-89. 
 
Bartleman, James K. Rollercoaster: My Hectic Years as Jean Chretien’s Diplomatic 
Advisor, 1994-1998 (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2005). 
 
Barton, Katherine. “Igalaaq, Northbeat celebrate 20 years: A look at how TV evolved in 
the North,” CBC News North, November 13, 2015, accessed May 12, 2016, 
 176 
 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/northbeat-igalaaq-20-years-how-tv-evolved-in-the-
north-1.3317652. 
 
Barry, Donald and Duane Bratt. “Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-U.S. 
Security Relations,” The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 
2008), p. 63-89. 
 
Beesley, J.A. “Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States: The Canadian View,” 
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 (October 1971), p. 1-12. 
 
Bell, Jim. “Northern forces to beef up emergency response work,” Nunatsiaq News, May 
26, 2006, accessed February 17, 2016, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/northern_forces_to_beef_up_emergency_re
sponse_work/. 
 
Bennett, Mia. “Blog: What does Trudeau win mean for the Arctic?” Eye on the Arctic, 
October 21, 2015, accessed May 24, 2016, http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-
arctic/2015/10/21/blog-what-does-trudeau-win-mean-for-arctic/. 
 
Bercuson, David J. “Up From the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian 
Forces After the Somalia Affair,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall 2009), 
p. 31-39. 
 
Berthiaume, Lee. “Key Arctic naval facility delayed by budget cuts despite being 
announced with much fanfare by PM in 2007,” August 21, 2013, accessed March 9, 
2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/key-arctic-naval-facility-delayed-by-
budget-cuts-despite-being-announced-with-much-fanfare-by-pm-in-2007. 
 
Bevington, Dennis. “Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty,” December 22, 2005, 
accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.dennisbevington.ca/pdfs/en/2005/dec25-
05_speech-harper.pdf. 
 
Bilder, Richard B. “The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses 
on the Law of the Sea,” Michigan Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 1 (November 1970), p. 1-54. 
 
Bland, Douglas L. “The Fundamentals of National Defence Policy Are Not Sound, in 
Canada Without Armed Forces? Douglas L. Bland, Ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 
2004). 
 
Bland, Douglas L. and Sean M. Maloney. Campaigns for International Security 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 2004). 
 
Bodet, Marc André. “Strongholds and Battlegrounds: Measuring Party Support Stability 
in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 2013), p. 
575-96. 
 177 
 
 
Boesveld, Sarah. “Report gives Harper government a failing grade for transparency,” 
National Post, May 10, 2011, accessed March 20, 2016, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/report-gives-harper-government-a-failing-
grade-for-transparency.  
 
Bonesteel, Sarah. Canada’s Relationship With Inuit (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services Canada, 2006). 
 
Bothwell, Robert, Ian Drummond, and John English. Canada Since 1945 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
 
Boutilier, Alex. “Stephen Harper heads north on annual Arctic journey,” Toronto Star, 
August 19, 2014, accessed March 7, 2016, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/08/19/stephen_harper_heads_north_on_annua
l_arctic_journey.html.  
 
Boutilier, Alex. “Bill for Stephen Harper’s annual Arctic trips tops $3.4M,” Toronto Star, 
January 27, 2015, accessed March 7, 2016, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/01/27/bill-for-stephen-harpers-annual-arctic-
trips-tops-34m.html. 
 
Brewster, Murray. “Harper in the Arctic: Fight between economic, social development 
takes centre stage,” CTV News, August 22, 2013, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/harper-in-the-arctic-fight-between-economic-social-dev-t-
takes-centre-stage-1.1422136. 
 
Briggs, Philip J. “The Polar Sea Voyage and the Northwest Passage Dispute,” Armed 
Forces & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring 1990), p. 437-52. 
 
Broeder, John M. “With 2 Ships Damaged, Shell Suspends Arctic Drilling,” New York 
Times, February 27, 2013, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/business/energy-environment/shell-suspends-arctic-
drilling-for-2013.html?_r=0. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1998). 
 
Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
 
Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever. “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: 
Reconsidering scale in securitization theory,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, 
No. 2 (April 2009), 253-276. 
 
 178 
 
Byers, Michael. “Cold Peace: Arctic cooperation and Canadian foreign policy,” 
International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 899-812. 
 
Byers, Michael. “Why Canada’s search for an icebreaker is an Arctic embarrassment,” 
The Globe and Mail, January 21, 2014, accessed March 6, 2016, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-north/why-canadas-search-for-an-
icebreaker-is-an-arctic-embarrassment/article16425755/. 
 
Byers, Michael, and Suzanne Lalonde. “Who Controls the Northwest Passage?” 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 2009), p. 1133-1210. 
 
Caldwell, Jr., Nathaniel French. Arctic Leverage: Canadian Sovereignty and Security 
(New York: Praeger, 1990). 
 
Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. “The Northern 
Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy” (2000). 
 
Canada Department of National Defence. “Challenge and Commitment: A Defence 
Policy for Canada” (1987). 
 
Canada Department of National Defence. “Defence in the 70s” (1971). 
 
Canada Department of National Defence. “1994 White Paper on Defence” (1994). 
 
Canada Department of National Defence. “Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry-
Executive Summary,” July 2, 1997. 
 
Canada Department of National Defence. “White Paper on Defence” (1964). 
 
Caplan, Gerald. “Harper’s media foes aren’t liberal—they’re moderate conservatives,” 
The Globe and Mail, September 13, 2014, accessed May 16, 2016, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harpers-media-foes-arent-liberal-theyre-
moderate-conservatives/article20586614/. 
 
Cavell, Janice. “Comparing Mythologies: Twentieth-Century Canadian Constructions of 
Sir John Franklin,” in Canadas of the Mind, Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, Eds. 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2007), p.15-45. 
 
Cavell, Janice. “’A little more latitude’: explorers, politicians, and Canadian Arctic policy 
during the Laurier era,” Polar Record, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 2011), p. 289-309. 
 
Cavell, Janice and Jeff Noakes. Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic Sovereignty, 
1918-25 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010). 
 
 179 
 
Cawley, Janet. “U.S., Canada in Cold War Over Who Rules the Arctic Waters,” Chicago 
Tribune, August 18, 1985, accessed August 28, 2015. 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-08-18/news/8502230914_1_northwest-passage-
internal-waterway-polar-sea. 
 
CBC News. “Canada, Denmark agree to resolve dispute over Arctic island,” September 
19, 2005, accessed February 15, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-denmark-
agree-to-resolve-dispute-over-arctic-island-1.551223. 
 
CBC News. “Russia plants flag staking claim to Arctic region,” August 2, 2007, accessed 
May 17, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-plants-flag-staking-claim-to-arctic-
region-1.679445. 
 
CBC News, “Canada launches new Arctic search for Franklin’s lost ships,” August 15, 
2008, accessed June 14, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-launches-
new-arctic-search-for-franklin-s-lost-ships-1.702857. 
 
CBC News. “Canada to spend $9B F-35 fighter jets,” July 16, 2010, accessed March 2, 
2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-to-spend-9b-on-f-35-fighter-jets-1.908494. 
 
CBC News. “Tory party, 2 senators face election charges,” February 24, 2011, accessed 
March 3, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/tory-party-2-senators-face-election-
charges-1.1070158. 
 
CBC News. “F-35s face communications problems in Arctic,” October 23, 2011, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/f-35s-face-communication-problems-in-arctic-1.971260. 
 
CBC News. “Nanisivik, Nunavut, naval facility breaks ground,” July 18, 2015, accessed 
March 6, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nanisivik-nunavut-naval-facility-
breaks-ground-1.3158798. 
 
Chalecki, Elizabeth L. Environmental Security: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara: 
Praeger, 2013). 
 
Chase, Steven. “Harper heads north to promote resource development,” The Globe and 
Mail, August 18, 2013, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.torontosun.com/2013/08/23/pm-says-hes-not-ignoring-arctic-social-woes. 
 
Chivers, C.J. “Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed,” New York Times, August 3, 
2007, accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html?_r=0. 
 
Coates, Ken S. and William R. Morrison. “Winter and the Shaping of Northern History: 
Reflections from the Canadian North,” in Northern Visions: Perspectives on the North in 
 180 
 
Canadian History, Kerry Abel and Ken S. Coates, Eds. (Broadview: Peterborough, ON, 
2001), p. 23-35. 
 
Cole, J. Michael. “Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russia Takes the Lead,” The 
Diplomat, December 6, 2013, accessed April 25, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarization-of-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-
lead/. 
 
Cornellier, Manon. “La bataille des glaces,” Le Devoir, September 1, 2007, accessed May 
21, 2016, http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/155286/la-bataille-des-glaces. 
 
CNN. “Russia plants flag on Arctic floor,” August 4, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/08/02/arctic.sub.reut/index.html?eref=yahoo. 
 
Davis, Jeff. “F-35 ‘a serious strategic mismatch’ for Canada’s North,’ retired colonel 
says,” National Post, April 25, 2012, accessed March 3, 2016, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/f-35-a-serious-strategic-mismatch-for-
canadas-north-retired-colonel-says. 
 
Damas, David. “Shifting relations in the administration of the Inuit: The Hudson’s Bay 
Company and the Canadian government,” Études/Inuit/Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 
1993), p. 5-28. 
 
Dawson, Chester. “Exxon Mobil, BP Suspend Canadian Arctic Exploratory Drilling 
Program in Beaufort Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2015, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-mobil-bp-suspend-canadian-arctic-exploratory-
drilling-program-in-beaufort-sea-1435348381. 
 
Defence Command Denmark. “Arctic Command,” last updated February 13, 2015, 
accessed April 28, 2015, 
http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/ArcticCommand/Pages/ArcticCommand.aspx
. 
 
Den Tandt, Michael. “After the photo ops, Harper must deliver on promises in the 
Arctic,” The National Post, August 21, 2013, accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/michael-den-tandt-after-the-photo-ops-
harper-must-deliver-on-promises-in-the-arctic.   
 
Diebel, Linda. “Exclusive: What really sunk Michael Ignatieff and the Liberals,” Toronto 
Star, May 7, 2011, accessed March 3, 2016, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/05/07/exclusive_what_really_sunk_michael_i
gnatieff_and_the_liberals.html. 
 
Diefenbaker, John. “A New Vision,” Speech at Civic Auditorium, Winnipeg, February 
12, 1958. Transcript accessed from Canada History, “John G. Diefenbaker: His Northern 
 181 
 
Vision,” accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://www.canadahistory.com/sections/documents/Primeministers/diefenbaker/docs-
thenorthernvision.htm. 
 
Diubaldo, Richard J. Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic (Montreal: McGill, 1978). 
 
Dolata, Petra. “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies Under Harper,” Canadian 
Studies, Vol. 78, No. 1 (2015), p. 131-54. 
 
Douglas, W.A.B. and Brereton Greenhous. Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second 
World War (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
 
Doward, Jaime, Robin McKie, and Tom Parfitt. “Russia leads race for North Pole oil,” 
The Guardian, July 28, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/29/russia.oil. 
 
Ducharme, Steve and Jim Bell. “Tootoo rides Liberal tsunami to grab Nunavut from 
Aglukkaq,” Nunatsiaq News, October 20, 2015, accessed June 2, 2016, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674tootoo_rides_liberal_tsunami_to_grab
_nunavut_from_aglukkaq/. 
 
Durey, Michael. “Exploration at the Edge: Reassessing the Fate of Sir John Franklin’s 
Last Arctic Expedition,” The Great Circle, Vol. 30, No. 2 (December 2008), p. 3-40. 
 
EKOS Research Associates. “Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public 
Opinion Survey,” January 2011.  
 
Elections Canada. “Maps Corner,” 
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=cir/maps2&document=index&lan
g=e, accessed April 6, 2016. 
 
Elections Canada. “Maps Corner—Historical Data,” 
http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=cir/maps&document=index&lang
=e#ffour, accessed April 6, 2016. 
 
Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan. “History of Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan 
2001-2014,” accessed February 11, 2016, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/afghanistan/history-histoire.aspx?lang=eng.  
 
Embassy of the Russian Federation to Canada. “Working Visit of the Prime Minister of 
the Russian Federation Viktor Zubkov to Canada,” November 29, 2007, accessed 
February 23, 2016,  http://www.rusembassy.ca/ru/node/345. 
 
English, Kathy. “Why do newspapers endorse?” Toronto Star, October 11, 2008, 
accessed May 15, 2016. 
 182 
 
https://www.thestar.com/news/politics/federalelection/2008/10/11/why_do_newspapers_
endorse.html. 
 
Exner-Pirot, Heather. “Blog: Stephen Harper and the North Pole—still embarrassing 
Canadians on Arctic policy,” Eye on the Arctic, December 11, 2013, accessed May 24, 
2016, http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2013/12/11/blog-stephen-harper-and-the-
north-pole-still-embarrassing-canadians-in-arctic-policy/. 
 
Floyd, Rita. Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental 
Security Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
Foster, Peter. “School for paranoia: The not-so-scary ‘school’ behind Stephen Harper,” 
The National Post, January 28, 2006, accessed May 16, 2016, 
http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=86eceb52-a380-41ca-bed8-70af28a87668. 
 
Foster, Peter. “’Northern Vision’ still alive—and still problematic,” Financial Post, 
October 20, 2007, accessed May 22, 2016, 
http://www.financialpost.com/scripts/story.html?id=b26fd04c-6a6b-428b-8fb2-
3bfa02f2a136&k=54236. 
 
Fry, Nathan. “Survivability, Sustainability, and Maneuverability: The Need for Joint 
Unity of Effort in Implementing the DOD Arctic Strategy at the Tactical and Operational 
Levels,” Military Review, November-December 2014, p. 54-62, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_201412
31_art012.pdf. 
 
Galloway, Gloria. “Harper government falls in historic Commons showdown,” The 
Globe and Mail, March 25, 2011, accessed March 3, 2016, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-government-falls-in-historic-
commons-showdown/article4181393/. 
 
Global Affairs Canada. “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, 
Canada, 1996), May 15, 2013, accessed February 2, 2016, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/ottdec-decott.aspx?lang=eng. 
 
Godefroy, Andrew B. In Peace Prepared (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014). 
 
Gorbachev, Mikhail. “Speech in Murmansk at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of 
the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk,” 
October 1, 1987, accessed September 7, 2015, 
https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf. 
 
Government of Canada. “Canada’s International Policy Statement” (2005), p. 7-8. 
 
 183 
 
Government of Canada. “Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future,” (2009), accessed February 24, 2016, http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-
eng.asp. 
 
Government of Canada. “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy” (2010). 
 
Grace, Sherill E. Canada and the Idea of North (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 2001). 
 
Haglund, David G. “Quebec’s ‘America Problem’: Differential Threat Perception in the 
North American Security Community,” Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Fall 
2009), p. 552-567. 
 
Hansen, Lene. Security as Practice (London: Routledge, 2006). 
 
Hataley, T.S. and Kim Richard Nossal. “The limits of the human security agenda: The 
case of Canada’s response to the Timor Crisis,” Global Change, Peace, & Security, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (Feb. 2004), p. 5-17. 
 
Harper, Tim. “Stephen Harper quietly scraps a pledge of transparency,” Toronto Star, 
November 30, 2014, accessed March 20, 2016, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/11/30/stephen_harper_quietly_scraps_a_pledg
e_of_transparency_tim_harper.html.  
 
Hayward, Dan. “Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative: New Prospects for Arms Control in 
the Arctic?” Northern Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 4 (July/August 1988), accessed 
September 7, 2015, http://carc.org/pubs/v16no4/4.htm. 
 
Hillmer, Norman and Adam Chapnick, Eds. Canadas of the Mind (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University, 2007). 
 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of 
Acute Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), p.76-116. 
 
Howson, Nicholas C. “Breaking the Ice: The Canadian-American Dispute Over the 
Arctic’s Northwest Passage,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(1987-88), p. 337-75. 
 
Huebert, Robert. “Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1999), p. 203-229. 
 
Huebert, Robert. “Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security,” Canadian Military Journal, 
Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2005-06), p. 17-29. 
 
 184 
 
Huebert, Rob. “Who best defends our Arctic?” The Globe and Mail, January 4, 2006, 
accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/who-best-defends-our-
arctic/article727039/. 
 
Huebert, Rob. “Why Canada, U.S. must resolve their Arctic border disputes,” The Globe 
and Mail, October 21, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canada-us-must-resolve-their-arctic-
border-disputes/article21189764/. 
 
Hulan, Renée. Northern experience and the myths of Canadian culture (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s, 2002). 
 
Hurrell, Andrew. “An emerging security community in South America?” in Security 
Communities, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 228-264. 
 
Hønneland, Geir. “Identity Formation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region,” Cooperation 
and Conflict, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1998), p. 277-97. 
 
ICI Radio Canada. “Un drapeau russe sous le pole Nord,” August 1, 2007, accessed May 
21, 2016, http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2007/08/01/002-pole-nord-
russe.shtml. 
 
ICI Radio Canada. “Ottawa nullement impressionné,” August 3, 2007, accessed May 21, 
2016, http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/international/2007/08/02/001-pole-nord-russie-
jeudi.shtml. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael and Joanne J. Myers. “The Lesser Evil: Hard Choices in a War on 
Terror,” Carnegie Council for International Affairs, January 23, 2004, accessed March 3, 
2016, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20040123/index.html. 
 
Jefferess, David. “Responsibility, Nostalgia, and the Myth of the Canadian Peacekeeper,” 
University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Spring 2009), p. 709-727. 
 
Jenness, Stuart E. Stefansson, Dr. Anderson, and the Canadian Arctic Expedition, 1913-
1918 (Gatineau, QC: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 2011). 
 
Jensen, Leif Christian. “Seduced and surrounded by security: A post-structuralist take on 
Norwegian High North securitizing discourses,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 48, No. 
1 (March 2013), p. 80-99. 
 
Jervis, Robert. “Security Studies: Ideas, Policy and Politics,” in The Evolution of Political 
Knowledge, Democracy, Autonomy, and Conflict in Comparative and International 
Politics, Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson, Eds. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University, 2004), p. 100-126. 
 185 
 
 
Johnson, Brian D. “Do we really own the Arctic?” Maclean’s, May 17, 2010, accessed 
May 23, 2016, http://www.macleans.ca/culture/books/historian-shelagh-grant-on-the-
coming-struggle-over-the-canadian-arctic-and-why-we-may-soon-lose-our-sovereignty-
in-the-north/. 
 
Jull, Peter. “Inuit Politics and the Arctic Seas,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage, 
Franklyn Griffiths, Ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1987), p. 46-63. 
 
Kaplan, Robert. “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic, February 1994, accessed May 6, 
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-
anarchy/304670/. 
 
Kent, Sarah. “Shell to Cease Oil Exploration in Alaskan Arctic After Disappointing 
Drilling Season,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2015, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/shell-to-cease-oil-exploration-offshore-alaska-1443419673. 
 
Keskitalo, E. C. H. Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region 
(Routledge: New York, 2004). 
 
Keskitalo, E. Carina. “Setting the Agenda on the Arctic: Whose Policy Frames the 
Region?” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 (Fall/Winter 2012), p. 155-64. 
 
Kirton, John and Don Munton. “The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath,” in 
Politics of the Northwest Passage, Franklin Griffiths, Ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 
1987), p. 67-97. 
 
Koivurova, Timo and David L. VanderZwaag. “The Arctic Council at 10 Years: 
Retrospects and Prospects,” University of British Columbia Law Review (2007), p. 121-
194. 
 
Korte, Gregory. “Trudeau state visit marks emerging ‘special relationship’ with Canada,” 
USA Today, March 10, 2016, accessed June 2, 2016, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/03/09/trudeau-state-visit-marks-
emerging-special-relationship-canada/81524932/. 
 
Kraska, James, Ed. Arctic Security in An Age of Climate Change (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2013). 
 
Krauss, Clifford. “Shell Delays Arctic Oil Drilling Until 2013,” New York Times, 
September 17, 2012, accessed March 9, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/business/global/shell-delays-arctic-oil-drilling-until-
next-year.html?_r=0.  
 
 186 
 
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney “The Canadian Rangers: A ‘postmodern’ militia that works,” 
Canadian Military Journal, Winter 2005-6, p. 55, accessed August 20, 2015, 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/doc/north-nord-03-eng.pdf.  
 
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for 
Canada and the Circumpolar World,” in Canada and the Changing Arctic, Franklyn 
Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Eds. (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier Press, 2011). 
 
Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. The Canadian Rangers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013). 
 
Lackenbauer, P Whitney. “Harper’s Arctic evolution,” The Globe and Mail, August 20, 
2013, accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/harpers-arctic-
evolution/article13852195/. 
 
Lackenbauer, Whitney and Peter Kikkert. “Sovereignty and Security: Canadian 
Diplomacy, the United States, and the Arctic, 1943-1968,” in In the National Interest, 
Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, Eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 
2011), p. 101-120. 
 
Lackenbauer, Whitney. “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Break It: Expanding and Enhancing the 
Canadian Rangers,” Munk School of Global Affairs Working Papers on Arctic Security 
(March 2013). 
 
Landriault, Matheiu and Paul Minard. “Does standing up for sovereignty pay off 
politically? Arctic military announcements and governing party support in Canada from 
2006 to 2014,” International Journal, Vol. 71, No. 1 (March 2016), p. 41-61. 
 
Lebow, Richard Ned. A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2009). 
 
Library and Archives Canada. “Securing Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” August 12, 
2006, accessed February 17, 2016, 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071123030520/http://www.premierm
inistre.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1275. 
 
Library and Archives Canada. “Prime Minister announces expansion of Canadian Forces 
facilities and operations in the Arctic,” August 10, 2007, accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071120165605/http://www.pm.gc.ca/
eng/media.asp?id=1787.  
 
Loukacheva, Natalia. “Nunavut and Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,” Journal of Canadian 
Studies 43, (Spring 2009), p. 82-108.  
 
 187 
 
Lupovici, Amir. “The Limits of Securitization Theory: Observational Criticism and the 
Curious Absence of Israel,” Internatioal Studies Review, Vol 16., Iss. 3 (September 
2014), p. 390-410. 
 
Mackenzie, Hector. “Canada’s Nationalist Internationalism: From the League of Nations 
to the United Nations,” in Canadas of the Mind, Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick, 
Eds. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University, 2007), p. 89-109. 
 
Mackrael, Kim. “Falling Oil Prices Hurt Canadian Economy,” Wall Street Journal, July 
15, 2015, accessed March 20, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/falling-oil-prices-hit-
canadian-economy-1437002047. 
 
Malley, Shaun. “Canada’s leadership of the Arctic Council—a look back,” CBC News, 
April 23, 2015, accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-s-
leadership-of-the-arctic-council-a-look-back-1.3046225. 
 
Mandraud, Isabelle. “Russia prepares for ice-cold war with show of military force in the 
Arctic,” The Guardian, October 21, 2014, accessed April 28, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/21/russia-arctic-military-oil-gas-putin. 
 
Martin, Pierre. “When Nationalism Meets Continentalism: the Politics of Free Trade in 
Quebec,” in The Political Economy of Regionalism, Michael Keating and John Loughlin, 
Eds. (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1997), p. 236-261. 
 
Martin, Pierre and Michel Fortmann. “Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a 
turbulent world,” International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 370-400. 
 
Mayer, Paul. “Mayer Report on Nunavut Devolution,” Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada, June 2007, accessed April 12, 2016, https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1357676177444/1357739682215#chp4h. 
 
McCannon, John. A History of the Arctic (London: Reaktion, 2012). 
 
McDiarmid, Margo. “Stephen Harper and the obsession with Franklin,” CBC News, 
September 3, 2014, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/stephen-
harper-and-the-obsession-with-franklin-1.2754180. 
 
McDonald, Marci. “The Man Behind Stephen Harper,” The Walrus Magazine, October 
2004. 
 
McQuaig, Linda. “Conservatives’ rise in popularity has been driven by Canada’s elite, 
not majority,” The Toronto Star, January 22, 2006. 
 
 188 
 
Meren, David and Bona Plumptre. “Rights of Passage: The Intersecting of 
Environmentalism, Arctic Sovereignty, and the Law of the Sea, 1968-82,” Journal of 
Canadian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 2013), p. 167-96. 
 
Michaud, Nelson. “Setting the Canadian Foreign Policy Agenda, 1984-2009: Prime 
Ministers as Prime Actors?” in In the National Interest, Greg Donaghy and Michael K. 
Carroll, Eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), p. 181-205. 
 
Mifflin, Michael. “Arctic sovereignty: A view from the North,” Policy Options, May 1, 
2007, accessed April 12, 2016, http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-arctic-and-
climate-change/arctic-sovereignty-a-view-from-the-north/. 
 
The Moscow Times. “Russia’s Rosneft Won’t Resume Sanctions-Struck Arctic Drilling 
Before 2018—Sources,” June 11, 2015, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russias-rosneft-wont-resume-sanctions-
struck-arctic-drilling-before-2018-sources/523478.html. 
 
Morton, W.L. The Canadian Identity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961). 
 
Mufson, Steven. “Obama administration greenlights Shell drilling off Alaska’s Arctic 
coast,” Washington Post, July 22, 2015, accessed July 4, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/07/22/obama-
administration-greenlights-shell-drilling-off-alaskas-arctic-coast/. 
 
Muirhead, Bruce. Dancing Around the Elephant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2006). 
 
Munton, Don and Tom Keating. “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, Vol 34, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 517-49. 
 
Murphy, Pat. “Is the National Post still a conservative newspaper,” Winnipeg Free Press, 
October 18, 2012, accessed May 15, 2016, 
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/opinion/analysis/Is-the-National-Post-still-a-
conservative-newspaper-174833901.html. 
 
Nader, Ralph. “Beware ‘deep integration,’” The Toronto Star, December 26, 2012, 
accessed May 23, 2016, 
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2011/04/26/beware_deep_integration.h
tml. 
 
The National Post. “Ocean explorers plant Russian flag on Arctic sea floor,” August 2, 
2007, accessed May 17, 2016, 
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=95c070f6-bcc0-460e-8c12-
e873dd18a1df. 
 
 189 
 
Natural Resources Canada. “Federal Elections, 1968 to 2000,” 
http://geogratis.gc.ca/api/en/nrcan-rncan/ess-sst/-/%28urn:iso:series%29atlas-of-canada-
federal-elections?sort-field=relevance, accessed April 6, 2016. 
 
NBC News. “Ship From Doomed Franklin Expedition Identified as Erebus,” October 1, 
2014, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/ship-
doomed-franklin-expedition-identified-erebus-n216341. 
 
Neufeld, David. “Parks Canada and the Commemoration of the North: History and 
Heritage,” in Northern Visions: Perspectives on the North in Canadian History, Kerry 
Abel and Ken S. Coates, Eds. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2001) pp. 45-75. 
 
Norwegian Armed Forces. “Cold Response: About,” last updated March 7, 2014, 
accessed April 28, 2015, http://mil.no/excercises/coldresponse/Pages/about.aspx. 
 
Nossal, Kim Richard. “Defense Policy and the Atmospherics of Canada-U.S. Relations: 
The Case of Harper Conservatives,” The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 37, 
No. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 26-27. 
 
Nossal, Kim Richard. “Late Learners: Canada, the F-35, and lessons from the New 
Fighter Aircraft program,” International Journal, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter 2012/2013), p. 
167-84. 
 
Nunatsiaq News. “’Operation Iqaluit’ achieves its objectives,” August 18, 2006, accessed 
February 17, 2016, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/operation_iqaluit_achieves_its_objectives/. 
 
Nunatsiaq News. “Report: ‘socio-economic objectives’ lay behind Nunavut social 
housing fiasco,” November 27, 2012, accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674report_socio-
economic_objectives_lay_behind_nunavut_social_housing_fia/. 
 
Oberleitner, Gerd. “Human security and human rights,” European Training and Research 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy Occasional Paper Series, Issue 8 (June 2002), 
p. 1-29. 
 
Oberleitner, Gerd. “Porcupines in love: The intricate convergence of human rights and 
human security,” European Human Rights Law Review, Issue 6 (2006), p. 588-606. 
 
Page, Christopher. The Roles of Public Opinion Research in Government (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
 
Parent, Joseph. “Institutions, identity, and unity: The anomaly of Australian nationalism,” 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 2007), p. 8. 
 
 190 
 
Parks Canada. “The Franklin Expedition: 2010 Search,” May 27, 2016, accessed June 14, 
2016, http://www.pc.gc.ca/eng/culture/franklin/recherche-search/exp2010.aspx. 
 
Petry, François. “The Opinion-Policy Relationship in Canada,” The Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 61, No. 2 (May 1999), p. 540-50. 
 
Piskunova, Ekaterina. “Russia in the Arctic: What’s lurking behind the flag?” 
International Journal, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 851-864. 
 
Plouffe, Joël and Harry Borlase. “L’Arctique de Stephen Harper,” Le Devoir, August 28, 
2010, accessed May 24, 2016, http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/canada/295162/l-
arctique-de-stephen-harper. 
 
Pouliot, Vincent. International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia 
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2010). 
 
Powers, Kathy and Gary Goertz. “The economic-institutional construction of regions: 
conceptualization and operationalization,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 
(December 2011), p. 2387-2416. 
 
Probe International. “Defending Sovereignty—Backgrounder,” December 13, 2005, 
accessed February 15, 2016, 
http://www.probeinternational.org/old_drupal/UrbanNewSite/ConservativeDefencePlan.p
df.  
 
Prystupa, Mychaylo. “Harper’s research station a ‘cloak’ for Arctic oil push, says climate 
expert,” National Observer, September 25, 2015, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://www.nationalobserver.com/2015/09/25/news/harper%E2%80%99s-research-
station-%E2%80%98cloak-arctic-oil-says-climate-expert. 
 
Pugliese, David. “Polar Challenge: Extreme Conditions Put High Cost on Arctic 
Operations,” Defense News, June 10, 2014, accessed April 28. 2015, 
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140610/DEFREG02/306100030/Polar-
Challenge-Extreme-Conditions-Put-High-Cost-Arctic-Operations. 
 
Pugliese, David. “Nanisivik naval facility was originally supposed to cost $258 million 
but DND balked at price tag,” Ottawa Citizen, September 8, 2014, accessed March 6, 
2016, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/nanisivik-naval-facility-was-
originally-supposed-to-cost-258-million-but-dnd-balked-at-price-tag. 
 
Pugliese, David. “Arctic exercise kicks off today involving Canadian Army, RCN, 
RCAF, Canadian Rangers,” Ottawa Citizen, April 1, 2015, accessed April 28, 2015, 
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/arctic-exercise-kicks-off-today-
involving-canadian-army-rcn-rcaf-canadian-rangers. 
 191 
 
Pugliese, David. “Canadian Military Looks to Expand Arctic Footprint,” Defense News, 
May 23, 2016, accessed July 3, 2016, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/2016/05/23/canadian-military-
looks-expand-arctic-footprint/84643736/. 
 
Quinn, Eilis. “Arctic missing from Paris climate agreement,” Radio Canada 
International, December 18, 2015, accessed July 3, 2016, 
http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2015/12/18/arctic-missing-from-paris-climate-agreement/. 
 
Randall, Stephen J. “Engaging the United States: The Department of Foreign Affairs and 
U.S. Policy, 1982-2005,” in In the National Interest, Greg Donaghy and Michael K. 
Carroll, Eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), p. 208-28. 
 
Raney, Tracey. “As Canadian As Possible…Under What Circumstances? Public Opinion 
on National Identity In Canada Outside Quebec,” Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 43, 
No. 3 (Fall 2009), p. 5-29. 
 
Remy, Carol Elizabeth. “U.S. Territorial Sea Extension: Jurisdiction and International 
Environmental Protection,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 (1992), 
p. 1208-52. 
 
Rennie, Steve. “Retirement looming for Lee-Enfield rifles used by Canadian Rangers,” 
The Globe and Mail, September 2, 2014, accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/retirement-looming-for-lee-enfield-
rifles-used-by-canadian-rangers/article20317691/. 
 
Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans. “The Ilulissat Declaration,” May 28, 2008, 
accessed April 22, 2015, 
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.  
 
Sabin, Jerald. “North’s Liberal vote a rebuke of Harper’s Arctic policy,” CBC, October 
21, 2015, accessed June 2, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/opinion-sabin-
arctic-policy-election-1.3280899. 
 
Sage, Walter N. “The Historical Peculiarities of Canada With Regard to Hemisphere 
Defense,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1941), p. 15-27. 
 
Simon, Mary. “Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home,” Journal of 
Canadian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 2009), p. 250-260. 
 
Sjolander, Claire Turenne. “A Funny Thing Happened on the Road to Kandahar: The 
Competing Faces of Canadian Internationalism?” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 15, No. 
2 (Summer 2009), p. 78-98. 
 
 192 
 
Sloan, Elinor C. Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 
2010). 
 
Song, Jung Hwa. “Cold War at North Pole?” ABC News, July 31, 2007, accessed April 
19, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=3432208. 
 
Staalesen, Atle. “Goliat’s fight against decline in Arctic oil,” Barents Observer, March 
10, 2015, accessed July 4, 2016, http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2015/03/goliats-
fight-against-decline-arctic-oil-10-03. 
 
Stacey, C. P. “The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 1940-1945,” 
International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1954), p. 107-124. 
 
Steele, Brent. Ontological Security in International Relations (Routledge: New York, 
2008). 
 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. “Neoclassical realism and identity” in, Neoclassical realism, 
the state, and foreign policy, Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
Stewart, Brian. “$30B fighter jets just the start of defence-spending boom,” CBC News, 
April 6, 2011, accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/30b-fighter-jets-
just-the-start-of-defence-spending-boom-1.1066653. 
 
Struck, Doug. “Harper Tells U.S. to Drop Arctic Claim,” Washington Post, January 27, 
2006, accessed February 16, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012602011.html. 
 
Struck, Doug. “Russia’s Deep-Sea Flag-Planting at North Pole Strikes a Chill in 
Canada,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2007, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/06/AR2007080601369.html. 
 
Struzik, Ed. “’Who’s guarding our back door?’” The Toronto Star, November 18, 2007, 
accessed May 22, 2016, 
https://www.thestar.com/news/2007/11/18/whos_guarding_our_back_door.html. 
 
Struzik, Ed. “Oh Canada: The Government’s Broad Assault on Environment,” Yale 
Environment 360, July 2, 2012, accessed March 8, 2016, 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/oh_canada_the_governments_broad_assault_on_environment
/2548/. 
 
TASS. “Russia’s Defense Ministry establishes Arctic Strategic Command,” December 1, 
2014, accessed April 28, 2015, http://tass.ru/en/russia/764428. 
 
 193 
 
United Nations. “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Outer limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, Submissions to the 
Commission, Submission by the Russian Federation,” June 30, 2009, accessed February 
14, 2016, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm.   
 
United Nations. “Troop and peace contributors archive (1990-2014),” accessed February 
10, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml. 
 
United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development. “Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future,” March 20, 
1987, accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf. 
 
United Nations Human Development Report. (1994), p. 22. 
 
United States Geological Survey. “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet 
of Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic,” 23, 2008, accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980&from=rss_home#.VTQzrcmtzxQ. 
 
United States National Snow and Ice Data Center. “Arctic Map,” 
https://nsidc.org/sites/nsidc.org/files/images//arctic_map.gif (accessed April 21, 2015). 
 
Vartankov, Raphael V. and Alexi Y. Roginko. “New Dimensions of Soviet Arctic Policy: 
Views from the Soviet Union,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Vol. 512 (November 1990), p. 69-78. 
 
Verhaag, Melissa A. “It is not too late: The need for a comprehensive treaty to protect the 
Arctic environment,” Georgetown Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Fall 2003), p. 559-61. 
 
Wagner, Eric. “The Peaceable Kingdom? The National Myth of Canadian Peacekeeping 
and the Cold War,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2006-2007), p. 45-
53. 
 
Wallace, Hugh N. The Navy, the Company, and Richard King, (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s, 1980). 
 
Walt, Stephen M. “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1991), p. 211-239. 
 
Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation. “Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Public 
Opinion Survey, Vol. 2,” (September 2015). 
 
Watson, Rob. “Putin’s speech: Back to cold war?” BBC News, February 10, 2007, 
accessed April 19, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm. 
 
 194 
 
Weber, Bob. “Canada’s military doing better job in Arctic than people believe, report 
says,” Toronto Star, May 26, 2015, accessed July 3, 2016, 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/05/26/canadas-military-doing-better-job-in-
arctic-than-people-believe-report-says.html. 
 
Weber, Bob. “Obama, Trudeau further some Arctic goals but miss others,” Maclean’s, 
March 10, 2016, accessed June 2, 2016, http://www.macleans.ca/politics/obama-trudeau-
further-some-arctic-goals-but-miss-others/. 
 
Wells, Paul and John Geddes. “What you don’t know about Stephen Harper,” Maclean’s, 
January 31, 2011, accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/what-
you-dont-know-about-stephen-harper/. 
 
The White House. “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Nordic Collaboration on Climate Change, the 
Arctic, and Clean Energy,” May 13, 2016, accessed July 3, 2016, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/13/fact-sheet-us-nordic-
collaboration-climate-change-arctic-and-clean. 
 
Whitlock, Craig. “Defense secretary Gates fires general in charge of Joint Strike Fighter 
program,” Washington Post, February 2, 2010, accessed March 2, 2016, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/01/AR2010020103712.html. 
 
Williams, Lisa. “Canada, the Arctic, and Post-National Identity in the Circumpolar 
World,” The Northern Review, No. 33 (Spring 2011), p. 113-31. 
 
Wilson, Gary N. “Nested Federalism in Arctic Quebec: A Comparative Perspective,” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 1 (March 2008), p. 71-92. 
 
Windeyer, Chris. “Layton backs Iqaluit port pitch,” Nunatsiaq News, September 7, 2007, 
accessed May 22, 2016, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/archives/2007/709/70907/news/iqaluit/70907_491.html. 
 
Winter, Elke. Us, Them, and Others: Pluralism and National Identities in Diverse 
Societies (University of Toronto: Toronto, 2011). 
 
Wolfrum, Rüdiger. “The Arctic in the Context of International Law,” in, New Chances 
and New Responsibilities in the Arctic Region, Georg Witschel, Ingo Winkelmann, 
Kathrin Tiroch, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Eds. (Berlin: BWV, 2010), p. 37-48. 
 
Woods, Allan and Richard J. Brennan. “Harper, Ignatieff duel over Western Arctic,” 
Toronto Star, April 17, 2011, accessed March 7, 2016, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2011/04/17/harper_ignatieff_duel_over_western_ar
ctic.html. 
 
 195 
 
Woolf, Nicky. “Canada uses Franklin expedition wreck to boost North-West passage 
claim,” The Guardian, September 13, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/13/canada-uses-franklin-expedition-wreck-
north-west-passage-claim. 
 
Young, Oran R. Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 
Young, Oran R. “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or cooperation in the circumpolar north,” 
The Polar Record, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 2009), p. 73-82. 
 
Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko, Eds. Polar Politics: Creating International 
Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
 
Zellen, Barry Scott. On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic 
Sovereignty, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). 
 
Åtlund, Kristian. “The European Arctic after the Cold War: How can we analyze it in 
terms of security?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 2, 2007. 
 
Åtlund, Kristian. “Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization 
of Interstate Relations in the Arctic,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 43, No. 3 (June 
2008), p. 289-311. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196 
 
VITA 
MICHAEL MCCORMACK 
Born, Miami, Florida 
 
2008     B.A., International Affairs  
     Florida State University 
     Tallahassee, Florida 
 
2010     M.A., International Security 
     Josef Korbel School at the University of Denver 
     Denver, Colorado 
 
2011-2015    Graduate Teaching Assistant 
     Florida International University 
     Miami, Florida 
 
 
